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This dissertation examines the connection between costs of interstate war and postwar 
domestic politics of countries that waged them.  Previous research focused primarily on 
explaining the chances of survival of war leaders by factors like outcome of war, 
culpability and regime type. This project contends that the variation in level of domestic 
hostility facing postwar governments also needs explanation, independent of the tenure of 
individual leaders.  This can be operationalized by counting political events that make it 
harder for an incumbent to govern effectively. This is the logical basis for replacing a 
dichotomous dependent variable (i.e. survival versus removal of a leader) with a combined 
count of antigovernment activities over a finite postwar period of five years. The study 
hypothesizes that the higher the cost incurred by a country in a war, the greater the 
likelihood that it will witness manifestations of antigovernment hostility.  The hypotheses 
were tested using cross-national data from a sample of warring countries from the period, 
1919-1999.  Countries that suffered civilian fatalities during war, tended to be at greater 
 
 
risk of overt anti-government hostility in the postwar period.  As a measure of costliness, 
battle deaths did not work as a predictor of postwar threats faced by governments of 
warring states.  The quantitative analysis was supplemented by case analysis of two 
countries – Paraguay after the Chaco War (1932-35) and Egypt after the Six Day War 
(1967).  The Paraguayan case demonstrated how counter-elites can successfully exploit 
popular discontent caused by the costs of the war to discredit and depose a victorious 
wartime leader and his coalition.  On the other hand, Egypt in the aftermath of the 1967 
war illustrates that leader turnover is only one among many possible political consequences 
of war.  A factional struggle within the pre-war winning coalition and popular expressions 
of antigovernment sentiment are possible without resulting in the removal of a wartime 
leader.  Secondly, it shows why outcome has consistently been a powerful predictor of a 
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1.1   Research Question 
On March 1, 1881, the Tsar of Russia Alexander II was killed by a bomb hurled at 
him by a member of a revolutionary terrorist group called People’s Will.  He had recently 
presided over a hard-fought victory in the Second Russo-Turkish war in 1877-78 in which 
the Russian side suffered 120,000 war-related fatalities and incurred a heavy financial 
burden.1 Despite the victory, the Tsar was criticized by the Panslavists and Russian 
nationalists who were supporters of the war but dissatisfied with his decision to stop at the 
gates of Constantinople, the capital of the Ottoman Empire.  The number of anti-regime 
activities directed at the Tsar from various quarters worsened after this war.  Alexander II 
was targeted four times by various assassins between January 1878 and March 1881when 
he was finally murdered (Moss, 2002; Radzinskii, 2005).   
The post-war fate of Alexander II motivates an interesting puzzle:  Why was the 
Tsar facing recurring challenges to his rule despite winning a major war?   The literature on 
war and survival of leaders has made the case that there is an association between war 
outcome (i.e. victory, defeat or draw) and removal of leaders and post-exit punishment.  
Despite its various contributions to our understanding of the incentives motivating wartime 
leaders, this literature has found it hard to explain several cases where the link between war 
                                                          
1 Smith (1972) estimates the costs of supporting the 200,000 troops on the front was an average of 174,000 
gold rubles a day.  
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outcome and a leader’s postwar fate is either counterintuitive or unclear.  The dominance of 
war outcome as a key predictor of the postwar fate of leaders has led to a neglect of the 
political effects of the variation in war costs.  The possibility that higher costs can alter the 
dynamic of domestic political competition by creating opportunities for new claimants for 
power tends to be discounted.  This study makes the case that popular discontent associated 
with costlier wars creates opportunities for rival claimants for power to replace the 
incumbent.  Secondly, previous studies treat removal as the primary indicator of political 
punishment for a wartime leader without recognizing that leaders differ in terms of their 
effectiveness in office.  Unsuccessful attempts to replace or challenge the leader are as 
significant as those that are successful.  This requires that we pay close attention to 
indicators of postwar domestic unrest.  As any increase in instability and threats to the 
government forces a leader to allocate greater resources to stay in power, an unstable 
postwar environment should be treated differently than a stable one.  If a war is followed 
by instability, then that should be part of our calculus in gauging its domestic consequences 
for the belligerent. 
1.2 A Theory on the Impact of War Cost on Postwar Domestic Politics  
The effect of war outcomes on the likelihood of “punishment” and “political 
survival” of wartime leaders has been studied quite extensively.  Despite its wide usage and 
logical validity, the choice of outcome as the primary explanation for the fate of leaders has 
been questioned in recent times.  Chiozza and Goemans, who are one of the most prolific 
contributors to this literature, have pointed out that for wartime leaders, “outcome factors 
as only one parameter in a large array of political forces that combine to drive the 
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probability and manner of losing office (Chiozza & Goemans, 2011, p. 61) (Italics mine).”  
Although they fail to clarify what these political forces might be, they have raised a very 
crucial issue.  In an earlier study, they did not find support for the effect of outcome on the 
hazard of losing office for democratic leaders (Chiozza & Goemans, 2004).  This finding is 
surprising given that democratic leaders tend to be easier to dislodge than autocratic 
leaders.  Besides outcome, what other parameters of war can help us understand the fate of 
wartime leaders in particular and postwar domestic politics in general?     
The focus on the causes of war and the dominance of the democratic peace research 
program within security studies has resulted in an inattention to theoretical and empirical 
work on the political consequences of war (Rasler & Thompson, 2002).  This study hopes 
to fill this gap by focusing on the political effects of war participation. This dissertation 
makes the case that besides the outcome of a war, we must also explore the effect of its 
human and material costs to explain its impact on domestic politics.  Costs may supplement 
or even override the logical impact of outcome on postwar domestic politics.  A costly 
victory may turn out to be equally bad for an incumbent as a defeat where the costs were 
not very heavy.  The costs imposed by war can be sufficient to trigger a domestic backlash 
against a leader even if he achieves victory.  Wartime leaders and governments will find it 
difficult to distribute the rewards of a costly victory proportionately amongst those who 
paid the price.  While the benefits are ephemeral, the costs of war are tangible for the mass 
public.  This motivates the argument that the costs of war are a crucial predictor 
influencing the behavior of domestic political actors.  The domestic political fallout of a 
war may vary with the suffering and disruption that it caused in the lives of ordinary 
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people.  Political mobilization against the incumbent may not be easy for opponents even 
after a defeat especially if his winning coalition is intact.    
In sum, the study makes the case that the political effects of war are not limited to 
the removal of leaders but to all the activities that are directed against the government by 
individual citizens and groups.  Therefore, the response variable is much more complex 
than what has been assumed by previous studies.   Changing the dependent variable should 
give us a richer explanation of the dynamics of postwar politics than can be gained by 
comparing the fate of leaders.  The core argument that I advance is that a higher burden of 
war costs worsens the domestic political problems for any incumbent in the postwar period.  
It may not even matter whether the leader was in power during wartime.  Simply put, the 
overall domestic environment following costlier wars should be more unstable.  In order to 
test this argument, war costs are used as the main predictor.  The dependent variable of 
survival or leader tenure has been redefined to include a range of anti-government activities 
undertaken by domestic actors after the termination of war.  This should give us an idea of 
the “second-order” political consequences – other than removal – that governments faced 
after their country has waged a war.   
This dissertation is designed as follows: First, I discuss the gaps in the existing 
literature on war and political survival that has motivated this study.  Second, I will present 
a theory which argues that higher costs change the incentive structure of different players 
in a political system thereby worsening the threats facing the government from domestic 
actors.  I also outline some contingent factors that can influence the main effect of war 
costs on postwar threats.  Third, I will discuss the elements of my research design. This will 
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include the key variables of the model devised to test my theory and the sources of the data 
used to operationalize them.  Next, I will report the results of the statistical tests of my 
hypotheses.  Finally, I will analyze two cases to provide an illustration of how different 

















2 Theory and Hypotheses 
 
2.1 Review of Literature 
In the first chapter, I mentioned that the focus of the previous literature on wartime 
and postwar domestic politics has primarily been on war outcome.  This chapter will 
review some of this work and explain how this study would build upon previous research.  
Scholars have previously established connections between factors such as leader 
culpability, type of role in war (i.e. target versus initiator), regime type and level of 
repression, war outcome with the likelihood of leader survival (Bueno de Mesquita & 
Siverson, 1995; Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, & Woller, 1992; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, 
Morrow, & Siverson, 2003; Chiozza & Goemans, 2011; Colaresi, 2004; Croco, 2011).  
These leader-based studies of war share the following assumptions:  Involvement in an 
interstate war is one of the most consequential decisions that can be taken by a leader and 
sanctioned by his winning coalition.  Like any other policy, a leader evaluates war in terms 
of his private costs and benefits rather than that of the national interest.  While making 
decisions relating to war, leaders are not guided by some rational analysis of their country’s 
strategic imperatives but by a concern for their political future.   
Based on these assumptions, one of the critical questions that they have raised is 
why are some leaders willing to “pay any price” to achieve their war aims while others quit 
or settle in the face of small losses (Wolford, 2007).   The response of the major studies of 
leader behavior during wartime can be summarized thus: The costs that a leader is willing 
to pay for a war depends on their political incentives that are a function of the likelihood of 
punishment that they expect to face if they were to concede defeat (Chiozza & Goemans, 
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2011; Croco, 2011; Henk E. Goemans, Gleditsch, & Chiozza, 2009).  Assuming that 
leaders know that incurring higher war costs make them unpopular, why do some leaders 
refuse to terminate wars in response to heavy losses?  Croco answers this question by 
making a distinction between culpable leaders that are clearly associated with the decision 
of getting into a war or waging it and non-culpable leaders.  Culpable leaders tend to stay 
in a war even if it gets costly and unpopular because they expect to be punished by their 
domestic populations if they preside over a defeat.  They believe that they are better off 
trying to win even at great cost rather than quit.  Such leaders are willing to incur higher 
war costs than others and reluctant to settle even when faced with rising costs.  This is why 
leaders who face higher settlement costs resist the political pressures to quit when faced 
with heavy losses during war.  Croco has found that culpable leaders are also associated 
with extreme war outcomes - total victory or catastrophic defeat.  She argues that the 
difference between culpable versus non-culpable leaders can be explained by the former’s 
expectation that he is more likely to be punished for defeat (Croco, 2011).  Croco follows 
most leader-based studies in which punishment is equated with removal from office.  Some 
like Chiozza and Goemans highlighted another kind of political punishment: the way 
leaders expect to be treated after removal.  Their case is that a leaders’ expectation of his 
postwar fate can be quite crucial in explaining his war-related policies.  An expectation of 
imprisonment or death after being deposed will motivate leaders differently than the 
likelihood of a peaceful retirement.  When a leader expects to face deadly consequences for 
bad war performance, he is less likely to make a settlement to terminate the war on 
unfavorable terms (Chiozza & Goemans, 2011). 
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Comparing survival rates of wartime leaders and isolating differences in 
punishment meted out to leaders after being deposed has provided valuable insights on the 
connection between war and domestic political change.  Yet, much more could be known 
about the qualitative differences between wartime leaders by focusing on the intensity of 
opposition that they faced during their tenure.  Does a war victory strengthen a wartime 
leader and government at home?  How is this political dividend to be measured?  What 
sanctions can a leader face from domestic opponents if he has survived a war defeat? The 
quick look at the Archigos data of Chiozza and Goemans shows that quite a few defeated 
wartime leaders held on to power for a substantial period after the war ended.  If these 
leaders were not replaced, did they face some other form of punishment?  It could be that a 
leader that survives a defeat becomes weaker in its aftermath even though he manages to 
hold on to office.  What events would characterize a weakened wartime leader?  It is 
certain that among those who survived, some wartime leaders tend to face a tough domestic 
environment while others tend to enjoy a benign one.  What factors would explain this 
variation? These are some of the questions that this study hopes to answer.  
 Selectorate Theory and Leader Tenure  
The selectorate theory is considered a benchmark on the incentives motivating 
different actors in a political system. The framework of the domestic distribution of power 
provided by this theory has contributed immensely to the general theoretical development 
of the leader-based research program.  Unfortunately, this theory’s wide-ranging influence 
has led to the uncritical acceptance of the length of leader tenure as the only significant 
outcome of interest in the literature on wartime leaders.  While it is true that the central 
goal of an incumbent is “to prevent being replaced by a challenger”, it is also true that 
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leaders also care whether their agenda is being implemented or thwarted by domestic 
actors.  A leader that is under constant threat from domestic opponents must be classified 
differently than one that is not.  Unfortunately, most leader-based studies do not make this 
distinction very clear and treat all “survivors” as the same. 
 The selectorate theory classifies the universe of political actors in any country into 
two groups: (1) The leader of the government and his supporters that constitute the 
members of the “winning coalition”; (2) The “selectorate” that includes all other residents 
of the country including the opposition that are participants in the formal or informal 
processes of political competition or have the potential to assume that role in the future 
(Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson, 1995; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).  Among the 
selectorate theorists, Siverson (1980) was the first to establish the connection between the 
outcome of wars and regime change.  He found that in the period 1815-1965, 45 out of 184 
belligerent states saw a non-constitutional change of government within three years of a 
war’s termination.  Moreover, the chance of non-constitutional change was twice as likely 
for a government that was one the losing side.   
Siverson’s findings on regime change laid the basis for later studies on war and 
political survival of leaders in which the default theoretical position was that a defeat in 
war makes it harder for a leader to stay in power.  Later studies from the selectorate 
theorists also made some rudimentary attempts to assess the effects of costliness of a war 
on the fate of leaders.  For example, Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson and Woller found 
substantial association between battle deaths and the probability of violent regime change, 
irrespective of a war’s outcome(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1992).  In a later study, Bueno 
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de Mesquita and Siverson concluded that war costs alter the domestic political 
environment, they limited these implications to whether higher costs are associated with 
removal of leaders or not (Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson, 1995). 
 Are all surviving leaders alike?   
Chiozza and Goemans’ discussion of “ex-post efficiency” of war for a leader and 
his fellow citizens points to a contradiction between the interests of the ruler and the ruled 
when it comes to measuring the costs of war: When a leader decides to go to war, “…even 
though their country-as-a-whole will surely suffer…, under certain circumstances war may 
pay for leaders (Chiozza & Goemans, 2011, p. 8).”  In their various contributions on this 
subject, Goemans and his collaborators have argued that the expected manner and 
consequences of losing office (i.e. the private costs of a leader) for defeat in war motivates 
leader behavior.  In other words, a leader who expects to be removed in a regular, 
constitutional manner faces different incentives during wartime compared to one who 
foresees removal through irregular, violent methods.  Following an impeding defeat, some 
leaders not only expect to be removed from office but to also suffer additional post-exit 
punishment in the form of death, imprisonment or exile.  This creates a divergence in the 
interests of leaders and the mass public when it comes to war termination.  If a leader fears 
severe post-exit punishment, he will be less willing to accept defeat and sue for peace even 
when he suffers heavy losses.   
When leader-based studies quantify the benefits that a leader can get from waging 
war, they only check whether he survived after the war ended.  If he was removed then the 
war did not pay off but if he survived, it did.  It is true that survival in office and personal 
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safety are driving motivations of leader behavior.  At the same time, leaders tend to also try 
their best to minimize intensity of opposition that they face while in office.  Several 
“punishments” can be imposed on a leader by various actors even if they are unable to 
remove him from office or inflict post-exit retribution.  A leader can survive after a war and 
still be made to pay a political price.  In order to judge whether wartime leaders paid any 
price for their wartime performance, we have to closely examine what happened in their 
countries after the war ended.  Previous studies on war and leader tenure have not 
considered the variance in the political effectiveness of surviving leaders.  Some leaders are 
strengthened while others are weakened in the postwar period.  Specifically, a leader that 
faces credible and recurring attempts by various domestic challengers to replace him can be 
classified as ineffective even though he survives a war.  If war participation has an impact 
on a leaders’ effectiveness, this must be investigated.   
 Turnover of wartime leaders: Does costliness matter?   
The link between war outcome and leadership turnover is not always 
straightforward.  When a leader is replaced by someone from the same political party or 
faction, leadership turnover may not have much significance.  On the other hand, when a 
leader is replaced by someone supported by a different faction, it completely changes the 
domestic political equilibrium of the country.2  If a war has created opportunities for a new 
coalition to stake their claims on power, it represents a significant change in the nature of 
                                                          
2 In his piece on the nature of regime change in the Arab world, Byman (2005) identifies three ideal types: (1) 
transition from one leader to another from the same cadre or power base, (2) shift from one group of elites to 
another and (3) shift from elite based rule to a regime that is more closely aligned with the preferences of the 
general population  
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the political competition (Byman, 2005).  Hence, any leader that survives in office after a 
war must be differentiated according to the following criterion: Did involvement in 
international war strengthen or degrade the incumbent’s hold on power?  Studying the 
whole gamut of anti-government events in the immediate postwar period can help in 
answering this question.   
Differentiating wartime leaders according to regime type has been used to explain 
postwar leadership turnover as well.  In this framework, war outcomes serve as the signal 
for the people (principal) to decide whether to reward or punish the leadership (the agent).  
Goemans argues that leaders of semirepressive, moderately exclusionary, mixed or 
anocratic regimes are most likely to be severely punished for either a moderate or 
disastrous defeat while extremely repressive regimes can survive a moderate loss.  
Democratic leaders are unlikely to survive even a moderate defeat but would only suffer 
the cost of losing their office.  Goemans argues in repressive regimes, an incumbent is 
more likely to survive a bad war outcome.  Since dictatorial regimes are more willing than 
democracies and mixed regimes to use repression against their opponents, they can evade 
this punishment (H. E. Goemans, 2000).   However, he did not test whether costliness of 
wars – irrespective of regime type or outcome – have an independent effect on the 
likelihood of punishment.     
Scholars are beginning to recognize the complexity of postwar domestic politics 
and the role that war cost may play in explaining what happens after wars are terminated.  
For example, Colaresi examines the interaction between war costs, regime type and the 
length of rivalry prior to the outbreak of war on the postwar turnover of leaders(Colaresi, 
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2004).  Although he finds some evidence for the proposition that defeat in a costly war 
leads to leadership turnover irrespective of regime type, he is unable to reach any firm 
conclusions on this question.  He admits that in explaining leadership turnover,  “…the 
interaction between war costs and regime type may be more complicated than previously 
expressed(Colaresi, 2004, p. 722).”  Colaresi’s contribution is in highlighting that the 
costliness of a war and the reaction of groups that bear the brunt of its effects can have 
important postwar political consequences.  Colaresi’s reservations regarding the nature of 
this relationship is warranted and it further corroborates the insight of others (Chiozza & 
Goemans, 2011; Debs & Goemans, 2010) that the relationship between war outcome and 
the political fate of leaders is much more complex than previously suggested (Bueno de 
Mesquita & Siverson, 1995; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1992; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 
2003).  This is the reason that aside from war’s outcome, the impact of costs on domestic 
politics needs to be investigated in greater detail.   
 War and domestic dissension 
Specifically, we need to theorize as to how war costs influence the behavior of 
different players within a political system.  A starting point could be to examine the 
responses of “mass public” to the costs of war.  In his work on war outcomes and military 
strategy, Stam has argued that the expression of domestic dissent tend to be a byproduct of 
most wars, across all regimes.  War-related dissent is exacerbated with rising costs.  
Although this is not his main focus, his logic that connects war and domestic dissent is very 
useful for developing a cost-based theory of war’s political effects.  He argues that in all 
regimes, it is up to a state’s “mass publics” to decide whether the costs of a war justify its 
expected benefits.  During the war, if this mass public becomes unhappy and shows signs 
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of withdrawing its support, the government and the leader has two options: either employ 
coercion to eliminate dissidents or offer inducements to shore up supporters (Stam 1996).   
Although Stam’s logic is useful, some questions remain:  Once the costs of war have been 
incurred and are deemed unacceptable by the “mass public”, how do they communicate 
their unhappiness within the political system?  Why does the opposition decide to exploit 
visible signs of dissension in some cases but not in others?  Do expensive wars have 
lingering political effects on the leader after the war is over? Some of these questions have 
been addressed in literature on US war participation and domestic politics where the 
availability of public opinion data makes micro-analysis feasible.  The main bone of 
contention in these studies is whether war costs in the form of casualties and military 
expenditures erodes public support for the use of force (Baum, 2002; Baum & Groeling, 
2010; Berinsky, 2007, 2009; Cotton, 1986; Gartner, 2008a, 2008b; Gartner & Segura, 
1998, 2000; Gartner, Segura, & Barratt, 2004; Gartner, Segura, & Wilkening, 1997; 
Mueller, 1973). It is not surprising that following the Vietnam War that was marked by 
strong anti-war protests and political instability; scholars tried to establish that US war 
involvement tends to be accompanied with social and political dissension (Stohl, 1976) and 
loss of seats in wartime and postwar elections for the party in power (Cotton, 1986).   
During the late 1960s and 1970s, some interesting data analysis explored the link between 
war-related deaths and war termination.  Klingberg studied some of the longest-lasting 
interstate and civil wars during the 1618-1918 period and found that the side that 
surrendered had lost approximately between 4 and 6  percent of their total population 
(Klingberg, 1966).      
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The broader interest in the drawing connections between the lethality and outcome 
of interstate wars and internal conflict has waned since its heydays in the late 1970s.  
During that phase, analysts of domestic violence like Skocpol had argued that the 
destabilizing effects of interstate war on the domestic balance of power in a society can 
trigger revolutionary changes (Skocpol, 1979).3  In later years, others like Harvey Starr 
continued to argue that a connection between the negative consequences of war – popular 
discontent, erosion of legitimacy of the ruler, strengthened opposition etc. – and 
revolutionary upheaval does exist, (Starr 1994) there was surprising little interest in 
empirically analyzing this relationship.  Besides the lack of empirical evidence for these 
claims, it is also questionable whether scholars of postwar domestic politics should only be 
focusing on revolutions at the expense of other indicators of instability in the aftermath of 
war.  A revolution is a unique process of leader removal in which the leader and his 
supporters can expect to be violently targeted after their exit from power.  Viewing war as a 
pretext for revolution also end up equating political punishment for a war leader with the 
termination of tenure and post-exit violence.  Scholars recognize that war can generate a 
range of serious political problems for any leader while he is still in office, ranging in scale 
from “turmoil” to civil war that do not result in the removal of the leader.  In their study, 
Wilkenfeld and Zinnes (1973) showed that interstate wars tends to worsen preexisting 
domestic conflicts of the “less intense variety” – demonstrations, strikes – but do not have 
                                                          
3 Starr sums up the central logic that motivates this literature: “War-to-revolution may be based upon war as 
an agent of change, as a factor in the growth of domestic discontent, as a factor in the weakening of 
governmental legitimacy and/or strength, or as a factor in the changing resource base of opposition groups. 




as much impact on more violent forms of domestic dissension – revolutions, guerilla 
warfare, mass killings, purges and government crises.   While Wilkenfeld and Zinnes 
provide a good first-cut empirical analysis of observable manifestations of various post-war 
incidents of instability, it is difficult to trust their conclusions given the limitations of their 
data.  This study further investigates the fundamental intuition that had guided their 
arguments that interstate wars and domestic instability are linked.  It hopes to advance this 
case by further clarifying how these connections are manifested in the form of specific 
events.   
To summarize, two questions have been raised in this review. (1) Other than 
removal of wartime leaders, what are the other negative political consequences that can be 
generated by war participation? (2)  Besides outcome, can costs explain the nature of 
postwar political events, specifically those that convey the scale and intensity of the 
opposition facing the government in power?  In the section that follows, I will present my 
response to these questions and through a theory of war costs and their domestic political 
consequences. 
2.2 A Cost-Based Theory of War and its Political Consequences 
The focus of this section of the dissertation would be to articulate a theory that 
undergirds the hypotheses that follow.  The core assertion made in this study is that costlier 
wars make it more likely that the government would face a whole range of negative 
“second-order” political consequences.  This includes all those events that merit being 
classified as a major unrest or challenge to the government’s authority.  These may not 
result in the removal of the leader or the fall of the government but pose a serious threat to 
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it.   Even if a wartime leader achieves the best possible result (i.e. a military victory and 
postwar survival), a greater incidence of anti-government activities worsens his domestic 
political environment which makes it harder to govern.4  These domestic challenges can be 
manifested in several forms: threats to a government’s territorial control by an insurgency, 
attempts at violent regime change by a coup and assassination against the leader, the 
erosion of political support for a government (See Figure 2.1).  These challenges arise 
because a costlier war creates the political conditions under which opponents are able to 
threaten the incumbent.  Even if the attempts by opponents to remove the leader are 
unsuccessful, he is forced to commit more resources to shore up his support and/or employ 




                                                          
4 The traditional “expected utility” arguments also recognize that the costs of war can have serious domestic 
political consequences. For example, Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson have argued that they key decision 
that a leader has to make prior to the start of a war is whether they want to incur these costs or not.  Their 
formal model illustrates that, other things being equal, these costs of war make it harder for a leader to stay in 
power. Since the incumbent has ultimate responsibility failure of diplomacy that result in war, he is culpable 
for the lives lost and property that is destroyed.  Hence, he is aware that he may pay a price for incurring these 
costs.  Hence, the decision to participate in a war may be endogenous to the “domestic political 
circumstances” facing them.  A leader will avoid getting into wars in which the expected costs are too high 
because these can threaten his survival.  Hence, higher the prospective costs of war the more likely that a 
leader will look for a diplomatic resolution of international disputes to avoid getting involved in a war (Bueno 
de Mesquita & Siverson, 1995).  However, as Croco, Sullivan and others have argued, leaders often 
underestimate the expected costs of war (Sullivan 2007).  Some leaders tend to have a greater propensity to 
use force to settle international disputes than others (Wolford 2007).  Once a war begins, a leader may feel 
compelled to persist even at great cost because he fears that quitting may invite severe punishment from the 





Figure 2.1  Pathway for Postwar Anti-Government Activities 
 
 
The political benefits that war can bring – acquisition of more natural resources, 
capture of territory etc. – must be evaluated by analyzing the scale of domestic anti-
government activities in the aftermath of the war.  In order to test this proposition, all 
events that can potentially destabilize a government in the postwar period were used as the 
dependent variable of this study.  The logic for doing so is that the understanding the 
factors that influence the postwar political environment can be far more illuminating than 
whether the wartime government survived or not.   
There tends to be a “rally-around the flag effect” associated with all interstate wars.  
The initial rally effect tends to evaporate as costs grow during the course of a war.  The 
disquiet with the rising costs of war may not translate into a politically viable opposition to 
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the wartime regime.  This transformation requires political mobilization which takes time. 
Hence, it follows that the anti-government challenges and attempts at removing the leader 
are more likely to appear after the conclusion of the war.   Although victory could help a 
leader and his wartime coalition to consolidate their hold on power, it matters what price 
was paid to achieve that outcome.  The lower the price of war, the less likely is the leader 
and government to face an unstable domestic environment.  This study seeks to test the cost 
of war as the main predictor for the level of domestic political unrest that may follow in its 
aftermath. 
First, I will theorize about how the costs of war can potentially influence the 
mechanism that generates anti-government events, by changing the preferences of different 
political actors.  Next, I will discuss the two kinds of costs – battle deaths and number of 
targeted civilians – that may be incurred by a country that wages war.  Third, I will outline 
the theory to support my hypotheses on the impact of these two variables on postwar anti-
government unrest.  A set of additional hypotheses would explore why the relationship of 
these war costs with postwar domestic instability could be contingent upon other variables.  
In the next chapter, I will present the results of a quantitative analysis of these hypotheses. 
2.3 Political actors and their preferences 
Borrowing the conception of a selectorate and winning coalition proposed by Bueno 
de Mesquita and his collaborators, an ideal-type of a political system5 can be segregated 
                                                          
5 The selectorate theory distinguishes the universe of political actors in any country into two broad groups: (1) 
The leader of the government and his supporters that are the members of the broader “winning coalition”; (2) 
The “selectorate” that includes all other residents of the country that are participants in the formal or informal 
processes of political competition or have the potential to assume that role in the future.  These also include 
the challengers or rivals that are interested in replacing the incumbent.  A key assertion of this theory is that 
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into five sub-groups: (1) leader and key officials of the government, (2) the winning 
coalition that support the leader and directly or indirectly benefit from the status quo, (3) 
the counter-elites who are credible contenders to replace the incumbent, (4) members of 
smaller, disparate opposition groups that cannot topple the leader on their own but can 
make governance difficult,  (5) mass public that are not directly involved in competition for 
political power except as voters in democracies or disenfranchised residents in 
nondemocratic regimes who give their tacit consent to the ruler.  All these actors in a polity 
have dominant interests and preferences.  A leader is primarily interested in extending his 
personal tenure in office for as long as possible given the constitutional or other constraints 
prevalent in the political system.   
Besides survival, leaders are equally concerned with achieving their policy goals 
while in office.6  Specifically, he must implement policies desired by his core supporters 
whose backing is pivotal for his survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).7  A leader has to 
                                                          
when the size of the winning is large, the provision of public goods is more efficient for a leader interested in 
staying in office.  A leader backed by a larger coalition cannot use his taxing and spending power to distribute 
private goods among individual supporters in return for their allegiance.  On the other hand, leaders with 
smaller winning coalitions can disburse private goods to a privileged group of supporters in exchange for 
their loyalty (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).     
6 The selectorate theory posits that a leader is primarily interested in extending his tenure for which he must 
choose policies that are favored by the “median stake-holder” of the winning coalition.  However, this is a 
very conservative view of the incentives motivating leaders.  A leader has to not only satisfy the median stake 
holder but also recruit new members into his winning coalition.    
7 Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson posit that even in an authoritarian system where voting is not a relevant 
political activity, a leader still has to be responsive to the preferences of the median powerholder.  A leader 
has to adopt policies that has the support of “… the individual or group that can count on the ability to 
mobilize more than half of the sum of all stakeholders’ utilized power on behalf of its agenda against any 
possible challenge (Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson, 1995, p. 843)(Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995: 
843).”  Their insight reminds us that even in authoritarian regimes, repression alone is not sufficient to stay in 
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overcome the veto players within the formal opposition as well as the winning coalition 
who can block his decisions or undermine his authority.  Besides retaining his existing 
backers, a leader has to continuously expand his support base.  In order to stay in power, a 
ruler employs a combination of three tactics: (i) placate new constituents by including them 
in the winning coalition, (ii) neutralize those opponents that can threaten his survival and 
(iii) ignore those that cannot pose a real threat.  There is a segment of the opposition that is 
overt, mobilized, violent and aggressive which cannot be reconciled.  A leader in a 
nondemocratic polity is more likely to apply suppressive methods like arrests and mass 
killing to eliminate such threats.  Suppression is also employed to deter potential 
opponents.  In democracies, violent repression is not as acceptable and governments have 
to find other means of counteracting the opposition.8   It has been persuasively argued that 
leaders with larger winning coalitions find it more efficient to provide public goods rather 
than buying off a narrow constituency(Bueno de Mesquita, 2003).  In varying degrees, a 
combination of the twin tactics of placation and neutralization are employed by all regimes 
to survive threats and implement their policies.  The more intense the domestic threat faced 
by an incumbent, the more placation and neutralization has to be done by him to stay in 
power.  Leaders can be differentiated by the intensity of challenge they face from domestic 
opponents.   
                                                          
power. A leader also has to buy off constituencies that will support it proactively because they benefit from 
his largesse. 
8  Yet, even democratically elected leaders sometime resort to misusing their law enforcement agencies and 
the legal system to target and discredit political opponents.   
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The opposition consists of several cliques and parties who have a common 
minimum program: replace the current leader with someone more receptive to their 
preferences.  The also try to detract the incumbent from pursuing his agenda while they 
wait to come to power.  Within the broader opposition, the counter-elites are best placed to 
replace the leader since they have access to resources and organizational capacity necessary 
to form a new winning coalition.  These counter-elites regularly update their beliefs on 
their chances of capturing power.  As they have the most to gain, they are most likely to 
exploit any political vulnerability that the incumbent might develop due to policy failures.   
These counter-elites and their supporters are different from another segment of the 
opposition: the groups and constituencies that have specific demands and grievances (e.g. 
secessionist movements, ethnic or religious groups).   The mass public is organized along 
ethnic, regional, occupational or religious identities some of which are mobilized as 
political groups.  Across, these groups, the mass public in any polity share an expectation 
that the government would protect them from foreign and domestic threats, manage the 
economy and provide public goods.  At the same time, most members of the mass public 
tend not to possess detailed knowledge on policy questions even in advanced democracies.9  
The political impact of any negative feedback from the mass public to major exogenous 
events (e.g. natural calamity, economic crisis, war etc.) is heavily dependent by how 
counter elites channel this sentiment.  A variety of mechanisms are available to counter 
elites to achieve this this goal depending on the nature of the polity. 
                                                          
9 Sometimes, constituencies and interest groups campaign for specific issues and set the policy agenda, 
although the scope of such activities may be restricted in authoritarian systems.   
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2.4 Different costs of war 
In order to achieve political objective through war, a country has to endure 
casualties on the battlefield and in some cases, targeting of its civilian population.  This 
study posits that both these parameters can have independent effects on the postwar 
domestic political environment that a government has to manage.  (1) Battle deaths: 
Casualties that are suffered by combatants in the battlefield is the most direct, visible and 
unavoidable cost of any war.  The Geneva Convention defines combatants in an interstate 
war as “all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command 
responsible to that Party to the conduct of its subordinates.”  The loss of combatants has 
permanent effects – psychological and economic – for members of their families.  
Battlefield casualties begin to accumulate as soon as hostilities begin and escalate in 
proportion to the duration and severity of the war.  Since the dawn of the age of 
nationalism, nation-states have made military service by the male members of society an 
integral duty of citizenship.  The proportion of citizens that can be sacrificed for waging 
war is not limitless and excessive losses in the battlefield can severely damage the public 
morale.  The record of the twentieth century has shown that there has been a secular decline 
in the number of battle deaths in interstate wars. This indicates that states are finding it 
harder to commit to wars in which they incur high casualties.  Given the political 
sensitivity of the number of battle deaths, it can serve as an important metric in analyzing 
the costs of war participation for a country. (2) Civilian targeting during war:  A war 
sometimes involves the deliberate targeting of civilians by the enemy forces.  Civilian 
casualties during war can occur due to starvation blockade, aerial bombing of population 
centers, threats resulting in forced displacement and collateral damage when military 
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targets are attacked (Downes 2007).  Belligerents have also engaged in intentional mass 
killing of noncombatants (Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004).  Failure to prevent 
loss of civilian life during war can threaten the incumbent’s legitimacy and popularity.  
Evidence of civilian targeting also tells us where the war was fought: at home near 
population centers or at front or in distant lands.  When hostilities occur near population 
centers, the stakes automatically are higher because the likelihood of damage to existing 
infrastructure becomes higher.10     
 Postwar Consequences of War Costs 
In order to formulate testable propositions that link specific costs of war – battle 
deaths and targeting of civilians – with particular forms of postwar domestic political 
challenges, I theorize about the link between higher war costs the changes in the 
preferences of political actors.  Domestic challenges against the government require that 
the opponents to the current regime are incentivized to undertake actions that threaten the 
status quo.  The costs of war participation appear as an endogenous political crisis that 
creates opportunities for the opponents of a regime to unseat it from power.11  This is 
                                                          
10 There is a third parameter of war cost: its economic impact.  The financial burden of war involvement can 
be immense even for wealthy nations.  However, there are problems with using this measure.  The 
overwhelming tendency of most states tends to be to postpone paying the economic costs of the war through 
short-term and long-term loans.  Also, in such situations, allies often come to the rescue and bail out nations 
struggling to pay the costs of war.  Therefore, states are able to avoid inflicting the financial burden of war on 
their citizens.  Other issue with examining this parameter is that very often economic problems facing a 
country are unrelated to war involvement but a legacy of domestic policy decisions taken years ago.  
Moreover, international events like regional or global financial crises can have a far greater immediate 
political impact than a spike in defense expenditure associated with the war.      
11 This study extends the Gartner’s logic regarding the effects of casualties on wartime public opinion to 
explain the changing incentives of the different actors in a polity: “When the individual’s utility for estimated 
costs exceeds their estimated value of the benefits, they oppose the conflict (Gartner 2008).” 
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especially true if the actual war costs turn out to much greater than the prewar estimates 
outlined by the political leadership.  A leader and government that underestimate the costs 
of war become highly vulnerable to their domestic opponents.   
Wars can coalesce the collective will of a national will around a specific national 
security goal shared by the rulers and the ruled (Schweller, 2009).12  However, once the 
costs have accumulated, cohesion can be replaced by dissension and discontent.  The 
coercive mechanisms applied by the state for mobilization of human and material resources 
for war can generate popular discontent.  This provides the soil in which political 
opponents can exploit popular weariness into domestic political challenges against the 
ruling establishment.  Hence, wartime mobilization can be a double-edged sword.  By its 
very nature, mass mobilization is designed to transmit the costs of war throughout society.  
War mobilization involves the exercise of coercion by the government to extract resources 
from the populace.  State-sanctioned compulsion is necessary for mobilization because the 
collective action and free rider problem can be particularly acute during war.  Since the 
benefits of a public good like national defense are nonexcludable, there is great incentive 
for each individual citizen to avoid paying his share of the cost of war (Stein, 1980).  
Governmental coercion can come in various guises: conscription or compulsory military 
service, higher taxes, forced nonmilitary labor (Tilly, 1978).   Unlike government 
                                                          
12 It is worthwhile to note that the fundamental insight of neoclassical realism is that in order to implement a 
vision of a grand strategy, the motivation of a leader and the elite is not sufficient. They must get the consent 
of key domestic constituencies to allocate resources to support their strategic goals (See Lobell, Ripsman and 
Taliaferro eds. 2009).  
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expenditures in peacetime, wartime expenses are visible to the mass public who can 
calculate the utility of these costs (Stein 1980).   
The basic import of this discussion is that the magnitude of the costs that war 
imposes – battle deaths and targeting of civilians – can alter the “perpetual disposition” of 
the competing elites as well as most members of the mass public (Jervis, 1976).  Most 
nation states are built on the consensus among the members of the selectorate that 
supporting a military force by paying taxes is essential for unambiguously valuable public 
good such as national defense (Stein 1980).  It is the tolerance of citizens to suffer specific 
war costs such as deaths and destruction of population centers that can vary.  The capacity 
of the members of warring states to absorb casualties can be very crucial variable in 
determining victory and defeat (Mack, 1975).  From the perspective of wartime leaders and 
their military advisors, battle deaths can be a key variable in judging whether a war is going 
poorly or not.  While there might be a threshold of battle deaths beyond which a leader has 
no choice but to accept defeat (Klingberg, 1966),13 in some cases reports of military 
successes can help overcome public weariness with costs in an on-going war (Gelpi, Feaver 
and Reifler 2009, Stam 1996).14   
                                                          
13 This is a controversial assertion and the empirical tests on this question have produced mixed results.  On 
the one hand, Klinberg found evidence that modern states find it impossible to continue fighting if their 
casualties reach 3 to 4 % of their total population.  On the other hand, Rosen has discovered that quite a large 
proportion of defeated states capitulated to their adversary even though their percentage of casualties as a 
proportion of total population was less than .05 % (Klingberg 1966; Rosen 1972).    
14According to Gelpi et al. a number of other factors can also impact citizens’ support for US military 
operations besides success: “…the stakes, the costs (both human and financial), the trustworthiness of the 
administration, the quality of public consensus on the policy goal in question (p. 2).  It is just that success 
matters more than anything else. As I argue later, this may be true for the US but these factors would operate 
very differently in other countries that get involved in war. The argument of Gelpi and his co-authors that 
American public bases its support for military operations based on a cost-benefit analysis in which success is 
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While the leader and his closest advisors pay attention to battle deaths, they are 
more focused on the war’s outcome because they fear that they will suffer severe political 
and personal consequences if they lose (Chiozza and Goemans 2011).   Maintaining the 
wartime morale in response to rising casualties is an essential ingredient of wartime 
leadership.  The decision to initiate war or to engage with an attacker reflects a consensus 
among a country’s leader and a significant section of the selectorate that paying its costs is 
better than the status quo.  Some sections of the selectorate including members of the 
winning coalition change their initial support once the costs are incurred.  If casualties 
trigger popular unrest and calls to end the war, the leader is faced with a conundrum.   
There is persuasive empirical evidence that a culpable leader is unlikely to survive in office 
if he were to terminate the war on unfavorable terms.  Hence, an increase in casualties or 
other costs during wartime may not be sufficient to compel a leader and his key advisors to 
concede defeat.   Under these circumstances, managing the war effort becomes the highest 
priority for the government and other items on the domestic policy agenda tend to get 
neglected.  This can be highly risky for whoever is in power (Wilkenfeld and Zinnes 1973).  
The more time and resources that a wartime leader has to allocate for a war effort, the 
                                                          
the most important criterion is persuasive in the light of the evidence they provide.  At the same time, one 
should not lose sight of the fact that their theoretical claims are limited to the unique context of US domestic 
politics. There is no reason to assume that the reaction of the mass public to high war costs in other countries 
will mirror those in the US.  Besides the many intricacies of the US political system such as term limits for 
the President and gerrymandering of Congressional districts, the great power status of the US is a crucial 
factor in how the issue of war costs plays out in its domestic politics. The US is an advanced democracy that 
has been a global power for over hundred years.  Its political institutions are highly durable that are capable of 
mediating dissent through institutional and non-institutional mechanisms as well through a public debate 
among various civil society groups.  Another key difference is that except the attacks on Pearl Harbor and the 
World Trade Center and the Civil War, the US has not experienced mass casualty warfare on its homeland.    
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fewer assets are available to solve internal problems.  If unresolved, these can threaten the 
leader’s survival and allow his domestic opponents to carry out anti-government activities.   
  Like other issues of public policy, the members of the winning coalition can hold 
divergent views on the wisdom of waging a war. Those with the closest “affinity” to the 
war policy may support paying any price to achieve the war aims (Bueno de Mesquita, 
2003).  However, there would be some who would withdraw their initial support for the 
war if the country suffers an outright defeat or if the war imposes heavy costs and suffering 
on the people.  These people are more likely than others to defect from the wartime 
winning coalition in the postwar period.  Guided by their interest of self-preservation, they 
would try to put a distance between themselves and an unpopular war.  There is another 
group which may have privately disagreed with the decision to go to war but went along 
with the decision due to partisan or professional considerations.  Defection at an opportune 
time can improve their chances of becoming members of another coalition that can stake its 
claim to power in the postwar period.  In sum, what is crucial to understand is that once a 
country wages war all political actors have to take a stand on whether they support or 
oppose it.  Therefore, a key question that defines political allegiances in the postwar period 
is whether a war’s costs were justified or not.   
This is why political management of war also involves achieving strategic goals at 
the minimum cost possible.  If the public perception is that the war’s cost was not worth the 
gains, counter-elites are likely to be encouraged to stake their claim for power.  A costlier 
war may encourage them to forge an alternative winning coalition to challenge the 
government.  It does not matter if the counter-elites overestimate their assessment of their 
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chances of coming to power.  From an incumbents’ point of view, what is crucial is 
whether they undertake actions to overthrow or destabilize him.  The incumbent 
government may also detect these threats and undertake preemptive actions like purges to 
neutralize them before these emerge.   The counter-elites may forge temporary alliances 
with smaller groups organized on regional or ethnic basis that are not serious contenders 
for power.  These groups have the capacity create turmoil by organizing dramatic events 
(e.g. guerilla strikes, assassinations of key government officials) that can destabilize the 
polity.  Some of these groups may have long-standing grievances that precede the war.  
They may form an alliance of convenience with the counter-elites for the limited goal of 
replacing the current ruler.   
Casualties not only influence those that are directly affected (i.e. the armed forces 
and their families) but also the national morale.  Wartime mobilization that emphasizes a 
sense of unified purpose can foster greater empathy for fellow citizens who are killed or 
injured in battle.  This often translates into expressions of solidarity with the troops.  After 
the war the mass public has to make a judgment about the utility of war (Stam 1996).  The 
number of casualties is one of the measure by which this utility is judged.  Higher number 
of battle deaths has the potential to worsen existing political disagreements between the 
opponents and supporters of the incumbent.  In more open political systems, this would be 
manifested in the form of “turmoil” – grassroots protest movements, and an increase in the 
saliency of the war as an election issue (Cotton, 1986; Mueller, 1973; Stein, 1980; Stohl, 
1976).  Conversely, in more closed political systems it is more likely to appear in the form 
of violent attempts at regime change such as assassination attempts, localized insurgencies 
and a coup.  It is also likely that nondemocratic governments are better at preempting such 
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threats by the deliberate targeting of their opponents through purges.  Higher casualty can 
be interpreted by the public as a sign of incompetence of the wartime leader by the mass 
public triggering events that threaten the government.  Finally, higher casualties are more 
likely to generate elite disagreement on the overall national security policy.  Any 
breakdown of elite consensus will influence the nature of leadership succession and create 
opportunities for new elites to capture power (Legro 2005).    
 Post-hoc Assessment of War Costs  
After the war is over, casualties and other costs serve as a crucial benchmark for the 
selectorate to evaluate the utility of the war (i.e. whether these were justified given the 
outcome).  War costs continue to influence the political behavior of the members of 
leader’s winning coalition, the counter-elites, the opposition groups and the attitudes of the 
mass public in the postwar period.  A widespread belief that the costs of war and its 
benefits are not in equilibrium can translate into attempts at regime change by counter 
elites and opponents of the current regime.  Even if these attempts are thwarted, an open 
struggle for power can potentially weaken the incumbent.  There are other reasons to 
expect fragmentation of the ruling elite and internal dissension against the leader and the 
ruling government following wars that turn out to be costlier than expected.  The loss of a 
large number of armed personnel can create resentment against the incumbent within the 
military.  Some senior and mid-level officers can conspire to remove the leader through a 
coup or assassination.  Postwar demobilization of the military can provide a pool of 
unemployed young men trained in firearms to join the ranks of various contending groups 
providing an essential ingredient for internal violence.   
31 
 
The core function of any government is the protection of citizens against foreign 
enemies.     This is why the failure of a government to protect its civilians can have serious 
political consequences.   Such an occurrence can also influence the political environment 
after the end of a war.  Warring states have found it strategically beneficial to inflict 
civilian casualties to compel their adversary to submit to their demands and bring about a 
quicker end to a war (Downes, 2006).  Empirical support for this theory underscores the 
powerful political impact of civilian casualties on war outcomes.  A cursory look at the 
data on interstate wars – especially in the last century – indicates that very few belligerents 
have managed to sustain a war effort with high levels of civilian casualties.   Many 
belligerents have acted on the belief that if they can kill sufficient numbers of enemy 
civilians, their adversary’s resolve to continue fighting will be broken.  It could be that 
civilian casualties increase the prospect of internal conflict that all leaders wish to avoid.  I 
make the case in this study that those belligerents whose civilians were targeted are likely 
to face a more challenging postwar environment than those where these were not.  A war in 
which civilians of a country have come under serious attack is by its very nature going to 
be more controversial because the costs of war are much harder to conceal.   When 
civilians are threatened in a meaningful way, it makes it more likely that the political 
decision to wage war becomes a contentious issue for postwar domestic politics.    
Direct attacks on civilians by a foreign power can alter the political dynamic in the 
specific area where such targeting occurs and change the overall domestic political 
situation of a country.  An escalation in civilian suffering can politicize segments of the 
mass public that may not have developed clear views on the war.  In countries where 
concentrated pockets of population have long standing grievances against the state, civilian 
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casualties can worsen this pre-existing dynamic.  If the state resources have been 
temporarily diminished due to the allocation for war, the prospective rebels, insurgents or 
participants in a civil war are incentivized to exploit this window of opportunity and target 
a weakened incumbent.   Hence, civilian suffering in a concentrated region increases the 
opportunity available for all anti-government political entrepreneurs to try and depose the 
current regime.   If opponents are convinced that the current government has been 
weakened by war participation, they are more likely to directly confront the regime.  If 
these groups believe that they can achieve their aims through violence, a government must 
allocate resources to counteract them or risk being deposed. Those civilians that are not 
directly affected by war may also turn against a government that fails to thwart an assault 
on key population centers.  When any country suffers civilian casualties during war, it 
symbolizes a strategic failure to defend its territorial sovereignty.  Even if the eventual 
outcome is a victory, civilian deaths are likely to pose a political problem for any 
government in the postwar period.  Thus, the occurrence of even a few civilian casualties 
changes the complexion of a war and by extension, postwar politics.   This is not to say that 
the variation in the numbers of civilians killed is not important as well.  Thus, the first point 
of distinction is whether there was a reasonable threat to the civilian population by a state’s 
war involvement and the second level of variation is the actual number of killings that 
occurred during the war.  My argument is that interstate wars in which civilians had 
reasonable fear of being harmed by the enemy should be categorized differently than those 
where this was not a possibility.  This is why I have tried to test for the effect of both these 
variations on the number of postwar threats through the hypotheses outlined below.    
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It could be argued that an average member of the mass public lack the capacity to 
make a rational cost-benefit evaluation of war as their “individual-level knowledge of 
central facts of war is weak (Berinsky 2009: p. 124).”  However, even if the entire populace 
of a country does not have equal information about some of the war’s “central facts” (e.g. 
geostrategic stakes, the terms of settlement etc.), the tangible effects of war such as battle 
deaths and civilian casualties are likely to leave a political impact on any war-affected 
country .  When the effects of war are felt by individuals and communities in any 
meaningful way, they can no longer remain neutral or indifferent.  The members of the 
mass public have to take a position – positive or negative – on the utility of the war.  It is 
quite possible that if the decision to engage in war was taken by the leader of their partisan 
or social group, some members of the mass public would continue to support it despite its 
heavy costs (Berinsky 2009).  Even if this were to be the case, mobilization of one section 
of the population in opposition and consolidation of another section in support for it would 
only serve to further accentuate the breakdown in domestic consensus on national security.  
This disaffection among segments of the mass public changes the political calculus of 
counter-elites as well as the broader opposition that can trigger anti-incumbent 
mobilization.  This study emphasizes that anti-government mobilization is as significant as 
the survival of a wartime leader or what happens to him after his exit.  Any leader that 
faces recurring postwar challenges will find it difficult to take decisions that align with his 
preferences in important issue areas.  Veto players in the polity would be emboldened to 
block his decisions.   It has been argued that leaders have often waged wars with the 
intention of consolidating their hold on power.  Even when a leader achieves the best 
possible outcome – victory and postwar survival in office – there are two factors that 
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determine whether he will get the political benefit from this outcome.  First, there is a time 
lag between a victory in war and distribution of its benefits among the winning coalition.  
Second, a leader has to ensure that a substantial plurality of citizens have to give their 
consent – or are coerced – to pay the costs of war.  While these costs are immediate, the 
benefits from a favorable war outcome are prospective (Stam 1996, p. 28). No leader or 
government can wage war without extracting resources from the citizens.  This study posits 
that the higher the level of extraction required for waging a war, the greater the anti-
government unrest in the postwar period.  Even if a wartime leader is replaced under the 
logic of culpability that does not exhaust the possibility that the postwar period would be 
highly unstable.  Costlier wars destabilize the polity by giving opportunities to new 
counter-elites to bid for power. This change in incentive makes it more likely that they 
would undertake anti-government activities.  
 Anti-Government Activities  
The outcome of interest in this study is the variation in the number of observable 
anti-government activities in country that has recently waged a war.  I define anti-
government activities as those events that make it more difficult for an incumbent to rule 
effectively.  An anti-government activity would be an overt and blatant expression of 
discontent by an individual or group against a given regime.  Anti-government actors can 
undertake violent actions that target symbols of the state – including senior officials – 
which may or may not threaten the survival of the government.  Or they can precipitate a 
crisis that creates a policy paralysis.  In other instances, the counter-elites can organize a 
conspiracy to remove the incumbent regime by illegal means.  This dependent variable 
focuses attention away from the crude indicator of survival versus removal of individual 
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leaders to the degree of “effective control” that a regime enjoys over a given period.  The 
concept of effective control is commonly used in the discipline of international law in the 
literature on sovereignty to establish whether foreign intervention for domestic human 
rights abuses is justified or not.  A leader that is constantly buffeted by the actions of his 
domestic opponents that question his legitimacy and threaten his survival cannot be placed 
in the same category as one who is able to implement his policy agenda with little or no 
resistance.  Both types of leaders are “survivors” but the latter is in a much more effective 
ruler than the former.  This study follows several others in trying to isolate the domestic 
effects of war participation on leaders and their regimes.  Since I firmly believe that all 
surviving leaders are not alike, I wanted to locate a dependent variable that would capture 
the variation in their “effective control” over their societies. 
In summary, the central thesis of this project is that higher levels of battle deaths 
and civilian targeting in an interstate war would alter the three parameters that shape 
domestic political competition in a polity in the aftermath of a war: (1) the opportunities 
available to challengers to overthrow an incumbent, (2) level of discontent amongst the 
mass public and (3) defection from the winning coalition.  When these parameters are 
altered, they change the likelihood of anti-government activities in a society.  Thus, the 
three central hypotheses of this study are as follows. 
H1a: The higher the battle deaths, the greater the likelihood of anti-government 
activities in the postwar period. 
H1b: Noncombatant casualties increase the likelihood of anti-government activities 




Figure 2.2: A Model of War Costs and its Political Effects 
 
 War Cost and Anti-Government Activities: Contingent Factors 
The discussion so far has tried to establish how the scale of costs may be useful 
explaining the anti-government events after the end of the war.  In addition, there are strong 
theoretical grounds to justify that some factors can interact with war costs to influence its 
effect on postwar unrest.  These include (1) the rules and norms that govern domestic 
political competition and transfer of power which is correlated with regime type; (2) 
whether the country was the initiator or the target and (3) the interests at stake in the war. 
Regime type 
   Impact of war costs on postwar political developments can vary depending on the 
representativeness of political systems.   Characteristically, nondemocratic regimes are 
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much more likely to neutralize the political opposition by force.  Bueno de Mesquita and 
Siverson have made the case that the longer an authoritarian leader stays in power, the 
greater the likelihood of his survival after defeat in war (Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson, 
1995).  The length of tenure should make the winning coalition of an autocratic leader 
much more stable making it harder for his domestic opponents to remove him.   This is 
why autocratic leaders are looking to wipe out the opposition by coercion and solidify their 
credentials with the winning coalition.  Under these circumstances, it is less likely that 
counter-elites would be able to mobilize mass dissension associated with higher war costs.  
The norms and means of political competition in a democratic and a nondemocratic 
polity are likely to be very different.  The use of violence by opposition may not be the 
exact point of distinction across regime types.  In fact, a recent study found that nonviolent 
campaigns tend to emerge more frequently under nondemocratic systems(Chenoweth & 
Stephan, 2011).  What is important is that in a representative political system with a 
constitutional mechanism for the transfer of power, opponents can use legally available 
means to challenge and remove the government over a variety of policy failures.  Given 
that democratic states have tended to avoid fighting high fatality wars, one can infer that 
the index of costliness is a measure by which democratic incumbents are likely to be 
judged by their constituents (Valentino, Huth, & Croco, 2010).  Since their opponents 
know this, the costlier the war the more likely they are to undertake actions to destabilize 
the incumbent.  Since barriers to removing an incumbent are lower and the opposition has a 
high chance of capturing power, democracies are more prone to events that are classified as 
“threats” in this dissertation.   In a democratic polity, there is a greater incentive for 
political entrepreneurs to exploit symptoms of mass dissension.  The counter-elites, 
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dissatisfied members or the existing winning coalition and smaller oppositional groups and 
factions are more likely to mobilize against the incumbent when the mass public shows 
signs of being unhappy with the costliness of the war.  This is why overall quantum of the 
antigovernment activities that would be observed in a democratic polity may be higher than 
in a nondemocratic regime. 
  This leads to the following hypotheses:  
H2a: The marginal effects of higher battle deaths on anti-government activities in the 
postwar period are higher in democracies than in nondemocracies  
H2b: The marginal effect of suffering noncombatant casualties on postwar anti-
government activities is higher in democracies than in nondemocracies. 
Initiators versus Targets  
 Studies of war as well as databases like COW have tried to code belligerents based 
on who started the hostilities.  This is commonly referred to as the “role” of the country in a 
war.  Previous studies on leader survival have reported systematic differences among the 
two categories of belligerents:  initiators and targets.   Chiozza and Goemans (2011) found 
that leader of targeted states have a harder time surviving in office or escaping post-exit 
punishment while the war was in progress.  According to their data, 37 % of leaders that 
initiated war faced some form of punishment in the form of removal from office, 
imprisonment, exile or death, while 44% of targeted leaders faced a similar fate.  Other 
studies have compared the war outcomes for these two categories and discovered that 
initiators tend to be victorious much more often than targets(Wang & Ray, 1994).  What 
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has been established is that the distinction between initiator and target merits further 
investigation whenever we are studying any aspect of interstate war.  It is quite possible 
that there is something fundamentally different in the consequences faced by targets and 
initiators after a costly war.  If we follow the framework of the expected utility 
explanations of war, a state and its leader that decides to start a war would do so because of 
the conviction that its benefits would outweigh its costs.  A leader or government that 
intends to start a war has to make his case to the winning coalition as well as to rest of the 
selectorate to convince them that he can achieve their pre-war aims at an acceptable cost.  
On the other hand, the leader of the targeted country only has the option to either submit 
the initiator’s demands or pay the costs of war to defend the status quo.   
Hence, the question that has to be examined is as follows: Do costlier wars have a 
different impact on the number of anti-government actions depending on whether the 
belligerent was a target or an initiator?  I argue that when the political leadership of a 
country that started the war miscalculates its expected costs, the decision to wage war 
becomes immensely controversial at home.  When the pre-war estimates of war costs 
declared by the initiator turn out to be wrong, his political “culpability” should be far 
greater than that of a target.  Therefore, those that start wars have a smaller window of 
opportunity to achieve their strategic goals during wartime.  On the other hand, the 
domestic political dynamic facing a targeted leader that has to incur the costs of war are 
likely to be different.  Under these circumstances, the costs of the war could be blamed on 
the foreign attacker rather than the leader.  Members of the selectorate may be more 
tolerant of war costs when these are incurred to defend external aggression.  The opposition 
and the counter-elites may feel compelled to support the government in a moment of 
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national crisis.  The counter-elites would find it harder to blame the incumbent for 
incurring costs of a war that was forced upon him by a foreign power.  
If the decision to wage war becomes a controversial issue, then all bets are off. It 
becomes more likely that opponents of the regime responsible for initiating the war would 
exploit the war costs for political gain and to attack the incumbent.  The unity forged 
through mass mobilization for protecting one’s homeland from a foreign invader may 
prove more durable and resistant to domestic dissension caused by high war costs.  Since 
the threat from foreign invasion is clearer to an average citizen, there will be greater 
willingness to accept the hardships caused by such a war.  Among countries that initiate the 
use of force pre-war disagreement among elites is more likely to come out in the open if the 
costs of war is perceived to be too high by the general public.   If the costs of war exceed 
pre-war expectations these divisions within the elite are likely to get exposed.  On the other 
hand, a targeted leader that successfully thwarts an invasion can get political credit for 
protecting the homeland.   When it is clear that a foreign invasion was responsible for the 
costs of war, the opposition may find it difficult to politically exploit any discontent 
amongst the mass public.  This is the justification for the hypothesis that a government of a 
targeted country is more likely to escape facing the political challenges that higher costs of 
war tends to generate.  This makes it theoretically plausible to explore the interaction of 
war costs with whether or not a state was the initiator to theorize that the negative political 
impact of high levels of costs would be greater for initiators. This argument can be restated 
in the form of the following hypotheses: 
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H3a: The marginal effect of battle deaths on postwar anti-government activities in 
countries that initiated wars is likely to be higher than those that were targeted. 
H3b: The marginal effect of suffering noncombatant casualties on postwar anti-
government activities is higher in countries that initiated wars than those that were 
targeted.   
High versus Low Stakes in War 
   While this study focuses attention on the political consequences of war costs, one 
has to recognize that wars differ in their saliency and consequences.   The adverse political 
outcomes that are precipitated by the costs of war can be contingent upon the specific 
nature of the dispute that led to the war.  When the dispute is with a long-standing rival or 
when there are territorial issues or a boundary question, political stakes are likely to be very 
high.  When adversary’s war aims are high, heavy losses in war are less likely to be 
associated with high levels of instability in domestic politics in the postwar period.  This is 
because there is a strong political justification to incur these costs.  Great powers can get 
involved in low-utility wars with relatively weak states in which their costs neither threaten 
their domestic economy nor their standing in the international order.  Powerful states have 
the resources to absorb the costs of low-utility wars and it is possible that their leaders 
calculate that their domestic political standing will remain largely unaffected by these 
costs.  The problem is that the strategic benefits from a total victory in a low-utility war 
tend to be intangible for the general population.  This makes it hard for the wartime 
government to defend the costs that are incurred in such an enterprise. 
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If the country’s war costs are deemed unacceptable by the mass public, then the 
regime in power is confronted with a political problem.  Even when these costs are a 
miniscule segment of the total assets and resources that the country can feasibly allocate to 
a war effort, this can have serious political consequences if there is a popular belief that 
these costs were unjustified.  Hence, the scale of costs may be a good predictor of the 
postwar political consequences faced by a wartime leader and his successors in low-utility 
wars.  Therefore, when the stakes are high a political backlash against the government for 
excessive war costs is less likely but the chances of such problems are higher when the 
strategic interests are not that salient.  The political environment following a costlier low 
stakes war is more conducive for the counter-elites trying to wrest power away from the 
incumbents than a costlier high stakes war.  Even if these counter-elites observe some signs 
of public unhappiness with war costs after a high stakes war they may not find it politically 
conducive to do so. Based on the above discussion, the contingent effect of high war stakes 
on the relationship between war costs and postwar anti-government activities can be 
hypothesized as follows: 
H4a The marginal effect of battle deaths on anti-government activities will be lower 
in a country that has waged a high stakes war than one that has waged a low stakes war. 
H4b The marginal effect of suffering noncombatant casualties on postwar anti-
government activities will be lower in a country that has waged a high stakes war than one 




3 Data Analysis 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter uses quantitative methods to explore the factors associated with a 
specific kind of political events that follow the end of war – activities of domestic actors 
that create problems for the incumbent government.  The central hypothesis of this study is 
that the heavier the costs incurred in a war, the more anti-government activities will occur 
in the postwar period.  The data analysis in this chapter compares the number of anti-
government actions among countries that participated in wars and attempts to isolate the 
factors that explain this variation.  I understand antigovernment actions to mean any event 
that makes it harder for a government to rule effectively.  These can be in the form of 
violent attacks or a political crisis caused by defections from the winning coalition.  Later, I 
describe in greater detail how this response variable has been operationalized for this study.  
 I expected this cross-national comparison to reveal whether heavier war costs 
influences the likelihood of postwar threats against the government.  The results only 
provided partial support for the central thesis of this study.  Countries whose civilians had a 
reasonable chance of being harmed experienced higher number of anti-government actions 
– as predicted by hypothesis H1b.  On the other hand, battle deaths had no effect on these 
events.  Three contingent predictors – regime type, war stakes and role in war (i.e. initiator 
vs. target) were also tested for possible interaction with the two war cost variables.  For 
initiators, higher battle deaths seem to have a bearing on the likelihood of postwar threats.  
If a country expended too many lives after starting a war, then its postwar domestic 
environment tended to be unstable.  Democracies also faced a similar problem if they 
44 
 
suffered civilian casualties.  Postestimation analyses of the marginal effects were 
conducted to further illustrate the effects of these contingent factors.    
  The impact of war involvement on domestic politics can be analyzed at various 
levels.  It is possible to compare the fate of different wartime leaders by contrasting their 
lengths of tenure; track changes in citizen attitudes towards war policy through opinion 
surveys or study relevant domestic events in countries after they have terminated a military 
engagement.  I have adopted third approach to identify the link between the costs of war 
and its political effects.  In the correlates of war (COW) database that I used for this study, 
an “interstate war” is defined by Small and Singer as any militarized dispute between two 
independent states with a combined count of at least one thousand battle deaths per year (or 
twelve-month period) (Small & Singer, 1982).  The cut-off for a country to be classified as 
a war participant was a minimum commitment of 1,000 troops – or 100 battle deaths 
(Sarkees & Wayman, 2010, p. 75).        
COW lists 193 country-level observations of interstate wars between 1919 and 
1999.  Since some countries fought more than one war at approximately the same time, 
including all the observations as they appear in the COW dataset was inappropriate for the 
requirements of this study.  This study is focused on explaining the political events within a 
country after it finished fighting.  For example, the US is listed in COW as a belligerent in 
three separate wars in South-East Asia during the 1965-1975 period: Vietnam War Phase 2 
(Inter-state # 163) the Laotian War Phase 2 (Inter-state # 170) and the Communist 
Coalition War (Interstate # 176) (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).   
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Since my main concern was the period following a war, I decided to count some of 
these instances of war involvement as a single observation in the dataset created for this 
study.  For a few countries that fought interstate wars in quick succession, I decided to 
count them as a single case of war involvement.  For example, the US involvement in 
Vietnam over the period 1965-1975 and the domestic threat events in the subsequent 5 year 
postwar period, 1976-81 form a single observation in my dataset.  The battle deaths 
suffered by the US would include all its losses in these three wars in South-East Asia.  This 
is based on the assumption that for the domestic audience in the US, the Vietnam War was 
a single war episode that ended in 1975 rather than three discrete events.  Hence, it does not 
make sense to count the periods after the end of Laotian and Communist Coalition Wars as 
unique observations of “postwar periods” although these wars were terminated in 1973 and 
1971 respectively.  After making these modifications, I was left with 156 country-level 
observations or war involvement between 1919 and 2004.  Table 3.1 lists all the variables 
included in the model and the number of missing cases.  The hypotheses were tested with 
114 cases for which information was available.    
Table 3.1 List of Independent Variables and Frequency of Missing Cases 
Independent Variables Frequency Percentage 
Ln(Battle Deaths) 1 0.6 
Civilian Casualties Dummy 14 9.0 
Net Military Expenditure 19 12.2 
ΔGDP (%) 15 9.6 
Ethnic Fractionalization 3 1.9 
Years Since Independence 3 1.9 
Population 1 0.6 
Regime Type 3 1.9 
Defeat Dummy 0 0 
Initiator Dummy 0 0 





3.2 Operationalization of War Costs 
Battle deaths and civilian fatalities are the two measure of war costs used in the 
analysis.  The assumption behind this choice is straightforward.  These are the most 
observable and direct effects of war involvement for any belligerent.  Their political 
significance can be gauged from the fact that outside of the two world wars, it has been rare 
for nations in the twentieth century to engage in interstate wars in which their battle deaths 
exceeded 1% of their total population.  This study assumes that the post-hoc assessment of 
the expected value of war by various domestic actors is influenced by the human costs of 
war.  Some previous studies have analyzed these cost variables to reach conclusions about 
war termination and postwar survival of leaders. It has been previously argued that that the 
tolerance to war-related fatalities and the power to inflict them on your enemy often 
determines who ends up on the winning side (Mack, 1975; Slantchev, 2003).  Among the 
subset of the most lethal wars of the period spanning from 1618 to 1918, Klingberg found 
that there is a threshold range of battle deaths and civilian casualties  – 6 percent of the 
total population – beyond which no side in a war was able to carry on fighting (Klingberg, 
1966).  In the leader survival literature, Bueno de Mesquita and his collaborators have 
found that all else being equal, higher battle deaths tend to increase the risk of removal for 
leaders, across all regime types and outcomes(Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson, 1995).     
The model of war costs outlined in Chapter 3 had articulated that the preferences of 
the domestic political actors following a war are likely to be influenced by the number of 
battle deaths and civilian casualties that had been incurred.  The higher the battle deaths 
and civilian casualties, the more actors interested in removing the current regime are 
incentivized to undertake actions that threaten the incumbent.  Domestic actors can 
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destabilize the internal political environment for the ruler even if they are unsuccessful in 
removing him.  Therefore, a crucial aspect of the postwar political management for any 
wartime leader is to convince a broad section of the selectorate that the war was worth the 
cost.  Thus, the question that the study seeks to answer is whether the number of military 
and civilian casualties influences how opponents react to an incumbent after the war.    
  The distribution of the raw data for both these casualty measures was found to be 
right skewed.  In order to normalize the battle data and make it appropriate for analysis, 
standard modifications like a log transformation were undertaken. The raw numbers of 
battle deaths suffered by a belligerent were converted into a log by adding 1: Log(Battle 
Deaths +1).  I also tested my models with the log of [(
Batte Deaths   
Number of Armed Personnel
) +  1].  This 
was done to account for the variation in the size of the military of different countries in the 
sample.  The bulk of the information on deaths of combatants has been accessed from the 
Correlates of War (COW) database and Clodfelter’s volume on wars and casualties 
(Clodfelter, 2002; Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).   Where there was a discrepancy between the 
two sources, I kept the casualty figure reported by Clodfelter. The data on civilian fatalities 
in interstate wars between 1919 and 1999 was retrieved from Downes and supplemented 
with information from Valentino et al. (Downes, 2006; Valentino et al., 2010).  I follow 
Mitchell’s (2012) recommendation to generate robust standard errors while running the 
models for this analysis where the distribution of the data was very likely to exhibit 
problems like heteroscedasticity and absence of normality.   
I generated correlation coefficients to identify whether there is any association 
among the variables that were included in this data analysis (See Table 3.2).  It is notable 
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that the highest correlation was found to be between battle deaths and civilian casualties.  
At 0.54 the correlation between the two war cost indicators can be classified as moderate.  
Among the three contingent variables that I expected to impact the relationship between 
war cost and postwar antigovernment events, the only concern is with high war stakes’ 
covariation with the two indicators of war cost – battle deaths (0.41) and civilian casualties 
(0.37).  Thus, any interaction effect that may be observed between the stakes dummy and 
any of the two war cost variables must be treated with caution. At the same time, a 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test in the ordinary least squares (OLS) model did not 
detect any multicollinearity problems.   
 Battle deaths and civilian casualties may tell us something unique about a country 
that has waged war. The first thing to note is that civilian deaths in an interstate war are a 
rare occurrence.  Unlike battle deaths that impact the combat forces and their families, an 
incidence of civilian casualties serves as a proxy for some unique characteristics about a 
country that took part in an interstate war.  First, it can tell us that a segment of the war was 
fought inside a country’s territorial boundary during which its population centers may have 
been deliberately targeted by the enemy.  Civilian losses can also occur as collateral 
damage when armed forces clash near population centers.  While it is theoretically possible 
to downplay the scale of battle deaths under some circumstances (e.g. under high repressive 
regimes or in wars fought away from home), it is almost impossible to do so when civilians 
are targeted.  When civilians are hurt due to fighting during wartime, the news of such an 
event is harder to suppress as this is also likely to trigger forced displacement out of the 
areas that have come under attack.  Secondly, an assault on civilians also often comes with 
a destruction of the existing domestic infrastructure that is likely to be concentrated around 
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population centers.  This could be the reason why many of the countries have chosen to 
fight wars away from home precluding any chance of civilian deaths. This is particularly 
the case with many of the foreign interventions by major powers like the US, UK and their 
allies during the twentieth century.   
With rare exceptions, most countries avoided getting drawn into protracted 
interstate wars that would put their home population at risk.  This could also be the reason 
that even countries that get into territorial wars with their neighbors, they prefer to sue for 
peace the moment their civilian populations come under serious threat.   For example, 
although India and Pakistan have fought four border wars in the six decades since their 
independence over a variety of highly contentious issues, none of these wars escalated to 
the point where either side suffered heavy civilian casualties.  Approximately 75% of the 
belligerent states in my sample lost less than hundred civilians in such wars, while 65% had 
no casualties.  Given the large proportion of cases with no fatalities, it was deemed 
appropriate to covert civilian fatalities into a categorical variable rather than undertaking a 
log transformation.  In any case, a log transformation of a distribution with so many zeroes 





























1.00             
Battle Deaths  0.03 1.00            
Civilian Casualties  
(3 categories) 
0.20 0.54 1.00           
Log(Net military 
expenditure + 100) 
̶  0.18 0.33 ̶  0.08 1.00          
Δ GDP (%) 0.06 0.09 ̶  0.09 0.05 1.00         
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
0.004 0.10 ̶   0.37 0.18 0.99 1.00        
Years since 
independence 
̶  0.06 ̶  0.37 ̶  0.02 ̶  0.11 ̶  0.24 ̶  0.22 1.00       
Log(Population) 0.13 ̶  0.02 ̶  0.22 ̶  0.12 ̶  0.13 ̶  0.02 0.22 1.00      
Democracy ̶  0.03 ̶  0.22 ̶  0.24 0.18 ̶  0.13 ̶  0.01 0.47 0.10 1.00     
Defeat 0.20 0.24 0.18 ̶  0.15 0.18 ̶  0.08 ̶   0.29 ̶  0.27 ̶  0.28 1.00    
Initiator  ̶  0.08 ̶  0.08 0.07 ̶  0.22 ̶  0.06 ̶  0.06 0.003 0.14 ̶  0.01 ‒ 0.09 1.00   
High War Stakes  0.16 0.41 0.38 0.05 0.15 0.20 ̶  0.26 0.01 ̶  0.01 0.17 ‒ .1 1.00  
No Leadership 
Change 
̶  0.07 ̶  0.07 ̶  0.07 ̶  0.19 0.07 0.09 ̶  0.14 ̶  0.02 ̶  0.38 0.06 0.08 ‒.03 1.00 
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I use two types of categorical variables to measure the effect of civilian fatalities on 
postwar instability against the government.  As a first cut, I generate a dummy variable to 
differentiate countries that suffered a minimum of hundred casualties from the rest.  This is 
to differentiate countries whose civilians had a reasonable fear of being harmed during the 
war versus those whose civilians were not involved in the fighting at any level.  Next, I 
created a three level variable in which countries that lost no civilians in wars were 
classified as the base category.  The two reference groups signifying the magnitude of 
civilian losses due to war fighting were (i) those with less than thousand deaths categorized 
as “low” and those that suffered more than fifteen hundred casualties labelled “significant”.  
These categories may seem arbitrary but I would argue that beyond a certain level, the 
variation in the fatality numbers does not really carry much meaning for the dependent 
variable being investigated in this study.  In other words, given the rarity of civilian deaths 
in interstate wars, the negative fallout that can be expected in a country that incurred 
sixteen hundred noncombatant casualties should be no different than for fifty thousand 
deaths.  What both these numbers tell us is that (a) major battles in the war were fought 
inside the territorial boundaries of the belligerent and/or (b) a significant section of their 
noncombatant population suffered the experience of being physically attacked.    
3.3 Dependent Variable: Anti-government Events 
Previous studies on this subject of postwar domestic politics have not differentiated 
leader tenure by classes of political events.  Leaders and governments were compared 
based on their length of tenure and post-exit punishment (Chiozza & Goemans, 2011).  
Leaders that survived but faced a destabilized postwar domestic political environment were 
placed in the same category as those who were strengthened by their participation in war.  
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This study takes the view that the incidence and scale of anti-government actions would 
help us better understand a war’s domestic effects rather than survival rates.  An incidence 
of these events indicates an erosion of power and authority of the regime that would not be 
detected if the response variable is restricted to the turnover of wartime leaders. Therefore, 
this quantitative analysis tries to explain the variation in the level of threats against the 
postwar government, instead of the survival rates of wartime leaders.   
The observations on the dependent variable are all the threat events that occurred 
within five years after the final year of the war.  The underlying logic of excluding 
domestic politics during wartime is that mobilizing any significant threat activity against 
the regime in power requires time and resources.  The expectation is that the number of 
threat events can serve as a proxy for the effectiveness of political control of a government 
and the severity of anti-government sentiment following the end of the war.  The choice of 
this response variable is driven by the logic that a higher level of unrest during postwar 
period is a manifestation of the domestic dissension unleashed by a war.  This study 
assumes that removal and post-exit punishment for wartime leaders are not the only 
negative consequences that a war can produce.  The variation in the number of threat 
events organized by counter-elites or extremist political formations such as insurgent 
groups in the postwar period can tell us much more about the domestic political 
environment of these countries.   
The Cross-National Time Series (CNTS) archive originally created by the late 
Arthur Banks includes a collection of annual counts of various events that can be classified 
as threats posed to a government.  I infer from the Banks codebook that the following event 
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categories from this archive can be included in this category:  assassination attempt against 
senior government officials, acts of guerilla warfare, major government crisis short of 
armed revolt and number of changes (or attempted changes) in government.  Unfortunately, 
the Banks dataset suffers from the following limitations: it only goes back till 1919 and 
information is missing for the duration of the Second World War (1939-45).  This is why 
the three wars that broke out just prior to the Second World War had to be dropped from 
the analysis: Third Sino-Japanese War (1937-41), Changkufeng War (1938) and 
Nomonhan War (1939).  An outcome variable Anti-Government Threats was created by 
adding the annual counts of four domestic events from the Banks dataset that occurred in 
each of the warring countries for a period of five years after they had finished fighting.  
These four threat events in the Banks dataset can be classified into two categories: 
Acts of physical violence against the government: 15  
The Banks dataset provides an annual count of any attempt at killing senior 
government officials. These can be a symptom of a wider disaffection against the regime in 
power.  Although some assassination attempts could be random acts carried out by lone 
individuals, these are more likely to be part of larger conspiracy hatched by motivated and 
mobilized groups.  At a minimum, such an event indicates that there is a constituency that 
is not only interested in removing the leader from office or destabilize the government but 
has the wherewithal to carry out such plans.  Assassination of key officials also indicates 
                                                          
15 The Banks’ CNTS dataset counts two kinds of episodes of violence directed against the state. Banks does 
not measure the scale of these events but provides an annual count of the number of times these occurred. 
These are defined as follows: (a) Assassinations - "The number of assassinations defined as any politically 
motivated murder or attempted murder of a high government official or politician." (b) Guerilla attacks - "The 
number of acts of guerrilla warfare, defined as any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by 
independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the present regime."  
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that the government is threatened by determined opponents willing to undertake a high-
risk, low-reward action.  Guerilla attacks are another form of anti-government violence 
which conveys that the presence of groups with resources and capability to brazenly 
challenge the state’s authority.  It is plausible that violent events like these are more likely 
to be the tools of political opposition in autocratic regimes that rely on repression to sustain 
their rule.  In regimes where nonviolent, constitutional expressions of dissent are 
unavailable, such episodes of anti-government threats are more likely.  At the same time, 
even in democratic regimes segments of the opposition can also be motivated to adopt 
extra-constitutional methods to weaken an incumbent.      
Crisis and Illegal Changes in Governing Elite16 
  Events that are classified as governmental crises pose a serious threat to the 
survival of a government because individuals and groups that initiate such actions often 
have access to the corridors of power.   A political crisis is often triggered by defections 
from the winning coalition.  Such defections signify a break-up of the existing winning 
coalition necessary for leadership removal or regime change.  These crises are symptoms of 
struggles for power and are a clear indication of a breakdown in elite consensus on whether 
the status quo must be maintained.  The most extreme form of such a crisis episode is a 
revolutionary or involuntary change in the governmental elite. While forced removal is 
clearly the worst outcome for the elite faction that currently holds power, even an 
                                                          
16 (a) Government crises is described in the Banks data codebook as “The number of major government 
crises, defined as any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall of the present regime - 
excluding situations of revolt aimed at such overthrow” (b)Forced changes in government include all 
“…revolutions, defined as any illegal or forced change in the top governmental elite, any attempt at such a 
change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is independence from the central 
government."            
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attempted revolutionary upheaval can seriously dent the authority they enjoy.  The very 
fact that a rival group or faction is able to attempt an illegal removal of members of the 
governing coalition betrays the weakness of a regime.    
 
Figure 3.1 Postwar Threats against Government , 1919-2004 (N=114) 
 
 
All these events ranging from nonviolent crises to unsuccessful attempts at regime 
change are indications of the loss of a government’s grip on power.  At the same time, there 
is a qualitative difference in the dangers that each poses to regime survival.  When a regime 
is compelled to remove member of the government in an unconstitutional manner, this 





















random act of violence.  However, all these incidents are a good proxy for antigovernment 
activities occurring within a country.    
 Response Variable: Model Fit 
 To recap, annual counts of four kinds of threat events constitute the dependent 
variable anti-government activities.  These included successful and unsuccessful 
assassinations of senior government officials, guerilla attacks, crisis that did not result in 
downfall of government and attempts of forced or illegal changes among the governing 
elite.17  The observation for each country in the sample is a tally of annual counts over a 
five year period after its participation in war ended.  Therefore, these are discrete values 
rather than continuous observations.  As illustrated below, the data for the components of 
the combined count of threat events are overdispersed and skewed to the right (See Figure 
3.1).  When an event count data is overdispersed (as is the case here), it is recommended 
that a negative binomial regression (henceforth NBR) count model be employed instead of 
a poisson.  This is because the poisson model makes a restrictive assumption that the 
variance of the response variable be equal to its mean (Long & Freese, 2007; Mitchell, 
2012).  As the two plots in Figure 3.2 show, the expected versus observed rate in the NBR 
for the predictors in my model fits much better than the poisson regression model for 
specific count of postwar threat events.  The LR test of overdispersion in the basic model in 
Table 3.4 supports the case for using the NBR to analyze this data.  
                                                          
17 In addition, there are other measures of general “unrest” like protests and workers strikes are also available 
from the Banks archive.  As a robustness check, I added these to the dependent variable and got similar 




3.4 Contingent Variables 
The study makes the case that the impact of war costs on postwar threats against the 
government and instability may be exacerbated by whether the belliegerent was 
democratic, an initiator or had vital interests at stake in the war.  In the sections that follow, 
I describe how each of these contingent variables was operationalized in the models that 
follow.  
Regime Type 
   In studies of war, variation in the representativeness of governmental 
institutions has been found to have significant effects on a variety of response variables 
with the democratic peace program emerging as one of the most productive avenues of 
research.  The main reason for using an indicator of democracy to create an interaction 
term with the war cost predictors is to examine whether the effect of war costs vary with 
the degree to which the political system allows dissension to be expressed.  A regime 
where opposition activity is tightly regulated is less likely to witness anti-government 
threats.  Hence, it is logical to expect that the effect of the war costs on domestic political 
events would be conditional upon the type of its political system.  It stands to reason that it 
would be easier for the opponents of the incumbent in a democracy to organize and carry 
out anti-government activities.  The regime type variable is operationalized through the 
Polity IV score which uses the 21-point scale of representativeness in governmental 
institutions ranging from - 10 to 10 (Marshall and Jaggers 2001).  This was converted into a 
nonzero scale by adding 11 to the existing distribution of scores.  Thus, instead of - 10 the 
lowest score possible became 1 assigned to the most autocratic regime and 21 was the score 
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for the most democratic.  The final observation for each country was an average score over 
the five year postwar period after it terminated a war.  I have dropped those countries from 
the analysis that were coded as “transitional” or “collapse of central authority” (i.e. - 66, - 
77 and - 88) in the Polity dataset as these are special cases that are beyond the purview of 
this study.  A dummy variable was created using the polity score to classify cases into two 
categories: democratic (polity score ≥ 17) versus non-democratic.  
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Initiator versus Target  
 The theoretical category of interest for the hypotheses in this study consisted of all 
the countries that started wars with the targets as the control group.  Higher war costs 
among initiators is expected to have more powerful positive effect on postwar threats 
compared to the group of countries that were targets in war.  It can be assumed that 
initiators often enter into war hoping for a quick, low cost and decisive victory.  When this 
does not happen, governments of countries that started a war are more likely to face 
dissension and by extension, threats. To test this argument, I used a dummy variable in 
which the state that initiated a war was coded as 1 while a target coded as 0.  The data was 
accessed from the Correlates of War (COW) database.   This distinction based on the type 
of belligerent has been very thoroughly researched in the literature on war and systematic 
differences between initiators have often been found across a variety of research questions.  
This makes it imperative that we test whether this categorization influences the relationship 
between war costs and postwar threats.   
War Stakes 
Similarly, I expect to find difference in the relationship between war cost and 
postwar threats between two groups: those countries that were involved in high stakes wars 
and those that were not.  The basic logic for this expectation is that when a country has 
emerged out of a high stakes, the mass public and the selectorate would be less receptive to 
counter-elites seeking to attack a government that had incurred heavy costs.  I order to 
operationalize this variable, I used the “war aims of the adversary” data collected by Croco 
(2011). She developed a 6-point scale to classify the belligerents based on the scope of the 
60 
 
strategic objectives of their adversary in war.  Any country with a score greater than 4 was 
classified as facing an adversary with a “high” war aim.  If there was a design by a 
country’s rival in war to annex its territory, attempt regime change or total conquest, then 
that country is coded as being in a high stakes war.  The theoretical expectation is that a 
country would be less likely to face postwar threats with higher war costs when the stakes 
are high.  When a country faces a danger of annexation or regime change or conquest in a 
war, regime opponents will not find the postwar environment conducive to exploit the 
dissension associated with higher costs. 
3.5 Control Variables  
 The level of domestic threats against a government can be the product of several 
factors that are not hypothesized in this study.  In models that seek to make cross-national 
comparisons of domestic political events, unique attributes peculiar to sub-groups of 
countries cannot be overlooked.  State of the economy and demographic characteristics 
exemplify such attributes that can have an independent effect on the outcome of interest in 
this study.  In order to account for some of these alternative factors and improve the overall 
predictive power of the model, the following variables were added:   
War outcome:  A large proportion of previous studies on postwar domestic politics have 
found that one of the key predictors of political events such as leadership change in the 
postwar period is war outcome.  Although the empirical evidence is often reliant of the 
interaction of outcome with factors such as regime type and culpability, this has to be 
accounted in any model that purports to explain postwar political events.  An adverse 
outcome in war is probably the severest kind of policy failure that an incumbent can face.  
Even if a leader is punished and a government is removed from office following a defeat, 
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this may generate additional instability in the polity. Therefore, I would expect a positive 
association of this measure with postwar threat events whether or not the wartime leader 
survived beyond the war.   I use the correlates of war (COW) database to create a dummy 
variable by coding all countries that were defeated as 1 and all others as 0 (Sarkees & 
Wayman, 2010).  As a robustness check, I also used the classification scheme provided by 
Reiter and his collaborators who have revised the COW dataset in some models (Stam, 
Reiter, & Horowitz, 2014). 
State of the Postwar Economy:  The general economic conditions within any country can 
be expected to influence the political events that occur within it.  If a country goes into 
economic crisis following a war, it would interfere with any independent effect that the 
costs of war would have had on the likelihood of anti-government activity.  The annual 
GDP percent data (in 1990 International Kheamis Dollars) from the late Angus Maddison 
and her collaborators (Bolt & van Zanden, 2013) has been used as a control the effect. It is 
quite plausible to argue that inferior economic conditions can generate domestic political 
instability.  Bad economic conditions can create a hospitable environment for any set of 
actors that wish to threaten a government. This measure was created by subtracting the 
annual GDP percentage in year five of the postwar period from year one. 
Population: The population data for the countries during the postwar period is from Banks 
Cross-National Time Series Archive.  In general, in studies of internal violence populous 
countries have been found to be positively associated with domestic instability.  Therefore, 
it makes sense that such a relationship may exist in countries in the aftermath of an 
interstate war as well.  The data was logged to overcome the skewness in the distribution. 
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Wartime Defense expenditure: In order to assess this, the difference between two values 
was calculated: (i) the annual defense expenditure of a country in the year prior to the start 
of the war and (ii) its peak level during the war.  These annual expenditure levels were 
taken from the National Military Capabilities estimates from COW database (Sarkees & 
Wayman, 2010).  This is used as a proxy for wartime resource mobilization.  A spike in 
defense spending during wartime may boost a state’s capacity to counter and deter internal 
threats as well.  This makes it logical to include this variable in a model that seeks to 
explain events that threaten the government.  In order to normalize the skewness in the 
military expenditure distribution, I added a constant (100) to get rid of the negative values 
prior to applying the log transformation: Log(100 + Net Military Expenditure).   
Years since independence: This indicates the durability of a national community as a 
cohesive political unit with the presumption that the longer it has survived the less likely it 
is to experience political instability.  Moreover, it is assumed that this measure would also 
be a proxy for the stability of state structures and processes which can impact the degree to 
which the country would experience anti-government threat activity.  I have accessed this 
information from the dataset created by Fearon and Laitin (2003).   
Ethnic fractionalization: Ethnic diversity of a society is often theorized as being a recurring 
source of domestic conflict.  The argument is that diverse societies find it harder to resolve 
competing claims among different groups.  Disputes over language, representation in 
government and access to natural resources can take a far more dangerous turn when these 
are manifested through competing ethnic groups.  By extension, governments are more 
likely to face overt threats in diverse societies.  I use the ethnic fractionalization index 
developed by Fearon and Laitin to operationalize this variable (Fearon and Laitin 2003).   
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Leadership change: The survival of the leader that were in power at the beginning of the 
war over the entire period of observation of this study (i.e. five years after the end of the 
war) also needs to be accounted for when studying the level of postwar threats against the 
government.  These leaders either head very stable winning coalitions or have created 
institutional arrangements that protect them from removal by their rivals.  Since leader 
turnover can be a destabilizing process in any postwar polity that may reflect in the kind of 
antigovernment events that I use as the dependent variable in this study, controlling for this 
factor is justified.    
3.6 Main Models: War Costs  
The goal of this data analysis is to find out how the main predictors in my model 
(i.e. war costs) are related with the changes in the expected count of antigovernment 
activities.  In order to achieve this objective, I began by running a series of NBR models to 
analyze the variation in the rate at which these events occurred in different countries 
following their participation in war.  The data on aggregate battle deaths and civilian 
casualties were used to calculate the severity of war costs.   I used different techniques to 
operationalize the data for these two variables to examine if their relationship with the 
number of postwar threats is consistent across different model specifications.   
  I use two formulas to normalize the battle deaths variable prior to testing it: Log 
(Battle Deaths + 1) and Log (
Battle Deaths
Number of Armed Personnel
 +  1).  The latter formula was meant to 
account for the disparity in the size of the armies on the coefficient or levels of significance 
of the battle deaths variable.  For civilian fatalities, I created a dummy variable by 
converting the data it into a dichotomous variable with countries that suffered more than 
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100 casualties as the reference group (i.e. coded as 1).  Of the 114 countries in the sample, 
29 were in this category which is a clear indication that this is a rare occurrence for 
interstate wars.  Secondly, in order to capture the variation among the countries that 
suffered civilian casualties, I divided the data into three categories according to the 
numbers of civilians killed: none (0), low (0-1500) and significant (>1500).  This created 
two reference categories within the group of countries that suffered civilian losses and 
those with zero casualties as the control group.  
Bueno de Mesquita and his collaborators have also combined some of the same 
variables from the Banks data in a study on leader survival and likelihood of revolutions 
(Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2010).  Instead of adding the raw annual count they 
converted these to a standardized score with the formula: 𝑧 =  
(Log (1+x) - Mean(Log(1+x)))
(Standard Deviation Log(1+x))
  
where x is the count of the number of events.  This formula normalizes the standard 
deviation for each of these event count variables to 1. Then they take an average to create a 
score which is a continuous variable rather than a count outcome (p. 940).  Adopting this 
approach, I created standardized version of my event counts dependent variable and tested 
models using ordinary least squares (OLS) linear regression (Table 3.5).   As another 
robustness check, I created models with information generated by Reiter and his 
collaborators who have sought to correct some of the misspecifications in the current COW 
dataset (Stam et al., 2014).   Reiter et al. code initiators much more conservatively by 
researching which states started a war and which ones joined a coalition in an on-going 
war.  Guided by their list, I created two dummy variables for initiators and joiners 
respectively.  Twenty two initiators in my sample were reclassified as either joiners or 
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targets based on the Reiter et al. database.  They also code winners and losers differently 
based on their judgment on whether or not the belligerent achieved their immediate war 
aims or not.  Several of the countries coded as winners in the COW dataset are revised as 
having only achieved a “draw” according to these authors.  Twelve cases that were coded 
as “defeat” from the COW data are classified as a draw by Reiter et al.  Finally, eight cases 
that were in my sample based on COW are excluded in their dataset based on different 
considerations.  They argue that the Ifni war of 1958 does not merit being classified as an 
interstate war because it did not meet the criteria of the minimum number of combined 
casualties.  They also exclude all the NATO allies that assisted the US in the Kosovo war 
of 1999 because their contribution to the war effort was not sizeable enough.  I created 
specifications of my parent model alternatively using the COW and Reiter et al. 
classifications for initiator and defeat in them.   
 Results   
The results of these models are presented in Table 3.3, Table 3.4 and Table 3.5.  As 
the first row in all these tables show, the battle deaths variable did not attain the minimum 
level of significance in any of them.  Surprisingly, the sign of the coefficient for battle 
deaths is also consistently negative, contrary to the theoretical expectation of this study.  
Even after I used a different transformation technique to modify the battle deaths data, 
these results remained largely unchanged.  The results in Model 1 and 2 demonstrate that 
countries where civilians were seriously threatened were more likely to suffer postwar 
threats against the government (Table 3.3).  This relationship is significant at the .05 level.  
The expected count of postwar threats for a country’s government in the reference group 
exceeded the base category by 87.6% in Model 1 and by 78% in Model 2, holding all other 
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variables constant.  In order to further clarify the differences between the two categories of 
war participants, the average marginal effects on the response variable are also illustrated 
in Figure 3.3.  All the average marginal effects reported in this chapter were calculated with 
the asbalanced option in Stata to account for overdispersion and unbalanced designs.    
 
 




The average marginal effects are calculated thus: For every case in the sample, the 
number of predicted threat events would be calculated as though it suffered high civilian 
casualties regardless of whether it did so or not.  Next, this process is repeated by 
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marginal effect, the difference between the average numbers of predicted events between 
the two categories is calculated for each case (Williams, 2011).  if the entire sample 
consisted of countries whose noncombatants were threatened, then the average number of 
postwar threat events would have been approximately 10.    With a sample composed fully 
of countries whose civilians were not threatened, then the average count would have been 
approximately 5.  Therefore, holding all other variables as they are, the number of 
predicted postwar threat events is likely to be double when a country’s civilians were at a 
reasonable risk of being harmed during war.  These results are graphically illustrated with 
confidence intervals around the two groups of countries.  Neither confidence intervals cross 
the zero line which means that these marginal effects are significant.  The confidence 
interval for the contrasts in predictive margins also barely touches the zero line. Thus, we 
can be reasonably confident that difference between the two groups is not being recorded 
due to chance.  It is important to note that of the 29 countries that experienced at least 
hundred civilian casualties, 13 ended up on the losing side.  Of these, all except Egypt 
(Offshore Islands War, 1954), Kuwait (Gulf War, 1990) and Iran (Iran-Iraq War, 1980-88) 
experienced some anti-government threat activity in the postwar period.    
In the remaining four models reported in this section, I used the categorical variable 
for civilian casualties with three levels – none, low and significant.  The results for these 
models are reported in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5.  It indicates that the effect of being in the 
highest category in terms of the civilians killed (i.e. more than 1500) compared to the base 
category of having suffered no losses – is significantly greater.  The list of these countries 
and the wars are in Table 3.6.  However, the difference between countries in the low 
category and the control group is not significant.  The overall effect of this three level 
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civilian casualties variable meets the standard of significance (β = 0.31; p-value = 0.058), it 
is the contrast between the two extremes – countries that suffered the highest civilian losses 
(< 1500) and those that incurred no losses – that is driving this effect for this variable.  The 
average marginal effects plot for these three levels is illustrated in Figure 3.4.  Using the 
postestimation commands for this variable after running these models showed that the 
average number of predicted threats among countries with no civilian casualties is 
approximately 5 which increases to 9 in the group with casualties higher than 1500.  The 
result for the difference in the number of events between the countries with significant 
civilian casualties versus no casualties is within an acceptable level of significance (p < 
0.10) in nearly all the models that were tested with different specifications.   These include 
models 5 and 6 where I apply an OLS regression with a standardized version of the 
dependent variable (Table 3.5). Therefore, we can be reasonably confident that this variable 
is a reliable predictor of postwar threats.  
Among the controls, the defeat dummy and net military expenditure 18 performed 
remarkable consistency across different models.  In all the models that I tried, the sign for 
both these variables is positive and within the commonly accepted levels of significance, 
which is usually treated as a sign of robustness.  Higher net military expenditure is 
associated with a lower expected count of postwar threats.  It could be that wartime 
expenditure on defense builds state capacity to deter domestic opposition in the postwar 
period as well.  The government of a belligerent that was defeated was more likely to face 
threats in the war’s aftermath compared to the rest.  This result complements the finding of 
                                                          
18 Log[(Defense expenditure in last war year – Prewar defense expenditure)+100] 
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previous studies that war defeat tends to be associated with likelihood of removal of leaders 
or the fall of governments (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1992).  The robust results for the 
defeat variable in this study indicate that this is not only a strong predictor of change of 
regime and removal of leaders but also indicators of postwar instability.  As mentioned 
earlier, the dummy variable for defeat is coded differently by Reiter et al. for twelve cases 
in my sample and it excludes eight cases from COW’s list of cases that are in my sample.  
Given that, it is crucial to note that defeat is a persistently strong predictor of postwar 
threats across various models.   
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Table 3.3: Negative Binomial Regression Model, War Costs and Postwar Threats (1919-2004)  
Variable Model 1 
(COW) 
Model 2  
(Reiter et al.) 
             Log(Battle deaths + 1) ̶  0.05 ̶  0.05 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
  Civilians threatened (> 100) 0.64** 0.61** 
 (0.26) (0.26) 
Log(Net military expenditure + 100) ̶  0.30** ̶   0.37 **  
 (0.14) (0.14) 
Δ GDP (%) 0.01 0.004 
 (0.01) (0.006) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.39 0.13 
 (0.38) (0.39) 
Years since independence ̶  0.001 ̶  0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Log(Population) 0.16**    0.19*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Polity Score ̶  0.015 0.03* 
 (0.017) (0.02) 
Defeat 0.55** 0.62** 
 (0.22) (0.21) 
Initiator  ̶  0.19 0.28 
 (0.21) (0.27) 
Joiner ______ 0.81** 
  (0.36) 
High War Stakes  0.08 0.23 
 (0.21) (0.25) 
No Leadership Change ̶  0.21 ̶  0.17 
 (0.22) (0.23) 
Dispersion Parameter 0.93 0.84 
Log likelihood ̶   313.93 ̶   291.61 
Probability > 𝝌𝟐 0.0020 0.0014 
Number of Cases 114 106 




Table 3.4: Negative Binomial Regression Model, War Costs and Postwar Threats (1919-2004)  
Variable Model 3 
(COW) 
Model 4  
(Reiter et al.) 
Log(Battle deaths + 1) ̶  0.05 ̶  0.07 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Low Civilian Casualties  (0  ̶  1500) 0.40 0.37 
 (0.27) (0.25) 
Significant Civilian Casualties  (≥ 1500) 0.64* 0.82** 
 (0.35) (0.38) 
Log(Net military expenditure + 100) ̶  0.24** ̶   0.29 **  
 (0.15) (0.14) 
Δ GDP (%) 0.01 0.005 
 (0.01) (0.007) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.45 0.31 
 (0.40) (0.42) 
Years since independence 0.00002 ̶  0.0011 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Log(Population) 0.12**    0.14*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Democratic Regime ̶  0.13 0.16 
 (0.23) (0.27) 
Defeat 0.48** 0.52** 
 (0.21) (0.21) 
Initiator ̶  0.16 0.35 
 (0.20) (0.27) 
Joiner ______ 0.88** 
  (0.37) 
High War Stakes 0.16 0.34 
 (0.20) (0.24) 
No Leadership Change ̶  0.31 ̶   0.13 
 (0.20) (0.22) 
Dispersion Parameter 0.95 0.8637 
Log likelihood ̶   314.794 ̶   292.59 
Probability > 𝝌𝟐 0.0081 0.0075 











































Table 3.5:Linear Regression Model (OLS), War Costs and Postwar Threats (1919-2004)  
Variable Model 5 
(COW) 
Model 6  
(Reiter et al.) 
Log (
Battle Deaths
Number of Armed Personnel
 +  𝟏) 
̶   0.85 
(0.084) 
̶  0.05 
(0.07) 
          Low Civilian Casualties (0 ─ 1500)   0.14 0.14 
 (0.17) (0.19) 
  Significant Civilian Casualties (≥ 1500) 0.49* 0.46* 
 (0.27) (0.27) 
Log(Net military expenditure + 100) ̶  0.12** ̶   0.15**  
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Δ GDP (%) 0.001 ̶   0.001 
 (0.0007) (0.004) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.11 ̶  0.05 
 (0.23) (0.24) 
Years since independence 0.001 ̶  0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
Log(Population) 0.06    0.07* 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Polity Score 0.014 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Defeat 0.33** 0.37** 
 (0.14) (0.16) 
Initiator  ̶  0.12 0.22 
 (0.12) (0.20) 
Joiner ______ 0.42 
  (0.31) 
High War Stakes  0.06 0.17 
 (0.14) (0.20) 
No Leadership Change ̶  0.04 0.006 
 (0.12) (0.13) 
Probability > 𝝌𝟐 0.035 0.068 
R-Squared 0.1941 0.2081 






Table 3.6 Belligerents with significant civilian casualties (≥1500) (1919-2004)  
Country War Name Duration Postwar threats 
China Second Sino-Japanese War 1931-1933 22 
Italy World War II 1939-1945 29 
Iraq Gulf War  1990-91 14 
Greece Second Greco-Turkish War 1919-1922 7 
Azerbaijan The Azeri-Armenian War 1993-1994 5 
Hungary Soviet Invasion 1956 5 
Armenia The Azeri-Armenian War 1933-1994 5 
United Kingdom World War II 1939-1945 3 
USSR World War II 1939-1945 2 
Tanzania Ugandan-Tanzanian War 1978-79 1 
Vietnam 
France 






Iran Iran-Iraq War 1980-88 0 




  The theory presented earlier also argued that the impact of costs on postwar threats 
could be conditional on the following factors: type of belligerent, the interests at stake and 
the degree of representativeness of its political system.   In order to check for 
multicollinearity among these contingent variables and the war cost predictors – battle 
deaths and civilian casualties – the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test with the regressors 
in the model was conducted.  The values for the variables were within the accepted range.   
In order to understand the effects of contingent factors on the war cost predictors, 
two sets of interaction models were generated for battle deaths and civilian casualties.  A 
total of six interaction terms were generated:  
(i) Log(Battle deaths) × initiator, (ii) Log(Battle deaths) × democratic regime type  (iii) 
Log(Battle deaths) × high war stakes,  (iv) Civilian casualty level (none/low/significant) × 
initiator, (v) Civilian casualty level (none/low/significant)  × polity score and (vi) Civilian 
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casualty level (none/low/significant) × high war stakes.  In order to test their joint effect 
under different model specifications, several models were created with different 
combinations of these three terms in the following order: 
                                            Table 3.7:  Interaction Terms in Models 2-15 
Model 7 :                            (i) 
Model 8:                            (ii) 
Model 9:                            (iii) 
Model 10:                        (i) (ii) (iii) 
Model 11:                           (iv) 
Model 12:                          (v) 
Model 13:                         (vi) 
Model 14:                 (iv) (v) (vi) 
 
 
The interactions of battle deaths with the three contingent variables were tested 
through different model specifications. The results for Models 7-10 are presented in Table 
3.8.  The overall two-way interaction effect for battle deaths with the initiator dummy19 is 
positive and within the acceptable levels of significance in the various models.  On the 
other hand, the interaction terms with the polity score and war stakes term performed 
poorly irrespective of the combination of variables used.   The results for the joint 
interaction term for battle death initiator can only provide preliminary support for my 
hypotheses that the effect of battle deaths on postwar threats will vary based on whether a 
belligerent was an initiator or not.  I had predicted that among initiators, marginal effect of 
battle deaths on postwar antigovernment threats would be higher compared to targets 
(H3a).   In recent years, scholars have conclusively argued that one cannot rely solely on 
                                                          
19 The results reported here are with the initiators coded in the COW dataset. I tested these interactions with 
the Reiter classification for initiators and found similar results. 
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the coefficients of a multiplicative term to test a hypothesis that predicts that two or more 
variables act together to explain an outcome of interest (Berry, Golder, & Milton, 2012; 
Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 2006).   In order to exhaustively investigate interactions 
between two covariates, one must examine how the “marginal effect” of one variable on 
the outcome changes across different values of another.  This is the approach I adopt to 
further investigate how the relationship between battle deaths and postwar threats is 
influenced by whether a belligerent was an initiator or not. 
 Effect of Battle Deaths on Postwar Threats among Initiators and Targets 
Among the 114 warring countries under analysis, 39 were classified as having 
started a war and the rest were targets in the COW dataset.  Among the initiators, 6 
managed to avoid any loss to their armed personnel.  The overall comparison of the 
average marginal effects of battle deaths on postwar threat incidents demonstrates that 
initiators are more likely to face instability in the aftermath of war compared to targets. The 
battle deaths × initiator interaction is constituted by a continuous variable, the logged 
values of battle deaths and a categorical variable, with initiators coded as 1 and targets as 0.   
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Table 3.8: Interaction of Battle Deaths (Log) with Contingent Factors (N=114) 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 


















Battle Deaths ̶    0.116** 
(0.05) 
̶   0.06 
(0.08) 
̶  0.04 
(0.05) 
̶  0.11*** 
(0.06) 






   0.23*** 
(0.06) 
Battle Deaths ×Democratic __________ 
 
   0.0003 









̶  0.069 
(0.10) 
̶  0.04 
(0.09) 
Log(Net military expenditure + 100) ̶    0.28* 
(0.15) 
̶  0.26* 
(0.15) 
̶  0.25 
(0.15) 
̶   0.27* 
(0.15) 
















Years since independence ̶  0.001  
(0.001) 






























Initiator  ̶  1.73***    
(0.42) 
̶  0.15 
(0.20) 
̶   0.15 
(0.21) 
̶  1.70 
(0.44) 








No Leadership Change ̶  0.12 
(0.21) 
̶  0.19 
(0.22) 
̶  0.20 
(0.22) 
̶  0.12 
(0.21) 
Dispersion Parameter 0.838 0.95 0.94 0.84 
Log likelihood ̶  309.29 ̶  310.80 ̶   314.53 ̶  309.19 












This combination of predictors allows us to compare average marginal effects of 
battle deaths on the predicted count of threat events between the two categories: initiators 
and targets.  Another way to analyze this interaction is to track the change in marginal 
effects on postwar threat count at different observations of the battle deaths distribution, 
among initiators and targets respectively.  These are also known as predictive margins.  To 
make the analysis manageable, “representative” values of logged battle deaths were 
selected and the differences in effects between initiators and targets were generated.  The 
graphical illustration in further confirms these effects.   In other words, the predicted 
threats increase with increases in battle deaths among initiators and decrease with 
increasing battle deaths for targets Figure 3.5. The average marginal effects for all 
observations of battle deaths on postwar threats among initiators and targets are illustrated 
in Figure 3.6.  It indicates that the overall marginal effect or slope of battle deaths is 
negative among targets and positive among initiators.    
The derivative (dy/dx) for targets is   ̶  0.78 and significant at the 0.05 level.  For 
initiators, it is 0.59 but it has a p-value of 0.249 as is reflected in the confidence interval 
that crosses the zero line (Figure 3.6).  Comparing the slope for postwar threats at specific 
values of battle deaths for initiators and targets reveals that the average marginal effect of 
battle deaths on postwar threats for initiators is lower than the targets for a segment of the 
distribution.  Beyond a certain level of battle deaths, the sign for the contrast in effects of 
battle deaths between initiator and target changes from negative to positive.  In other 
words, initiators are likely to face more postwar threats compared to targets only at higher 
levels of battle deaths.  This illustrates the contrast between initiators and targets quite 
clearly.  Initiators face greater postwar threats compared to targets only at the higher points 
79 
 
in the battle deaths distribution.  The plot in presents the contrasts in predictive margins 
between initiators and targets as battle deaths increases (Figure 3.7).  Overall, there is a 
discernible difference between the two groups of belligerents as far as the effects of battle 
deaths on postwar threats are concerned.   It is clear by looking at Figure 3.5 that an 
incremental increase in battle deaths tends to have opposite effects on postwar threats 
among initiators and targets respectively.  As battle deaths increase, these are likely to 
generate more postwar threats for initiators.  Among targets, higher battle deaths seem to 
have an opposite effect.   



































 Figure 3.6 Average Marginal Effects among Initiators and Targets 
 







































































Table 3.9: Interaction of Civilian Casualties with Contingent Factors 
 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
Log(Battle Death)  ̶   0.045 ̶  0.04 ̶   0.05 ̶   0.038 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.045) 
Civilian Casualties (Low) 0.005 0.97 0.36 0.78 
 (0.45) (0.61) (0.29) (0.79) 
Civilian Casualties (High) 0.13 0.41 0.82 0.13 
 (0.48) (0.57) (0.40) (0.54) 
Civilian Casualties (Low) × Initiator 0.72 __________ __________ 0.81 
 (0.60)   (0.59) 
Civilian Casualties (High) × Initiator 0.93* __________ __________ 0.88* 
 (0.49)   (0.50) 
Civilian Casualties(Low) × Polity Score __________ ̶  0.05 __________ ̶  0.06 
  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Civilian Casualties(High) × Polity Score __________ 0.02 __________ 0.04 
  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Civilian Casualties (Low) × High Stakes __________ __________ ̶   0.04 0.26 
   (0.47) (0.44) 
Civilian Casualties(High)× High Stakes __________ __________ ̶   0.54 ─  0.80* 
   (0.50) (0.48) 
Controls ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Dispersion Parameter 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.88 
Log likelihood ̶  313.54   ̶   313.62 ̶   314.48 ̶  311.37 
Probability > 𝝌𝟐 0.0015  0.0003 0.0149 0.000 
NOTES: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***= p < 0.01; **= p < 0.05;  








 Interaction of Civilian Casualties with Contingent Factors20 
For the civilian casualties’ variable with three levels - none, low and significant - a 
three by two design was created with the three dummy variables: initiator, democratic and 
high war stakes.  I used the polity score as a continuous variable as well as a democratic 
regime dummy to make predictive margins more meaningful.   Prior to investigating these 
interactions further, I examined the row means of postwar threat events for the different 
combinations of these two categorical variables.  The frequencies showed that this is an 
unbalanced design as the number of observations is not equal across the cells.  With this in 
mind, I ran the models and the postestimation commands using the “asbalanced” option in 
Stata which artificially balances an unbalanced design (Mitchell, 2012, pp. 236-237). 
A partial output for models 12  ̶  15 is presented in Table 3.9.  The results for the 
interaction term for high civilian casualties with initiator and high war stakes seemed to 
indicate support for the hypotheses laid out in earlier chapters (H3b and H4b).  As 
mentioned earlier, the coefficient and test of significance in the parent model only confirm 
that there is evidence of a two-way interaction.  The p-value for a multiplicative term tells 
us that the joint interaction is significant and there is a discrete change (from the base level 
of no casualties = 0) in the average marginal effects in one categorical predictor with a 
discrete change in another.  In order to further examine the nature of these two interactions, 
I compared the adjusted means broken down by the different levels in each of the 
constituent factors.   
                                                          
20 Interaction terms were tested with the two categorical variables for civilian casualties (> 100 versus rest) 
and the three contingent factors as well.  
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For the interaction of the three categories of civilian casualties with the initiator 
dummy, the average marginal effects plot in Figure 3.8 shows the predicted number of 
events for each level of civilian casualties – none, low and significant.  For initiators that 
experienced significant civilian casualties, the average number of predicted threat events is 
13.75.  This is the average number of postwar threat events that are predicted by the model 
if the entire sample of observations were to consist of initiators who had suffered 
significant civilian casualties.  On the other hand, for initiators that did not suffer 
substantial civilian fatalities the average number of predicted threat events is 4.3.  In other 
words, 4.3 is the average number of threat events are likely to occur if the entire sample 
consisted of initiators that did not suffer significant civilian casualties (Jann, 2013). The 
hypothesis H3b specifically suggested that the more civilian casualties a country suffered, 
the greater would be the number of postwar threat events for initiators.  This would require 
comparing the marginal linear predictions by estimating the effect on the response variable 
of a discrete change in one covariate – civilian casualties – from none (0) to low (1) and (2) 
significant while holding the other covariate – role in war – constant at either initiator (1) 
or target (0).  As Figure 3.8 shows, with increasing levels of civilian casualties from none 
(0) to significant (2), the predictive number of threat events for initiators also increases.  
Similar effect is illustrated for countries in low stakes wars.  Suffering significant casualties 
in a low stakes war yields more postwar instability than in a high stakes war (Figure 3.10) 
as well as among democratic compared to nondemocratic countries (Figure 3.9). 
The contrasts of marginal linear predictions is another option in Stata that helps us 
to understand these differences among various categories much more clearly (Stata, 2013).  
It reveals that among countries that experienced no civilian casualties, the targets face a 
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higher likelihood of postwar threats than initiators.  The F-test for this contrast is 
significant (β =  ̶  0.56; F = 3.49; p-value = 0.06).  Among countries that suffered civilian 
casualties the signs for the contrast are reversed and initiators are more likely to face threats 
after war than targets.  However, the F-test for the contrast is not significant for these two 
levels for civilian casualties.   In a separate model, I contrasted two categories among 
initiators: those whose noncombatants were at risk (minimum hundred civilian deaths) 
versus the rest.  The F-test for this interaction is very persuasive (F = 17.92, p = 0.000).  
This provides conclusive support for hypothesis H3b that when countries that initiate wars 
put their civilians in harm’s way, it dramatically increases the likelihood of postwar threats 
in these countries.  Using a democratic dummy in the interaction term with civilian 
casualties also yields similar results.  Among countries with the polity score of 6 or higher, 
the effect of experiencing civilian casualties is highly pronounced.  The joint F-test for this 
interaction is significant (F= 7.93; p-value = 0.09).  Among democracies, countries that 
suffered significant civilian casualties were predicted to experience more postwar threat 
events than those that suffered none (β = 1.45; p-value =0.009).  The marginal effects plot 
for the interaction of the three levels of civilian casualties with the entire range of 
observations for polity score bears this out as well (Figure 3.11).   For countries with 
significant casualties, the degree of representativeness seems to correspond with the 
expected number of postwar threat events.  
This effect is further confirmed by contrasting the marginal linear predictions 
between those countries where at least hundred civilians were killed versus the rest.  The F-
test confirms that within democracies, the prediction of postwar threats is greater for 
countries that put their civilians at risk (F = 8.52, p = 0.004).  The F-test for the contrast 
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between democracies and nondemocracies among countries that lost more than hundred 
civilians during wartime is also within the range of statistical significance.  Democracies 
experienced more postwar threats than nondemocracies after their civilians are targeted in 
war (F = 2.82, p-value = 0.09).   Using this categorical variable for civilian casualties, I 
also found that countries that were in low stake wars and lost a minimum of hundred 
civilians had a higher rate of postwar events than countries whose population were not put 




















































































Figure 3.10 Predictive Margins for different levels of Civilian Casualties by Stakes in War 
 




























Civilian Casualties: 0 = None; 1 = Low; 2 = Significant
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3.8 Summary and Discussion 
The list of hypotheses and the results of the data analysis are summarized in Table 
3.10.  The parent models 1 ̶ 6 only provide a partial support for the basic contention of this 
study that higher war costs make it more difficult to govern a country.  The battle deaths 
coefficient is not within the range of significance contrary to the expectations of the theory 
(H1a) although significant levels of civilian deaths are associated with higher level of 
postwar threats (H1b).  Using an alternative categorical variable for civilian casualties 
yielded similar results.  Countries where noncombatants faced the prospect of being 
harmed were found to be significantly associated with higher incidence of threats compared 
to the rest.  This could be because this variable serves as a proxy for countries whose 
population centers and domestic infrastructure were attacked during wartime.  This shows 
that a completely different political dynamic operates in countries that have to fight wars 
inside their territorial boundaries where their civilians can be targeted.  It is intuitive that 
the failure to protect populated areas would generate serious anti-government sentiment in 
the postwar period which is manifested in the number anti-government events that are 
observed in the data.   
Across a variety of model specifications, the interaction terms that included the 
initiator dummy and the war cost predictors showed reasonably robust results in the 
expected direction (H3a and H3b). The record suggests that the more war costs were 
incurred by those that started a war, the more would be their rate of anti-government 
activity in the postwar period.  This shows that the selectorate and the mass public is less 
tolerant of higher war costs when political leaders enter wars by choice, making it easier 
for regime opponents to threaten it.  The results for the interaction of war costs with regime 
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type were much less robust: interaction of battle deaths with regime type (H2a) and war 
stakes (H4a) failed to reach the level of significance.   The results for the interactions of the 
civilian casualties’ variable with the contingent predictors were relatively more 
encouraging.  Initiators that suffered significant civilian casualties or that put their 
noncombatants at risk faced the prospect of higher postwar threats.  Similar generalizations 
can be made for democracies and countries that were in low stakes wars. The more 
representative a political system, the more its postwar government was likely to experience 
threats from domestic actors if civilians were harmed.  
The other key finding was that defeat had a powerful independent effect in all the 
models.  Countries that were defeated tended to face a higher a level of anti-government 
threats compared to all other war outcomes. This relationship maintained a .05 level of 
significance across different model specifications.  This finding opens up an interesting 
possibility.  It could be that even the successors of defeated wartime leaders – culpable or 
not – tend to face a challenging domestic environment following the war’s termination.  
My sample does not differentiate cases based whether the wartime leaders or governments 
survived or not.  It would be interesting to examine whether the removal of the culpable 
leader had any effect on the incidence of threat events in a country that was defeated.  If 
defeated belligerents across categories – initiators, targets, democratic, nondemocratic etc. 
– report higher postwar threats, it may also suggest that that even if a leader survives a 
defeat he does not totally escape political punishment.  The positive relationship between 
defeat and postwar threats bolsters the claims made by earlier studies wartime leaders are 
better off trying to win by paying any price rather than concede defeat.  If a country is 
defeated, threats against the government – greater targeting of key officials, guerilla attacks 
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and crises tend to follow.  The selectorate and the mass public are not likely to react 
negatively to war costs if the political leadership avoids defeat.   Even if a culpable wartime 
leader is removed following a defeat, anti-government sentiment is likely to be manifested 
through threat events directed against the successor.  The removal of wartime leader and 
government may not be sufficient to completely pacify the backlash generated by the 
costliness of a war.  The internal conflicts generated by defeat in war can spillover for the 
successors of leaders that presided over these events.  The same argument holds for civilian 
fatalities as well.  If a leader fails to protect its civilians, negative consequences are likely 
to follow even if these do not result in his removal and post-exit punishment.  Even 













Table 3.10: Summary of Results 
Support? Hypothesis 
No H1a: The higher the battle deaths, the greater the likelihood of anti-government 
activities in the postwar period. 
 
Yes H1b: Noncombatant casualties increases the likelihood of anti-government 
activities in the postwar period 
 
No H2a: The marginal effects of higher battle deaths on anti-government activities in 
the postwar period are higher in democracies than in nondemocracies  
 
Yes H2b: The marginal effect of suffering noncombatant casualties on postwar anti-




H3a: The marginal effect of battle deaths on postwar anti-government activities 
in countries that initiated wars is likely to be higher than those that were targeted. 
 
Yes H3b: The marginal effect of suffering noncombatant casualties on postwar anti-
government activities is higher in a country that initiated wars than those that 
were targeted.   
 
No H4a The marginal effect of battle deaths on anti-government activities will be 
lower in a country that has waged a high stakes war than one that has waged a 
low stakes war. 
 
Partial H4b The marginal effect of suffering noncombatant casualties on postwar anti-
government activities will be lower in a country that has waged a high stakes war 











4  Case Studies 
 
4.1 Introduction 
   One of the theoretical impetuses for this dissertation comes from the concept of 
“linkage politics” that was originally propagated by James Rosenau. The linkage approach 
sought to uncover mechanisms that connect the realms of interstate war with domestic 
conflict (Wilkenfeld & Zinnes, 1973).  It advanced the idea that “the phenomena that 
originate in one sphere have implications for observable events in another (Bar-Siman-Tov, 
1983).”  The literature on war and leadership/regime change and survival, which also 
motivates this study, is part of this tradition.  So far, I have primarily examined the 
“linkage” between the variation in costs of interstate war – battle deaths and civilian 
casualties – and the threats and challenges faced by postwar governments.   
In Chapter 2 (sections 2.2 – 2.4), I had articulated a theory to explain the level of 
political instability in countries that have recently fought wars.  The goal of this theory was 
to justify why the costliness of war can be a useful barometer to explain postwar domestic 
politics.  The fundamental assertion I made was that costlier wars incentivize domestic 
contenders for power and other regime opponents to undertake anti-government activities.  
Costlier wars create an independent dynamic of mass discontent which encourages counter-
elites, political groups and organizations as well as defectors from the existing winning 
coalition to think that their attempt to topple the incumbent can be successful (See Figure 
2.2).   
The quantitative analysis presented in Chapter 3 was an attempt to test this theory.  I 
used a different dependent variable (i.e. level of instability and postwar threats against the 
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government) than has traditionally been used in leader-based studies.   I argued that using 
the removal of wartime leaders and their post-exit fate as indicators of postwar political 
punishment may be too reductive.  The outcome variable must capture the overall level of 
postwar societal and political discontent irrespective of whether the wartime leader was 
still in power or not.  The effect of war cost – measured in terms battle deaths – on postwar 
threats was not supported by the statistical models while civilian fatalities was found to be 
positively associated with such events.   
While statistical analysis is helpful in detecting broad patterns across a variety of 
diverse cases, it has its limitations.  In order to complement the empirical results from the 
previous chapter, I have done an in-depth analysis of two cases.  These can be invaluable in 
uncovering how the hypothesized variables influence the outcomes of interest.  Case 
studies also help to isolate the intervening causal processes that are difficult to capture in 
large-n studies (Bennett & Elman, 2007, pp. 174-175).   This chapter will examine how far 
the theory articulated in sections 2.2 – 2.4 “fits” the cases that were selected of intensive 
examination: (1) Paraguay’s victory in the Chaco War (1932-35) and (2) Egypt’s defeat in 
the Six Day War (1967).   
 Case Selection 
While selecting these two cases I kept three things in mind: (i) battle deaths (ii) 
outcome (iii) the fate of wartime leaders and their government.  While the Chaco War 
lasted almost three years at the end of which Paraguay emerged victorious, the Six Day 
War was a very brief, albeit costly engagement forcing Egypt to immediately concede 
defeat.  Battle deaths are frequently used as a proxy for war costs and it was a great surprise 
when the variable performed so poorly in the large-n empirical tests presented in the 
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previous chapter.  Given their size and population, the battle deaths suffered by both 
countries in these wars were quite significant although the raw count of Paraguayan deaths 
(36,000) was three times higher than that of Egypt (10,000).  While it suffered fewer battle 
deaths, Egypt’s military capabilities were seriously degraded by the Israeli attack forcing it 
to accept defeat almost as soon as the war began.  This may point to a problem with relying 
too heavily on battle deaths as an explanatory variable.  I saw these case studies as another 
opportunity to analyze the political effects of higher battle deaths.  Hence, I deliberately 
chose these two wars where there were no recorded instances of civilians being killed or 
targeted (Downes, 2006, 2008).  Given the empirical support for the theory that countries 
that suffer civilian casualties are much more prone to face postwar instability, I thought it 
would be more useful to choose cases where only combatants were harmed.    
 While Paraguay was a weak and unstable democracy in 1932, Egypt under Nasser 
would be classified as a long standing autocracy in 1967.  However, according to the Logic 
of Political Survival Data Source developed by Bueno de Mesquita and his collaborators, 
at the time they waged their respective wars, the size of their respective winning coalitions 
was the same : 0.25 (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).  The other motivation in choosing 
these two cases is to illustrate that comparing the survival rates of wartime leaders may not 
be sufficient to illustrate the domestic political consequences of war involvement.  This 
may help uncover some of the complexities behind postwar turnover (or lack thereof) in 
political leadership that have already been discussed elsewhere (Colaresi, 2004).   
The two cases represent two “ideal types” of wartime governments – (i) Those that 
were deposed after being victorious (ii) those that survived after being defeated.  Variation 
in war outcomes had to be a consideration in case selection because my data analysis had 
95 
 
shown robust support for the association between defeat in war and heightened levels of 
anti-government activity in the postwar period.   This bolstered the findings of previous 
studies in which defeat in war was found to be a consistently significant factor in predicting 
the rates survival and severity of post-exit fate of wartime leaders.  These two wartime 
governments took different and counterintuitive political trajectories in the postwar period:  
While the government of President Eusebio Ayala of Paraguay was deposed in a coup 
within eight months; President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt survived in office – till his 
death from natural causes three years after the war ended.  In the traditional binary models, 
Ayala would be coded as a wartime leader who had been “punished” while Nasser would 
not.  Analyzing these two cases should illuminate why the events unfolded the way they 
did in these two countries after they fought a war.   
4.2 Case I: Postwar Regime Change 
Wartime leadership is perhaps the toughest test of political management and a 
victory in war is a policy success like no other.  A political leader that has successfully 
accomplished such a difficult assignment can reasonably expect to be feted by his fellow 
citizens.  It follows that such a leader would be insulated from significant threats from 
domestic opponents in the aftermath of the war.  Yet, there have been several instances in 
history when victorious leaders have been unceremoniously forced to demit office after the 
war ended.  Why would a leader of a country be removed from power even after winning a 
war?  The answer may lie in the costliness of the war.  Higher cost wars can generate 
domestic effects that produce sub-optimal political outcomes for wartime leaders.  The 
unfortunate fate of President Ayala of Paraguay after the victorious campaign in the Chaco 
seems to fit this theory and merits further investigation.  The analysis below will primarily 
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focus on the human and material costs suffered by Paraguay in the Chaco War and its 
impact on the contemporaneous domestic political situation of the country.  In order to 
contextualize this narrative, I will incorporate relevant aspects of the broader strategic 
setting in which the Chaco War was fought and the diplomatic negotiations that were 
involved in ensuring its termination and postwar settlement.  Prior to delving into them in 
greater detail, it will useful to summarize the key events pertaining to the Chaco War and 
its aftermath.  
 Chaco War and Paraguay: An overview 
It has never been disputed as to which side initiated the Chaco War.  Bolivia started 
the aggression to achieve its war aim of acquiring territory in the arid Chaco region on its 
boundary with Paraguay.  While Paraguay was the first to officially declare war, Bolivian 
troops were the ones to commit the first aggressive act (Farcau, 1996, p. 113).  Bolivia 
wanted to gain direct access of a trade route to the Atlantic that was lost after its defeat in 
the War of Triple Alliance (1865-70).  The incentives to fight over the Chaco were also 
heightened by the widespread belief on both sides that the region contained reservoirs of oil 
(Clodfelter, 2002, p. 412).  After three years of intense fighting that cost tens of thousands 
of lives on both sides, the Ayala government of Paraguay agreed to an armistice offer from 
Bolivia in June 1935 (Lambert & Nickson, 2013, p. 193).    
Although Bolivia’s offer of an armistice was a de facto admission of defeat, 
Paraguay had not completely annihilated its military capabilities.  The answer to the 
question “Who won?” may not have been conclusively answered when fighting ceased in 
1935 (Rout, 1970, p. 45).  Tortuous diplomatic negotiations were conducted for almost 
three years with arbitration by several countries including the US.  Paraguay, as the 
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smaller, weaker power, emerged with the more favorable terms of the peace signed in 
Buenos Aires in 1938 (Hughes, 2005, p. 412).  Although most of the disputed territory was 
eventually awarded to Paraguay(Clodfelter, 2008, p. 414),  Rout succinctly summarizes the 
net result of the Chaco War for the two belligerents: “Bolivia lost the Chaco but retained its 
petroleum treasure.  Paraguay won the Chaco but did not reach the oil fields (Rout, 1970, p. 
45).”  Although one can quibble about the scale of the victory, Paraguay had wildly 
exceeded its prewar expectations and was the victor by any objective measure.  Both sides 
engaged in total mobilization of their economies for war, French and German military 
advisors were used in massive battles with modern, lethal weaponry.  In many ways, this 
was a preview of the casualty levels that were reported few years later in the Second World 
War (Hughes, 2005, p. 412). 
The government of Paraguay was led by a civilian president Eusebio Ayala who 
ruled the country throughout the entire duration of the war.  The military operations were 
primarily handled by General Jose Felix Estigarribia.   Both men played their respective 
roles in wartime leadership providing a great example of civil-military collaboration under 
trying conditions (Gleditsch, Chiozza, & Goemans, 2009).   Despite achieving a victory 
against a stronger opponent, Ayala’s government could not survive even a year after the 
cessation of hostilities.  Both Ayala and Estigarribia were forcibly removed in a military 
coup in February 17, 1936, eight months after accepting the armistice offer.  They were 
initially jailed and then sent into exile.  The coup marked the fall of Liberal Party from 
power, which it had held since 1904.   The new regime headed by Colonel Rafael Franco 
was short-lived and in 1937, General Estigarribia returned from exile and was elected 
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president.  He lasted three years.  Thus, Ayala’s removal was followed two more illegal 
changes in regime in Paraguay in quick succession.    
  This indicates that the policy success in thwarting Bolivian aggression and 
acquiring the disputed territory did not yield any political dividends for the Paraguayan 
leadership that was at the helm during wartime.  In fact, they suffered the severest form of 
political punishment, short of execution.  Their successor also could not stay long and the 
overall nature of postwar politics can be fairly described as extremely turbulent.  In the 
next section, I detail the human and financial toll of the war for Paraguay. 
 
           Table 4.1 Paraguay and the Chaco War: Basic Facts 
Variable Observation 
Battle Deaths 36,000 
Civilians threatened  No 
Outcome Victory 
Role in War Target 
War Stakes  High 
Number of Leadership Changes during War 0 
Postwar tenure of Wartime Leader Deposed in a coup after 8 
Months 
Number of Postwar Leadership Changes in 5 year period 3 
 
 
 Paraguay’s Costs in the Chaco War  
There is general consensus that the Chaco War was one of the most lethal interstate 
wars in Latin American history.  The Correlates of War (COW) database records the 
number of battle deaths for Paraguay to be 36,000 which is the consensus in the standard 
historical accounts of the war (Farcau, 1996; Hughes, 2005; Sarkees & Wayman, 2010; 
Zook, 1961).   This represent almost 3.5% of its total population (Zook, 1961, p. 241).  As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, an analysis of all wars (interstate and civil) between 1618-1918 
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has shown that populations losses up to 6 percent is the maximum that even the most 
determined belligerent has been able to bear (Klingberg, 1966).  This gives us a sense of 
the historical significance of the scale of Paraguay’s losses in this war.   
  Clodfelter has reported that of these, approximately 12,000 soldiers were killed in 
action while the rest had fallen victim to war-related diseases and the inhospitable terrain 
and weather they encountered in the Chaco.  In addition, 26,000 are estimated to have been 
wounded.  Table 4.2  lists the six major battles in the war (Clodfelter, 2008, p. 414).   In his 
account of the war, Farcau asserts that 40,000 Paraguayan died from all causes while the 
number of wounded to be approximately double that number.  This does not include those 
that contracted serious illnesses during the war. The percentage of casualties as proportion 
of the total force mobilized for the war is truly mindboggling.  The estimated number of 
troops mobilized was between 100,000 and 140,000 which was approximately 11 –15% of 
Paraguay’s total population  (Brilev, 2013, p. 252; Farcau, 1996, p. 237).   Almost fifty 
percent of all men that were mobilized for the war were either killed or injured.   
While the lethality of firepower was the primary cause of casualties, scarcity of 
drinking water on the battlefront increased the likelihood that a huge number of combatants 
would not survive the war.  The logistics had great difficulty managing the long supply 
lines that were required to wage war in an arid region where each soldier needed a 
minimum of ten liters to stave off dehydration.  Water tankers had to bring fresh supplies 
from Isla Poi, which was almost sixty kilometers away from the Chaco (Farcau, 1996, p. 
53).   The diseases associated with lack of access to drinking water took many lives on both 
sides (Lambert & Nickson, 2013, p. 211).  The contagion of epidemic diseases was made 
worse by the mass contact between the armed forces of the two belligerents and Chaco’s 
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indigenous people.  Malaria was pervasive on the Chaco front forcing Field commanders to 
send frantic requests to headquarters for medical staff to deal with infectious diseases 
amongst the troops  (Horst, 2010, p. 297).   
Since the war lasted for almost three years, it is instructive to note the temporal 
breakdown of these casualties over this period.  Given what was to come, Paraguay 
enjoyed a string of early successes with relatively few fatalities till the end of 1932: 700 
soldiers had been killed, 1,400 wounded, 65 captured (Clodfelter, 2008, p. 414).  However, 
this casualty count does not present the full picture of the severity of the war for the 
Paraguayan forces.  Although battlefield losses were low, by November 1932 almost 50% 
of the Paraguayan troops that were deployed on the front were suffering from influenza or 
dysentery. They were severely afflicted with malnutrition and paucity of medical supplies 
(Farcau, 1996, p. 98).  In 1933, Paraguayans suffered approximately 9,000 casualties 
including killed and wounded.  Of these, 8000 casualties were expended on a single battle: 
the Paraguayan victory at Campo Via between October 23 to December 13, 1933.  
Although fighting continued for another year and a half, in retrospect, Bolivia never 
recovered from its loss at Campo Via.  In the first seven months of 1934 Paraguayans had 
lost another 5,000 soldiers as Bolivia mounted a counteroffensive.  Paraguayans suffered 
their biggest defeat of the war on May 25, 1934 at Canada Strongest.  This single 
engagement resulted in 1,556 soldiers being taken prisoner and 400 killed or wounded.  
Between May to December 1934, Paraguayans had lost an additional 17,000 men, wounded 
or missing.  In their failed attempt to occupy the Bolivian oil fields in Santa Cruz Province 
in the final six months of the war (i.e. the period from January from June in 1935), the 
Paraguayans lost an additional 15,000 casualties to warfighting and diseases (Clodfelter, 
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2008, p. 414).   Thus, it seems like the biggest wave of casualties for Paraguay came 
between May 1934 and the armistice of June 1935.     
 
           Table 4.2  Major Battles of the Chaco War: Paraguayan Deployments  
Location Date Year Troops 
Deployed 
Boqueron September 9 – 30 1932 7,565 
Nanawa – First Assault January 19 1933 2,500 
Nanawa – Second  Assault January 24 – 28 1933 5,000 
Nanawa – Third Assault July 4 – 8 1933 6,000 
Campo Via October 23 – December 13 1933 26,500 
Canada El Carmen November 11-16 1934 11,000 
 
             Source: Clodfelter, 2008 
Logistical problems made it impossible to commit tanks and airplanes and artillery 
in the Chaco region.  The terrain, climate and distances in the various theaters of this war 
had made it imperative that the bulk of fighting be done by infantrymen, most of whom 
were illiterate peasants, who had never been outside their village communities (Clodfelter, 
2008, p. 414; Farcau, 1996, p. ix).   
Recollections and contemporaneous accounts of combat by Paraguayan infantry 
officers convey how the “…the horrors of modern warfare carved its mark deep into their 
beings (Farcau, 1996, p. ix).”  For example, one officer that was part of the first battle of 
the war with mass casualties – the offensive to recapture the Boqueron Fort21  ̶  described it 
thus: “The vile war; the hell, the desert, the agonizing thirst, the infernal heat that envelops 
                                                          
21 The Battle of Boqueron was one of the first major battles that the Paraguayan’s won, albeit at the cost of 
heavy casualties.  It was a counteroffensive launched to retake a fort that had been occupied by Bolivian 
forces.   Hundreds of Paraguayan troops feel to gunfire as the Bolivian Lieutenant Colonel Marzana held out 
for almost twenty three days.  This kind of lethal engagements between the two sides would be the pattern of 
fighting in numerous battles throughout the war (Lambert & Nickson, 2013, p. 198) 
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you, the stench of rotting bodies left for days on end…this kind of war is a terrible 
crime(quoted in Seiferheld, 2013, p. 200).”  Carlos Maria Sienra Bonzi’s recollections are 
typical of many Paraguayan recruits who were traumatized by the searing levels of violence 
that they would encounter in the Chaco.  He was recruited as part of the massive 
mobilization of armed forces at the outbreak of the Chaco War and rose to the rank of 
lieutenant.  Later events would show that their combat experience also radicalized and 
politicized many members of the armed forces. It was the Chaco War veterans like Carlos 
who formed the core base of support for the plotters of the coup of 1936 against Ayala.   
Carlos took the political path favored by many of his fellow combat veterans in the 
tumultuous postwar period:  He joined the Partido Revolucionario Febrerista (The 
February Party) that came to power after deposing the Ayala government in 1936 (Lambert 
& Nickson, 2013, p. 203).   His moving description of military combat gives us a sense of 
how a politically aware Paraguayan soldier in the Chaco War evaluated its costs and 
benefits (Bonzi, 2013, pp. 204-205): 
War scars a man forever, and it is not easy to get over the images left by so 
much death, with the knowledge that you were part of that mad war machine.  All of us 
went to the Chaco as youngsters…We thought war would be an adventure, but we were 
confronted with a brutal reality.  It would have been much more constructive for 
everyone to have had friendly trade relations with Bolivia rather than killing each other 
like we did in those three terrible years of war.   
 
While these sentiments were common among young Paraguayan men that saw the 
consequences of serious combat, the dominant prewar public opinion had been one of war 
hysteria.   
Besides the truly staggering human costs, the financial impact of the war on an 
impoverished country like Paraguay was no less significant.  The Paraguayan leaders were 
very cognizant of its lack of military preparedness and the years leading up to the Chaco 
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War.  A secret Executive Order 21.211 of 29 July 1925 by President Jorge Antezana 
Villagran authorized the expenditure of 1,810,000 gold pesos, equivalent to £ 348,715, on 
arms acquisition in Europe (Hughes, 2005, p. 430).  Between 1925 and 1932 Paraguay had 
spent almost £ 1,250,000 on arms  (Hughes, 2005, p. 430).   According to another estimate, 
over a six years period prior to the outbreak of the war, successive governments spent 
$4,730,733 on a buying spree of a wide variety of military hardware (Zook, 1961, p. 63).   
The two Presidents during this period – Eligio Ayala (no relation to the wartime President 
Ayala) and Jose P. Guggiari – secretly allocated 60 percent of the total revenues to prepare 
for the impending war, meeting the debt obligations for the War of Triple Alliance (1864-
70) and creation of a reserve of foreign currency and gold.  In 1929, the government was 
forced to take an internal loan of £ 470,000 (100 million Paraguayan pesos) in order to 
keep up with these purchases (Hughes, 2005, p. 432).  One thing to note is that all the 
spending and military modernization prior to the war was done in secret. This secrecy 
would have political consequences which shall be discussed in section 4.2.2. 
The Paraguayans paid for most of these purchases in hard currency.  In order to 
raise this money, it relied on its income from exports, issues of paper, loans sourced from 
Argentina totaling 16,626072 Ps. ($5,542,026).   In addition, it used up the 3,000,000 Ps. 
gold surplus ($4,900,500) built up by former President Eligio Ayala.   After the war began, 
the huge booty captured – 28,000 rifles, 2,300 automatic weapons, 96 mortars, large 
ammunition stores – valued at over $10,000,000 helped to defray some these costs (Zook, 
1961, p. 241).   
While Paraguay was carrying out its program of rearmament, the global economy 
was hit with the Great Depression in 1929.  Fortunately for Paraguay, it was still a largely 
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autarkic economy whose dependence on foreign exchange from exports was limited.  This 
contained the damage that the global economic crisis could inflict on it.  While it was not 
ravaged by the depression, it was saddled with a total foreign debt of 830,000 pounds 
sterling by 1930.  This forced the government to drastically cut domestic expenditure to 
keep the arms purchases going (Farcau, 1996, p. 24).  Fortunately for Paraguay, foreign 
investors that were connected to the Liberal Party elite were able to ensure a steady supply 
of credit to finance the war and keep the economy stable (Shea, 2014).  All the same, by 
August 1934, the financial strain of the war was coming to a head for Paraguay.  The 
economic effects of maintaining such a large military and paying for the costs of 14,000 
Bolivian prisoners were beginning to be felt on the economy (Zook, 1961, p. 202).   
At this crucial point in the war, the Argentinian government came to the rescue.  
Over the months of October-November 1934, Argentina secretly deposited 4,000,000 Pesos 
(Argentinian) in two installments in Paraguay’s account in Paris.  The transfer of this 
interest free loan with an open-ended repayment schedule was done in total secrecy with 
the help of middlemen.  This was a lifeline that revived the Paraguayan war machine in the 
final stage of the war enabling it to invest in vehicles and transportation equipment.  Given 
that logistical issues were especially crucial in this war, this Argentinian assistance at a 
crucial stage was a decisive factor in achieving victory(p. 205).  
Besides helping pay for the war, access to inexpensive credit helped Paraguay to 
avoid visible economic dislocation over the duration of the war.  This could be one of the 
reasons why the Ayala regime did not face political problems at home while the war was in 
progress (Shea, 2014).  No attempt was made to remove Ayala nor was there any 
significant anti-government activities observed during wartime Paraguay.  The same forces 
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that deposed the Ayala regime within months after the war ended may have acted sooner if 
the country was undergoing an economic crisis during the war years.   In the next section, I 
review the historical background and the nature of the Paraguayan political system before, 
during and after the Chaco War.      
 Paraguay before the Chaco War  
The nature of the Paraguayan political system in the period corresponding to the 
Chaco War and its aftermath was the product of the developments in decades following its 
defeat in the War of the Triple Alliance (1865-1870).  The constitution that was created 
following Paraguay’s defeat sought to excise the legacy of the tyrannical rule of Francisco 
Solano Lopez (1862-1870) (Hicks, 1971, p. 90)22.  The period between the War of Triple 
Alliance and the Chaco War were characterized by anarchy, frequent turnover of leaders, 
corruption and financial machination that drove the country into debt and considerable 
penetration by foreign commercial enterprises (Hicks, 1971, p. 91).23   
The two main political parties that emerged under the constitutional system of 1870 
– Colorados and Liberals – owed their genesis to two rival clubs that were formed after the 
War of Triple Alliance when the Brazilian occupation was still in effect (Lewis, 1982).24 
                                                          
22 The new constitution stated purpose was to create a liberal, democratic government.  The president was 
supposed to be elected with a bicameral legislature.  The other key principles it sought to uphold were the 
freedom of press, universal suffrage, and the protection of private property (Hicks, 1971, pp. 90-91).  This 
constitutional scheme may have been inspired by the principles of the Enlightenment but the reality of 
Paraguayan politics did not match its lofty ideals.   
23 A majority of the country’s land passed into the hands of foreign companies over this period facilitated by 
successive governments (Lewis, 1968, p. 23)  Paraguay had as many as forty-one presidents from 1872 to 
1932 when the Chaco War broke out.  Governments were always under threat of armed military uprisings and 
street battles among political factions were quite common (Farcau, 1996, p. 24).     
24The postwar winning coalition congealed that under the banner of the Colorado Party also known as the 
National Republican Party with the counter elites organized under the banner of the Liberal Party.   Apart 
from the two main parties, a Communist Party was active as well although it was not a serious contender for 
power.  The Liberal Party was initially organized by businessmen and professionals who felt cheated by the 
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The Liberal party wrested power away from the Colorados with the aid of the Argentinian 
government in 1904 (Lewis, 1968, p. xxi).  Under different leaders, Liberals held power till 
the coup of 1936 brought a new coalition to power after the Chaco War.  However, it is 
misleading to divide Paraguayan history according to the party in power as neither of these 
two major parties were cohesive entities (Hicks, 1971, pp. 92-93).  The internal violence in 
Paraguay during the decades leading up to the Chaco War was rooted as much in intra-
party factional splits as the rivalry between the two parties.  During the Liberal era, various 
groups of the Liberal party were not averse to using violent means against each other 
(Lewis, 1968, p. xxi).25 The general level of instability in Paraguay over this period is 
illustrated by the scatterplot in Figure 4.1 that displays annual count of four types of anti-
government threat events in that country between 1919 and 1939.26  
                                                          
vested interests that sought to monopolize economic opportunities with the collusion of the government that 
was formed in Paraguay after the end of foreign occupation in 1876 (Hicks, 1971, p. 92).    
25 There was a rapid turnover of leaders even though the Liberal Party held power in the period spanning 1904 
to 1936.25 The first reasonably free and fair election of Paraguay was held in 1928 in which Jose P. Guggiari 
won. Despite the election, Guggiari administration’s credibility remained suspect due to the low participation 
in the elections of 1928 that helped regime opponents to label it as a minority government.  This weakened 
Guggiari’s capacity to cope with the crises that were emerging  (Lewis, 1968, p. 29).   Liberal party was 
divided into hostile factions: (i) Guggiari loyalists, (ii) a group that favored a rival Liberal politician named 
Eduardo Schaerer and (iii) dissident Liberals that represented the radical wing of the party.  The third group 
of young radicals would later join the coup against Ayala in 1936.   
26 The graph in Figure 4.1 plots the four classes of events that were used to construct the dependent variable 
in the statistical models in Chapter 3.   
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Figure 4.1 Annual Count of Anti-Government Activities in Paraguay, 1919-1939 
 
Source: Banks Cross-National Time Series Archive 
The decade prior to the Chaco War also saw a rapid professionalization of its armed 
forces.  Following the government’s victory in the civil war of 1923, a concerted effort was 
made by the Liberal government to improve the management and training of the Armed 
Forces which went a long way in ensuring victory in the Chaco War.   The political 
establishment became more accommodative of officers of competing political loyalties.27  
From the 1920s onwards, the sociological profile of the military also changed: a career in 
                                                          
27 Officers that showed sympathies to opposition parties and movements were not automatically terminated 
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the military became sought after, as can be gauged from the number of recruits from a 
middle class or upper class background (Abente, 1989, p. 543).   
The 1920s also witnessed the birth of a key social organization called the Liga 
Nacional Independiente headed Adriano Irala and Juan Stefanich.28  It be a key voice of 
nationalist opposition against the Liberal government in the months leading up to the 
outbreak of the Chaco War.  Its publication La Nacion were filled with detailed accounts of 
the government’s lack of preparation for the impending war (Warren, 1950, p. 6).  After the 
war began, this became the main platform for the critics of the strategic and tactical 
decisions of the Ayala regime.   Members of this organization eventually joined the 
coalition that carried out the coup against Ayala.   
Prewar Paraguayan society was also suffering from socio-economic tensions that 
were simmering under the surface.  Unbeknownst to the squabbling members of the Liberal 
party elite and their respective supporters, the economic impact of the party’s laissez faire 
doctrines was also creating a pool of discontent in the society.29   
                                                          
28 The Liga began in 1928 as a political club formed by university intellectuals who advocated broad social 
and economic reforms, without regard to party politics.  Although small in numbers, the Liga exercised 
considerably influence on public opinion through the newspaper La Nacion (Lewis, 1968, p. 28).   Irala and 
Stefanich were prominent intellectuals and held professorships at the prestigious National University (Lewis, 
1968, pp. 28-29).    
29 The domination of foreigners in the Paraguayan economic life was visible to all.  Most peasants were 
landless, forcing them to work in exploitative conditions for large landowners of foreign origin (Lewis, 1982, 
p. 35). The working conditions in the privately-owned agricultural estates (latifundios) resembled feudal 
domains.  On the eve of the Chaco War only five percent of the Paraguayan population possessed their own 
land.  In a country whose chief means of production was agriculture, such a lopsided ownership structure 
gave a vast section of the citizenry a very good reason to be discontented with the existing political 




 Eve of the Chaco War 
In late 1927 and into 1928 incidents between the patrols of the two countries 
became more frequent on the disputed border with Bolivia.  In the Buenos Aires conference 
of 1928, Bolivia set aside all previous boundary treaties.  Its strict negotiating stance at the 
conference made no secret of its goal of the “complete rejection of all possessory actions of 
Paraguay since 1536 (Zook, 1961, p. 46).”  More seriously, Bolivia also began blatant 
encroachments into the disputed territory.  Paraguay’s leaders were cognizant of the threat 
but could do little more than protest as they knew that their country was totally unprepared 
to wage a full-scale war.  The failure of the Buenos Aires conference signaled to both sides 
that they would have to speed up their mobilization for war.  As the relatively weaker side, 
the threat for Paraguay was very stark. 
When Bolivians erected Fort Vangaurdia on the upper Paraguay River in 1928, the 
crisis came to a head.  Members of the Paraguayan opposition and Liberal dissenters came 
down hard on the government for its failure to respond to the Bolivian incursions.  
Colorados, the Schareristas (supporters of Liberal politician named Scharer) and Liga 
Nacional Independente did everything in their power to expose the woeful state of 
Paraguay’s armed forces in order to embarrass the government.  As news of the 
construction of Fort Vangaurdia reached the capital Asuncion, demonstrators gathered and 
there were loud demands for a robust military response to Bolivian aggression.  While 
these sentiments were duly reflected in the Paraguayan legislature, the political leadership 
could not do much as they knew that the country was in position to wage a war  (Farcau, 
1996, p. 13). 
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As mentioned in section 4.2.2, the truth was that a considerable amount of resources 
were being allocated to rapidly modernize the military.  The political problem for the 
Liberal politicians in the government was that this was all being in secrecy.  This severely 
damaged the Liberal Party’s reputation as a protector of national security.30  With the 
political debate over the government’s response becoming more rancorous, a Paraguayan 
officer Major Rafael Franco launched an attack on Fort Vanguardia without the consent of 
his political or military leadership.  This made the war all but inevitable (Farcau, 1996, p. 
12; Lewis, 1982, p. 36).  As later events would prove, there is a strong possibility that 
Franco’s actions were driven as much by patriotism as the calculation that the outbreak of 
war would be politically beneficial for a capable army officer like him.  Although Franco’s 
troops succeeded in retaking the fort of the Bolivians, this action proved to be a strategic 
disaster for Paraguay and political problem for the Liberal regime.  When Bolivia occupied 
two Paraguayan forts in retaliation, the outbreak of war seemed imminent.  To buy more 
time, the Liberal government thought it wise to agree to arbitration through a multilateral 
peace conference at Bouenos Aires.  Give the state of preparedness of their armed forces, 
this action is understandable.  When the government agreed to rebuild Fort Vangaurdia and 
return it to the Bolivians as part of a deal brokered at this conference, it further weakened 
its credibility of Liberal Party at home and dented its popularity (Lewis, 1982, p. 36).     
There were anti-government demonstrations in the capital Asuncion in October 
1928 to protest against this move.  These could only be suppressed by the lethal use of 
                                                          
30 There was a valid strategic reason why successive Liberal Party governments were trying to hide their arms 
acquisition as much as possible.  As the storms of war with Bolivia gathered, the Paraguayan government 
wanted to avoid provoking Bolivia into launching a full-scale preemptive strike.  However, the concealment 
of the arms purchasing process from the public reinforced the popular impression – shared by a section of the 
military – that Liberals were not serious about meeting the Bolivian threat (Zook, 1961, p. 67). 
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force by the government of Guggiari. Sensing an opportunity, Franco began plotting a coup 
with a number of the junior army officers to remove the Liberal government which at that 
time was headed by Guggiari.  However, he found no support from senior officers who 
were convinced by Guggiari to stay loyal to the existing government.  Guggiari then 
discreetly had Franco removed from active duty and sent abroad (Farcau, 1996, p. 26).   
The Liberal government’s reputation was further sullied by another eruption of 
violence on October 23, 1931 which was basically an attempted coup d’etat by the Liga 
Nacional.  When a crowd of anti-government student demonstrators tried to break into the 
Presidential Palace, troops opened fire killing and injuring several of them. This event had 
tremendous long-range repercussions (Lewis, 1982, p. 37).  On 26 October 1931, all 
members of the opposition Colorado Party resigned en masse from the legislature forcing 
Guggiari to demit office.  The Vice President,  Eusebio Ayala replaced him (Farcau, 1996, 
p. 26; Zook, 1961, pp. 55-56).  Many of the students who survived the “23 octubre” 
incident were reservists that later served in the Chaco War as officers.  On the front, they 
found common cause with regular army officers that had long been disgruntled with the 
Liberal government.  The battle fields of Chaco would serve as the venue for the formation 
of many of the networks of combat veterans that would be critical in the postwar attempt to 
create a new order (Lewis, 1982, p. 37). 
As domestic public opinion turned rabidly in favor of waging war, senior Liberal 
politicians were struggling to come to a consensus on the Bolivian threat. Ayala had 
publicly suggested in 1931 that Paraguay should be open to considering Bolivia’s demands 
as it could actually work in its favor:  “I suggest that the Foreign Ministry’s proposal be 
sent (to Bolivia) along with other suggestions…to show our desire to satisfy Bolivia to the 
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point of giving her access (to the Rio Paraguay).”  He further commented that a Bolivian 
port would improve trade and possibly give Paraguay preferential access to Bolivian oil.  
On the other hand, hawks within the government like Foreign Minister Jose Zubizaretta 
demanded a complete Bolivian withdrawal from the Chaco (Farcau, 1996, p. 26).  
Eventually, people like Ayala were isolated and the country moved inexorably towards 
war.31   
Ayala was formally elected President in the election of 1932.  Like his predecessor 
whose election was undermined by low voter turnout, the legitimacy of Ayala’s election 
was severely undercut by the boycott of Colorado party, the dissidents Liberals, and the 
Liga Nacional Independiente (Lewis, 1968, pp. 35-36).  President Ayala’s election 
provided a semblance of unity for the Liberal Party as both the “officialist” wing and the 
followers of Eduardo Shaerer (shaererista) supported him. Moreover, with his long 
standing ally, Estigarriia, ensconced in the post of commander-in-chief of the army, 
Ayala’s winning coalition appeared stable as the country prepared for war (Lewis, 1968, p. 
36).  
 Wartime developments and postwar period 
 The war formally began in July 1932 after Bolivia seized Fort Pitiantuta.  The start 
of the war seemed to paper over the pre-war domestic dissension in Paraguay.  Military 
reservists were called up and there was total mobilization of the society for war.  Even a 
known anti-establishment figure like Franco was called back and assigned to active duty in 
                                                          
31 It is also important to recognize Eusebio Ayala’s involvement in negotiations of a 1913 treaty for the 
competing boundary claims of Paraguay and Bolivia (Lewis, 1968, p. 29).  Ayala had given a concession to 
Bolivia that had built some forts within the arbitral zone (Lewis, 1968, p. 30).  This had already made many 
nationalist Paraguayans, who advocated a hawkish stance vis-à-vis Bolivia, suspicious of Ayala.  His public 
stance in 1931 calling for negotiations to avoid war would have further cemented these suspicions. 
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a command position.  However, this surge of nationalistic sentiment did not mean that the 
danger for Ayala from his domestic opponents had dissipated.  Even while officers and 
soldiers were fighting on the front under the leadership of Ayala and his allies, they were 
preparing for a postwar revolution to replace them  (Lewis, 1968, p. 36).  The costliness of 
the war provided these anti-Ayala forces a readymade excuse to carry out their designs 
after the war ended.  It is quite possible that these counter-elites would have attempted a 
regime change even if the war had not occurred.  However, the costliness of the war 
ensured that any credit for the military victory could not be claimed by the Ayala regime. 
Despite being the weaker power on paper, the Paraguayan forces, especially the 
peasants, generally exhibited better warfighting skills than their Bolivian counterparts.   
Within a few weeks, they succeeded in checking the Bolivian advance.  Overcoming 
tremendous challenges, the Paraguayans were occupying most of the Chaco by December 
1933(Lewis, 1982, p. 37).  It is at this point that President Ayala took a decision that would 
make his domestic political position very precarious.  Hearing reports of a string defeats 
and worsening political crisis in Bolivia had convinced a large number of Paraguayans – 
including those on the front – that the Bolivians could be forced to surrended in a matter of 
days.  At this stage, when Paraguay’s president, Eusebio Ayala proposed a truce, it invited 
universal opprobrium.  This decision was castigated by regime opponents as another 
example of the mismanagement of the war (Lewis, 1982, p. 37) .  
In their eyes, the truce the government had let the Bolivian Army off the hook when 
it was on knees.  Instead of pushing for victory, they had given it time to recoup its 
battlefield losses and reorganize to carry on the war (Farcau, 1996, pp. 161-162).  The case 
made by regime opponents was strengthened when Bolivia took advantage of the truce to 
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recover and launch a counteroffensive.  The intense fighting continued for another year and 
a half.   Ayala loyalists claimed, perhaps truthfully, that the army was in no position to 
press home the advantage in December 1933 and needed the truce to regroup.  It was 
Estigarribia who had conveyed to Ayala that Paraguayan troops were facing supply 
shortages.  Ayala concurred with his trusted commander.  However, both came under 
vicious attack by the political opponents for this decision (Farcau, 1996, p. 161).  The most 
vocal of these was Juan Stefanich of the Liga Nacional who rhetorically accused Ayala and 
Estigarribia “of betraying Paraguayan interests (Warren, 1950, p. 8).”  
Although Paraguay did win in the end, its casualties had multiplied manifold by 
then (Lewis, 1982, pp. 37-38).  Although it is a matter of conjecture, if Paraguay had 
succeeded in making Bolivia surrender in 1933 Ayala could have played on the euphoria of 
victory to deter potential challengers and survive in office.  As mentioned in Section 4.2.2, 
the last phase of the war (January 1934 – June 1935) was also the most lethal in terms of 
fatalities for Paraguay.  Estigarribia confirmed in his memoirs that there was no way his 
forces could have pressed on at that stage given the logistical problems he was facing.  In 
fact, he believed that if he carried on the campaign in December 1933 it would have 
certainly ensured Paraguay’s defeat (Farcau, 1996, p. 162).    
By the time victory came, eighteen months and thousands of additional casualties 
later, a vast section of the soldiers were terribly disaffected with the Liberal government.  It 
is not surprising that these soldiers saw their contribution and sacrifices as far more 
consequential in making this victory possible than the strategic competence of President 
Ayala and senior Paraguayan military commanders like Estigarribia.  In their view, the war 
had been won “in spite of – not because of – government’s leadership (Lewis, 1982, p. 
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38).”  While the loss of lives in battle undoubtedly caused widespread grief among the 
Paraguayan people, the victory in the Chaco War bolstered the military espirit de corps and 
helped to mobilize it as a political force to bring down the Liberal government (Abente, 
1989, pp. 543-544).  The Chaco War had the unintended consequence of undermining the 
basis of the system of elite consensus among civilian politicians by legitimizing the 
political role of the military (Abente, 1989, p. 544)  Victory in the military campaign raised 
the social profile and prestige of the armed forces to unprecedented levels. Many veterans 
were imbued with a strong sense of mission that translated into a socialization against the 
existing ruling Liberal elite that was currently represented by Ayala.   
Ayala may have hoped that the celebratory victory parades in the Paraguayan 
capital of Asuncion would translate into political capital for him.  Unfortunately for him, 
these were more an expression of mass relief rather than a reflection of the popularity of 
the government.  There was widespread sorrow at the heavy death toll rather than jubilation 
at the military victory (Farcau, 1996, p. 230).  It was in this environment that vast numbers 
of demobilized and unemployed veterans of the Chaco War congregated in Asunción in 
late 1935 and early 1936.  The divide between the ruling elite Liberals and the Chaco War 
veterans had become irreconcilable and it was a matter of time before an open struggle for 
power would erupt (Chesterton, 2013, p. 124).   
In their desire to bring down the Liberal regime, the disgruntled members of the 
armed forces found allies in the emerging and vociferous middle class of white collar 
workers, professionals, and intellectuals.  Some of them were represented in the reserve 
corps composed of university students that had been given basic military training.  This 
group served as a bridge between the regular officers and the soldiers.   Some of these 
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university students had earlier participated in the bloody protests in October 1931 
expressing the demand that the Liberal government give a robust response to Bolivian 
aggression (Lewis, 1968, p. 36).  Although they fought under the leadership of the Liberal 
government, they were bitterly opposed to the existing order dominated by its oligarchy.  
The comradeship that these Paraguayans from different backgrounds experienced in the 
battlefield of Chaco broke down the ideological foundations on which old political parties 
and rivalries were based (Pendle, 1967, p. 32).  These university educated men imbued 
with radical ideas also helped to foment discontent among workers and peasants towards 
the country’s general socio-economic structure that was high unequal and exploitative 
(Lewis, 1968, p. 36).  To add to all this, the effects of the global depression was still 
reverberating across the world.  Although Paraguay had escaped being directly impacted, 
its effects eventually added to the woes of the Paraguayan economy.    
Therefore, the aftermath of the Chaco War brought together a broad coalition 
against the Ayala regime: besides the military and the existing opposition that had 
abstained from the 1932 election, it also brought together members of two classes – the 
peasants and workers.  Throughout history, such a coalition has often proved to be a 
sufficient precondition for a social revolution.  The radicalization of the middle class and a 
small but active proletariat also created a fertile ground for the spread of both neo-fascist as 
well as leftist ideologies.  Prior to the war, these newly politicized social groups fed the 
popular perception created by anti-Liberal forces that the politicians in power were too 
weak to protect Paraguay’s interests vis-a-vis Bolivia.  After the war, Paraguay’s failure to 
occupy the Bolivian oil fields after a string of early military successes solidified this 
perception (Abente, 1989, p. 544). 
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Plotting and conspiracies among officers and soldiers against the Ayala government 
that were afoot during the war gathered steam after it ended.  The conspirators settled on 
Colonel Rafael Franco as their leader.  He was the military officer who had attacked Fort 
Vangaurdia in 1928 without authorization of the Liberal Party government.  His anti-
establishment credentials vis-à-vis the Liberal elite were very sound: He had been relieved 
of active duty for his role in the Fort Vangaurdia incident.  He was even exposed as a 
plotter of a coup against the Guggiari government and sent into exile.  Three years later, in 
October 1931, the pro-war demonstrators hailed him as their hero even as they castigated 
the Liberal government for its failure to meet the Bolivian threat.  When the war began, the 
Ayala government brought him back from exile.  He performed heroically in the war 
further bolstering his standing with the would-be revolutionaries as well as in the general 
public as a national hero.  Franco enjoyed fanatical loyalty of the soldiers under his 
command because he was successful in manipulating the military bureaucracy to ensure 
preferential treatment for them (Lewis, 1982, p. 38). Apart from his troops, there was a 
considerable section of the regular army officers that were very impressed with Franco’s 
open defiance of the government’s prewar diplomacy, which they regarded as spineless.  
They also regarded the diplomatic solution to the Vangaurdia incident of 1928 as a national 
disgrace.  Franco’s popularity among the rank and file of the armed forces can be gauged 
from the fact that he had also become the head of the 10,000 member war veterans’ 
association, the Asociacion Nacional de Ex-Combatientes  (Lewis, 1968, p. 36).  This body 
was formed in 1935 “as a protest against the inefficiency of traditional parties(Warren, 
1950, p. 9).” 
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In many ways, Franco was the ideal candidate to lead the coup.  His natural 
proclivity for self-aggrandizement had been in evidence throughout his military career. The 
other factor was his bitter, long-standing rivalry with General Estigarribia who had become 
closely associated with the Ayala regime as a result of their wartime collaboration (Farcau, 
1996, p. 238).  It was in Franco’s personal interest to prevent the Ayala regime from 
consolidating its power after the war because this would have also elevated Estigarribia’s 
claim as the military mastermind of the victory in the Chaco War.   
The Liberal government did not help its cause with a series of steps in the 
immediate aftermath of the war which were bound to make it even more unpopular.  Citing 
deteriorating economic conditions, the Liberal-dominated Paraguayan Congress voted to 
withdraw pensions due to disabled war veterans.  On the other hand, it promoted 
Estigarribia to the highest rank of field marshal along with an annual pension of 1,500 gold 
pesos for life.  This move created an irreconcilable gulf between Ayala’s favorite Army 
commander and the common soldiers and diminished Estigarribia’s prestige (Lewis, 1968, 
p. 38, 1982, p. 38).  Rumors began to circulate that Ayala was looking to get a law passed 
through Congress that would remove the term limit that barred anyone from holding the 
office of office of President for two consecutive terms (Chesterton, 2013).  The 
conspirators did everything in their power to spread this message that along with 
Estigarribia, Ayala was scheming to exploit the war victory to establish a dictatorship.   
The other pitfall for the Ayala regime was its handling of the postwar negotiations 
that were held under the auspices of a Pan-American forum of neutral nations. The 
importance of postwar negotiations can hardly be understated in the political events that 
unfolded in Paraguay in the aftermath of the Chaco War.  There were a variety of factors 
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that would go into the deal that would eventually be struck.   The protocol enshrining the 
cease-fire began at noon on June 14, 1935 (Farcau, 1996, p. 236).  On November 1, 1935 
the representatives to the peace conference attended by six neutral countries and the 
belligerents declared the war over. The problematic nature of the peace conference is 
illustrated by the remark made by the Chairman Hugh Gibson, who represented the US.  He 
bluntly told the Paraguayan delegation that it could not get everything it wanted because 
unlike “a war ended by the imposition of terms by the victor…in the present case, the 
cessation of hostilities was negotiated, not imposed… (Rout, 1970, p. 128).  This left Ayala 
in a conundrum: at home there was little doubt in anyone’s mind that Paraguay had 
comprehensively defeated their enemy and only a maximalist postwar agreement in its 
favor would be politically viable for his domestic audience.  The Paraguayan victory on the 
battlefield made it so that any settlement with even a hint of compromise could be 
portrayed as treason by Ayala’s political opponents.   
After a period of negotiation, the Chaco Peace Conference secured a protocolized 
act 21 January 1936 which released all prisoners of war and renewed diplomatic relations 
between the two belligerents.  According to its terms, Paraguay traded its prisoners of war 
with Bolivia for a fresh guarantee of the status quo in terms of the territory it had acquired.  
It was also concluded that the costs of maintaining prisoners would be that of the host 
country, which was also in Paraguay’s favor.  The postwar agreement to which the Ayala 
government gave its assent cannot be called a weak compromise.  Any objective 
assessment of the terms of the armistice would lead anyone to conclude that Paraguay had 
achieved a diplomatic victory.  Zook concludes that “... the state (Paraguay) whose arms 
had beaten the aggressor preserved the military triumph at the peace table (Zook, 1961, p. 
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24).” Yet, the opponents of the Liberal regime in Paraguay were successful in capitalizing 
on the popular impression that their country had failed to capitalize on its military success.  
The main reason for this was that while these negotiations were going on, the 
domestic situation facing Ayala was getting worse by the day.  Military leaders who had 
policy differences with the high command during the war, and were consequently 
sidelined, were unhappy.  The sudden and rapid demobilization was an economic and 
social setback for many members of the military, especially for reserve officers.  This pool 
of embittered, discontented veterans of the Chaco War were ready to believe the opposition 
propaganda that the Ayala government was throwing away the hard fought victory at the 
peace table (Farcau, 1996, p. 238; Zook, 1961, p. 248).  It was clear by now that the 
prospective revolutionaries wanted to base their campaign on the propaganda that Ayala 
was not bargaining hard to protect Paraguayan interests at the peace conference (Farcau, 
1996, p. 238). 
  After the war ended in July 1935, Colonel Franco had been assigned to head the 
Military College by the Ayala government.   It was on Estigarribia’s recommendation that 
Ayala had appointed Franco to this post.  Estigarribia mistakenly thought that this move 
would pacify the radical segments of the military officer corps (Chesterton, 2013).  The 
Ayala government was aware of the aforementioned conspiracy and the prospective role of 
Franco.  However, he let the situation fester.  Later, Ayala explained the reason why he 
failed to respond promptly and vigorously to the gathering threat to his survival in the 
immediate aftermath of the war.  According to him, he was waiting for the peace settlement 
at the Chaco Peace Conference with Bolivia to be signed before acting.  He thought that 
openly cracking down on regime opponents at that stage would have worsened domestic 
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dissension, embarrassed Paraguay before the international community and weakened its 
negotiating position.  Ayala’s patience finally ran out when Franco started using his post at 
the Military College as a platform to give anti-government speeches.  Estigarribia ordered 
his arrest on February 4, 1936 and he was deported to Argentina two days later (Chesterton, 
2013; Warren, 1950, p. 10). The New York Times reported the events unfolding in 
Asuncion in the following manner (Gleditsch et al., 2009): 
The Paraguayan Government has formally charged Colonel Rafael Franco, its most 
prominent Chaco war hero, with being a Communist and has ordered him deported to 
Argentina. A communiqué from the Ministry of War charges that Colonel Franco plotted 
the overthrow of the government, instigated and supported by Soviet organizations. ...For 
more than a year there has been strong resentment in the Paraguayan Army against the 
professional politicians who control the government. Now that these politicians are 
squabbling among themselves for the Presidency, there is a strong sentiment both in and 
outside the army in favor of establishing a military government and ousting all 
professional politicians. Colonel Franco, as the idol of the soldiers, would be the natural 
candidate for the Presidency if this movement should be successful.” 
 
 This was followed by another Franco collaborator, Colonel Camilo Recalde being 
arrested.  Ayala confined him to the military hospital rather than making a public spectacle 
of his arrest.  Unfortunately for Ayala and the Liberal regime, this move was not enough to 
deter the plotters which included several mid-ranking military officers. While some leading 
civilian politicians were also part of this conspiracy, it was the military leaders that were 
the major protagonists that shaped the events that were about to unfold (Lewis, 1968, pp. 
38-39).  After the sudden removal of Franco and Recalde, the plotters led by Facundo 
Recalde (Colonel Recalde’s brother)32 convinced another military leader with sufficient 
seniority and prestige – Colonel Fedrico Wedell Smith, the commander of Campo Grande 
garrison – to join them(Lewis, 1968, p. 39).   
                                                          
32 Unlike his brother, Facundo Recalde was a journalist by profession 
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On February 17, 1936, the conspirators struck in the shape of a trainload of troops 
who had been stationed at the Campo Grande cavalry garrison.  After disembarking at the 
Asuncion station in the early morning hours, they proceeded to the president’s palace.  
Ayala was drive to take refuge on a gunboat on the river.  When no help came to rescue 
him, he resigned.  Thus ended thirty-two years of Liberal rule.  Estigarribia, who was in the 
Chaco, learned of the coup, but was in position to offer any resistance. He was arrested 
upon his return to Asuncion on 21 February, and both he and Ayala were sent into exile 
(Farcau, 1996, p. 40; Lewis, 1968).  Colonel Franco was now summoned back from 
Argentina to head the new government under the banner of the Febrerista Party (Lewis, 
1982, p. 38).  Domestically, Franco imposed a strict press censorship.  Tribunals were 
created to prosecute politicians who were suspected of treason during the war.  Franco 
promised that land would be expropriated from their owners and redistributed to the 
landless poor (Pendle, 1967, p. 33). 
Unfortunately for the new regime, the soldiers and intellectuals who came together 
on an anti-Liberal platform had little else to hold them together.  The people who held 
portfolios in the Febrerista regime held such disparate ideological beliefs that it was a 
matter of time before the government would run into trouble.  This is clear from the 
allegiances of Franco’s key ministers: While the ministers of justice and education were 
socialists; those holding the treasury and the interior portfolios were neo-fascists who 
wanted an authoritarian state; a Colorado party man was in charge of agriculture; and the 
minister of foreign affairs Stefanich was a liberal democrat from the Liga Nacional 
Independiente.  When each of these constituent factions made demands on Franco to 
implement their disparate policy agendas, he found it impossible to reconcile the 
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contradictions (Lewis, 1982, p. 39).  Franco’s solution was to impose restrictions on 
political activity: Under Decree Law 152 passed on March 10, 1936 all labor unions, 
parties, business organizations were abolished (Lewis, 1968, p. 53).   This caused a sharp 
reaction from a variety of groups and associations which included ex-combatants and labor.  
In the face of such widespread resentment, several key members of the cabinet resigned 
destabilizing the government.  It was only members of the Liga Nacional were left to 
support the regime (Lewis, 1982, p. 39).   
On the diplomatic front, Franco failed to push the core agenda of the revolution: to 
renegotiate the “shameful” peace treaty with Bolivia at the Chaco Peace Conference that 
the Ayala government had signed on January 21, 1936.   Stefanich of the Liga Nacional 
who was now Rafael Franco’s foreign minister had previously attacked the January 21, 
1936, agreement and denied that the Liberal Party diplomats had ever won any diplomatic 
victories over Bolivia. The new regime promptly repudiated the peace treaty as one of its 
first official acts (Farcau, 1996, p. 239).    However, after months of negotiations Franco’s 
government had to agree the withdrawal of the Paraguayan forces from the advanced 
positions that they had held since the end of the Chaco War.  While there is no doubt that 
Franco and his supporters genuinely believed that they would defend Paraguay’s interests 
much better than the ousted government, their ambitious goals were stymied by the realities 
on the ground in Chaco.    
 A Neutral Military Commission had been set up to negotiate the postwar 
boundaries between the two countries.  The Franco government tried to bargain hard to 
retain the territories it had acquired during the war, based on the widespread belief that they 
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were sitting on unexplored oil deposits. 33 However, they were told by the commission that 
these expectations were highly exaggerated.34  The Franco government initially refused to 
believe these reports as it had come to power precisely to ensure that Paraguay maximize 
its gains from the Chaco War.  Once they were convinced that the prospective oil windfall 
was a mirage, Foreign Minister Juan Stefanich indicate a possible reorientation of his 
nation’s position on December 25, 1936 (Rout, 1970, p. 144).35  This reorientation meant 
that Franco and the Febreristas would have to drop a major part of their anti-Liberal plank.  
                                                          
33 Even before the hostilities ended when the Liberal government was in power, Paraguayan forces had begun 
to drill in the Chaco.  Prior to June 1935, the Paraguayans had drilled some ninety-five wells searching for 
petroleum.  On the Bolivian side of the line, in what had been part pf the neutral zone, troops guarded three 
capped wells.  Dry well had been found by the Paraguayans near Machareti.  Hence, the belief that 
Paraguayans held territory rich in petroleum was not totally absurd.   
34 One of the members of the commission, Major John Weeks, a United States military attache, wrote back to 
the State Department on June 23, 1936: “from conversation with Paraguayan officers, it is evident that they 
believe that they occupy territory containing oil, and they expect to retain this occupied territory (Rout, 1970, 
p. 143-144).”  In June 1936, Spruille Braden, the US mediator at the Peace Conference, informed the State 
Department that both Standard Oil and Argnetine Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF) had come to the 
same conclusion: “…based upon their respective geological and engineering studies, and even a certain 
amount of drilling…oil does not exist in the area to the east of the line of hitos.  Authorities further state that 
were it to be found, it (oil) would be at such great depth as to make it entirely uneconomical for exploitation.  
In so far as possible, this information will be conveyed to Paraguayan officials in an attempt to lessen their 
desire to retain this western section of the Chaco (Rout, 1970, p. 145).” 
35 The foreign minister’s stand did not indicate that all Paraguayan diplomats were preparing to renounce 
posthaste their quest for petroleum.  Juna Isidro Ramirez, conference delegation head under Rafael Franco, 
continued to believe in the possibility of a Chaco bonanza.  On January 18, 1937, he urged Stefanich to 
undertake an extensive subsoil study in the Machareti-Nancorainza-Tiguipa area.  In May 1937 Emiliano 
Rebuelto, Argentine government engineer, informed Ramirez that extremely deep wells would have to be 
drilled to obtain petroleum in the western Chaco.  In August Ramirez recommended that Carlos Emilio 
Cremiex, a Swiss-born Argentine national, be allowed to explore for petroleum near Machareti.  The final 
Paraguayan effort to locate petroleum came in November and December 1937 (Rout, 1970, p. 145) On 
January 4, 1938, however, Paraguayan delegates were at last were prepared to admit that if petroleum 
reserves existed to the east of the line of hitos they were “commercially unimportant.”(Rout, 1970, p. 146).     




As it turned out, when Franco eventually ordered his commanders in the Chaco to 
withdraw from the positions that were being held since the end of the war it precipitated a 
rebellion in the army that brought down the Franco government.  Led by Lieutenant 
Colonel Ramon Paredes the garrison at Concepcion and Campo Grande joined forces and 
launched an attack on the capital.  On August 15, 1937 Dr. Felix Paiva replaced Franco as 
provisional president (Warren 1950, p. 16).  The Liberals were back in power, but this time 
it was with the explicit backing of the army.  This change of government had little effect on 
the Chaco negotiations: the peace treaty fixed the final boundary in the Chaco behind the 
Paraguayan battle lines.  The Liberals were aware that the danger to their survival had not 
ceased and in 1939, they went looking for a popular military officer to replace Paiva.  
Marshall Estigarribia, the “General of Victory,” was the natural choice. Once in office, 
however, Estigarribia found the going very tough.  The social reforms introduced by the 
Franco government had raised expectations regarding the scope of welfare functions of the 
state.  The old Liberal politicians in Congress wanted to junk those measures while 
Estigarribia concluded that doing so would be politically disastrous.  This led to a 
constitutional crisis: Estigarribia dissolved the Congress and assumed dictatorial powers.  
He asked his cabinet, who called themselves “New Liberals” to write a new constitution 
whose provision would contain many of the social welfare principles embodied in Franco’s 
“February Revolution” and was a huge departure from the laissez-faire doctrines of 1870 
constitution.36 
                                                          
36 Estigarriia commented on the reasons for the ideological shift represented by the new constitution:  “As a 
result of the War of the Chaco and other political circumstances, there had occurred an anarchy dangerous to 
the national existence…Paraguay needed a constitution more genuinely its own, without detriment to the 
cardinal principles of American democracy states in the Constitution of Philadelphia and the Argentine 
Constitution of 1853, and adopted by our country in the Constitution of 1870, which arose out of a great 
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              Although the new constitution was to remain in force for another quarter of a 
century, a series of events pushed the “New Liberals” out of power and brought the old 
Liberals back.  However, this was to be a pyrrhic victory and Liberals of all stripes were 
soon banished from Paraguayan political life.  After Estigarriia’s sudden death in an 
airplane accident in 1940 his war minister, General Higinio Morinigo became president as 
a caretaker president.  Once in power, Morinigo manipulated the military appointment 
system to build his support to turn on the old Liberals who had put him in power.  The 
ghost of the Chaco War came back to haunt the Liberals years after it had ended:  Citing a 
document recently published by the Argentine Foreign Ministry regarding its activities in 
the Chaco Peace Conference, Morinigo made the case that Liberals had tried to solicit 
Bolivian support to overthrow the Franco government.  The Liberal party was banned and 
their leaders exiled.  Henceforth, Morinigo used the constitution of 1940, with its expanded 
presidential powers, for legitimizing a dictatorship whole sole constituency of support was 
the military (Lewis, 1982, p. 42).   
 Political impact of war costs 
It is clear from the account presented above that Paraguay was not unfamiliar to 
dramatic and visible political instability prior to the Chaco War.  Although it was 
nominally a constitutional democracy the rules and norms of political competition were not 
settled.  However, the heavy costs that the Chaco war imposed on its people made it 
                                                          
disaster.  “it sought…to defend more ably our society and to broaden the radius of action of the State in that 
which refers to its intervention in economic and social life, by which the discarded concept of a neutral and 




possible for new elites to bid for power and opened the space for a fresh set of political 
actors to pursue their policy agendas.  Military success that was achieved at a heavy cost 
could not protect its wartime political leaders from removal.  Interestingly, even the 
replacement of Ayala, whose culpability was clear and well-established, did not exhaust the 
potential for threats and unrest for his successor.  The successor of the wartime government 
also failed to survive for too long as the new government struggled to negotiate the peace.  
The fate of this victorious wartime government and its successor calls for a reexamination 
of the concept of political punishment and leader culpability that has become so central to 
the literature of war and political survival (Croco, 2011; H. E. Goemans, 2000).   The fate 
of successors of culpable wartime leaders may be an additional avenue of research that can 
be explored. 
 Various historical accounts clearly indicate that the coup against President Ayala 
was primarily organized by a faction within the military.  In this enterprise, they were 
assisted by a conglomeration of political groups and factions who advocated contradictory 
policy programs.  The coming together of this motley coalition under the umbrella of 
counter elites fits the theoretical argument that I had outlined in Chapter 2.  My theory 
basically rests on how costlier wars change the incentives of key members of the 
selectorate.  When war costs pile up, counter-elites sense an opportunity to exploit the 
general sense of public malaise in their favor. In a country like Paraguay that had its first 
nominally free and fair election in 1928, the formation of this kind of a conspiratorial 
coalition is not very surprising.  However, it is definitely defensible to argue that the 
tremendous costs of the Chaco War on the country created a hospitable environment for 
such a coalition to carry out its conspiracy to bring down the existing government.   
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The revolt against Ayala received support from a variety of civilian actors, mostly 
unsuccessful anti-Liberal politicians and ideologues that had little hope of attaining power 
through normal democratic processes in the existing system.  This included Marxists, 
reformist moderates, Fascists, Colorados and the Liga Nacional.  The radical wing of the 
Liberal Party that had opposed the Ayala faction also joined.  However, it was the 
disgruntled army officers like Franco that led the plot.  After assuming power through 
unconstitutional means, the new winning coalition felt an obligation to justify replacing 
twenty-five years of civilian rule – however corrupt and inefficient it may have been 
perceived to be – with that of the military.  Among these rationalizations, the heavy 
casualties suffered during the course of the war came in very handy.  By pointing to the 
heavy losses that were incurred, the Febreristas could cover their actions with the sheen of 
credibility, patriotism and national interest.  They launched a frontal attack on the Liberal 
party personified in Ayala’s government for failing to protect the national interest and 
taking decisions that resulted in avoidable fatalities (Lewis, 1968, p. 41). The proclamation 
put out on behalf of the new political formation when it assumed power ferociously 
attacked the Liberal for failure to manage the war properly.  The following passage in the 
proclamation is particularly instructive as it underlines that the conduct of the Chaco War 
by the Liberal government headed by President Eusebio Ayala was crucial in motivating 
them (Smith & Recalde, 2013, pp. 218-219): 
“The savage war broke out over our people, who were manacled by the satrapy of Puerto 
Pinasco and its occult machinations. Through the irony of fate, he was the president and 
commander in chief of the nation’s armies, whose men went off to leave their bones in the 
blood-stained fields of the Chaco, already the home of enemy machine guns.  And then not 
a day passed when the compromised agent of foreign bosses did not try to diminish by 
every means in his power the miraculous victories of a Paraguay revived…the proof of 
treason carried to its maximum: the offering of an armistice to Bolivia after the victory of 
Campo Via, in order to prevent the capture of the remainder of the invading army…He 
(President Ayala) planned the destruction of the Liberating Army in order to replace it with 
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prison guard.  We will not mention the people’s anguish and desperation, which the 
vampires dwelling in the presidential circle sharpen day by day in order to enslave them.  
Hunger strikes every home.  Thirty thousand Paraguayans died in the Chaco, thousands of 
millions of pesos have been spent, yet in the postwar period they casually debate the most 
urgent problems and ramifications brought upon the country by the regime…But all this 
might have been sufferable had it not been for new plans by the people’s unfaithful 
president and his accomplices to pare down the Republic’s territorial sovereignty and to 
irredeemably frustrate all the victories of our armies in the Chaco War. ” 
  
My contention is that absent the incredible costliness of the war, such rhetoric would 
not have carried much meaning.  Once such heavy costs had been sunk, the wartime 
government of Ayala found itself battling the odds of survival.  Even if Ayala had survived, 
he would have only done so by beating back a robust counter-coalition that was intent on 
removing him.  The heavy casualties and the public disaffection these created altered the 
incentives of key members of the selectorate in postwar Paraguay and motivated them to 
bid for power.  They felt confident in plotting and carrying out a coup against a government 
that – by any objective measure – had performed brilliantly in defending the nation in a 
deadly and prolonged war.  The plotters were convinced that despite the military victory, a 
public case could plausibly be made against President Ayala and the Liberal Party that they 
were unworthy of continuing in power.  This helped motivate the pool of diverse political 
actors that became united in their opposition against the Liberal government.  The 
exhaustion and disaffection in the Paraguayan with the long and grinding war was 
exploited by a coalition of counter-elites that had been out of favor with the Ayala regime.   
As with other wars, the soldiers and officers that experienced the brutal realities of 
combat in the Chaco were traumatized by the experience.  Some of them also became 
radical opponents of the existing political order.  A rapid postwar demobilization placed 
46,515 members of the military back into civilian life after the armistice of June 1935 
(Clodfelter, 2002, p. 414).  A large proportion of these combat veterans would provide the 
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base of support for the counter-elites that deposed the wartime winning coalition of Ayala.  
It may be the case that some Paraguayans had wanted to avoid war at all costs and were 
unhappy that the Ayala government failed to keep the peace with Bolivia.  The Paraguayan 
Communist Party is an example of such a group.  However, this was decidedly a minority.  
The overwhelming mood within Paraguay in the years and months leading up to the 
initiation of hostilities was in favor of war.  Given that Bolivia was the aggressor and had 
been encroaching on the Chaco for quite some time, the high stakes of an impending war 
were clear to all whether they were part of organized political formations or not.   Paraguay 
had a predominantly agro-based economy.   All its neighbors were larger and relatively 
more powerful (Farcau, 1996, p. 23).  Its last major militarized dispute, the War of Triple 
Alliance (1865-1870) had been disastrous: it lost nearly half the territory that it possessed 
when it became independent from Spanish rule.  The war had also annihilated most of its 
male population  (Farcau, 1996, pp. 23-24).  Given this legacy, the repeated encroachments 
by Bolivian forces in the Chaco were initially met with fatalism among ordinary 
Paraguayans.  However, as the implications of the Bolivian actions on the border became 
known, this fatalism gave way to a wave of intense nationalistic sentiment.  There was a 
popular mood that a war had become essential to defend their homeland against Bolivian 
aggression.  It was widely believed that a failure to appropriately respond the Bolivian 
threat could spell the end of Paraguay as a nation.  From the beginning, the majority 
opinion within Paraguay was that any war with Bolivia would be a fight for survival 
(Farcau, 1996, p. 24).    
Given that the Paraguayan opinion was largely in favor of this war, what explains the 
formation of a diverse counter coalition to depose the wartime government of Ayala that 
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carried out the popular will?  Once the war losses had been accumulated, these forces 
calculated that the visible costliness of the war had negated any political capital that the 
Ayala government would gain from achieving and exceeding its prewar aims.  Ayala’s 
opponents focused on the perceived failure of his regime to press home the strategic 
advantage in the final months of the war.   They also tried to exploit populist sentiment in 
Paraguay that a victory gave their country the right to inflict the most onerous terms on 
Bolivia in postwar negotiations.  Hence, any concession, however minor, made by the 
Ayala regime at the Chaco Peace Conference was portrayed as a betrayal of Paraguay’s 
national interest.       
Despite emerging victorious, the Ayala government could not counteract popular 
opinion and propaganda of its opponents that it had mismanaged the war.  After the heavy 
casualties that it suffered over the course of three long years, every move made by the 
Ayala government during the treaty negotiations at the multilateral Chaco peace 
conference37 was viewed with deep skepticism.  The news of minutest hint of possible 
concessions to Bolivia was immediately castigated as an example of Ayala’s weakness.  
Eventually, the coalition of anti-Ayala forces settled on a popular war hero, Rafael Franco 
as their leader and proceeded to carry out the coup against him.  
Franco regime was beset with several problems and it could have fallen under the 
weight of its own contradictions.  However, it also found out that replacing a government 
that had fought an expensive war leaves behind a toxic legacy.  When Franco’s government 
had to admit that there was no oil bonanza in the offing from the territories Paragauy had 
                                                          
37 The Chaco peace conference was organized under the auspices of several countries including Argentina, 
Brazil, and the United States to help negotiate the termination of the war 
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acquired during the war at such a huge cost, it made its position untenable as well.  Franco 
was also deposed by a rebellion from within the army.  Just eighteen months ago, Franco 
was being universally hailed as a war hero who could lead the revolutionary charge against 
the weak and corrupt Liberal political establishment.  Even Franco found it impossible to 
survive when he could not deliver the spoils of victory that would adequately compensate 
for the losses that had been incurred.  Although Liberals succeeded in briefly returning to 
power, they soon found themselves being banished from Paraguayan politics as a military-
backed dictatorship under General Morinigo assumed power in 1940.  This set Paraguay on 
a trajectory of decades of authoritarian rule and derailed the prospects of a constitutional 
democracy for some time to come.   
4.3 Case II: Postwar Regime Survival  
To say that defeat in war is the worst outcome for a wartime government and its 
leader, is to state the obvious.  It follows that the risk of terrible political consequences for 
the regime and its head should be extremely high after – or sometimes during – such a war.  
As the statistical results in Chapter 3 have shown, the likelihood of anti-government events 
tends to be much higher in countries that faced defeat.  It is intuitive to think that states do 
not concede defeat unless the costs that they are incurring have become untenable.  Given 
the overwhelming support for the defeat variable in explaining postwar threats to the 
government and survival of wartime leaders, I decided to choose a case where the wartime 
leader and government survived despite a defeat.  The analysis focuses on the last years of 




This investigation of the costs of Egypt’ defeat in the Six Day War and postwar 
domestic politics is driven by two objectives.  First, the case allows us to make a judgment 
on the relative weight of outcome and cost as an explanatory factor of antigovernment 
hostility: What is the effect of the costliness of war in a country that had suffered an 
“extreme” defeat?  Such a case should also help in judging whether a defeated wartime 
leader that survives paid any political price.  If he does, how is this price extracted by his 
domestic constituency?  As I mentioned in Chapter 2, most studies of postwar survival 
code all surviving leaders in the same category.  I argued that since all wartime leaders that 
survive are not alike, the bluntness of this coding scheme may generate incomplete and/or 
erroneous conclusions regarding the effects of war on domestic politics.  The variation in 
the incidence and intensity of domestic challenges faced by a surviving wartime leader can 
help us evaluate whether he was punished or not.   
Any wartime leader that is still office three years after a war is usually classified as 
doing “OK”.  Even if some culpability had been assigned to the leader for waging the war, 
it is said that he avoided punishment (Chiozza & Goemans, 2011; Croco, 2011; Henk E. 
Goemans et al., 2009).  By surviving a costly defeat, Nasser after 1967 defied the 
expectation of political accountability advanced in most theories of war and leader survival.  
He remained in office for three years after a comprehensive defeat which cost thousands of 
lives.  The case addresses the question: Short of removal, what other negative 
consequences can a wartime leader face?  Does Nasser’s postwar survival mean that he 
paid no price for his war performance and the costs that were incurred?  Did his regime 
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escape “second-order”38 negative domestic consequences of war involvement?  The 
historical record suggests that Nasser did face serious domestic problems during the 
postwar period.  We need to pay close attention to manifestation of these anti-government 
events that occurred in Egypt soon after the end of the 1967 war.  The massive costs that 
Egypt suffered in a short span of time and the loss of the Sinai had forced Nasser to accept 
defeat in the Six Day War.  This event created opportunities for new domestic actors to 
enter the political process and challenge the norms and practices of the regime.  Despite the 
evidence of postwar anti-government events that I present, I only claim a partial “fit” of 
this case with the argument that I made in Chapter 2.  While both outcome – a 
comprehensive defeat – and costliness were important contributors to the changes in 
Egyptian domestic politics, the evidence suggests that the defeat was by far the most 
palpable cause of postwar political destabilization.  In the sections that follow, I will 
illustrate how this happened.        
 Six Day War and Egypt: An Overview 
The June 1967 crisis that eventually resulted in the war erupted in a matter of weeks 
with the Egyptian government taking most of the initial escalatory steps (James, 2012, p. 
58).  It resulted in approximately ten thousand deaths and a crushing defeat at the hands of 
Israel.  As the name suggests, this happened in a matter of days.  Egypt lost major portions 
of its territory in the Sinai.  Nasser resigned taking moral responsibility for the defeat.  
However, there was an immediate upsurge of popular emotion against his decision among 
the Egyptian people which was reflected in massive gatherings on the streets of Cairo on 
                                                          
38 As I explained in Chapter 2, these cover those events that make it difficult for a ruler to govern effectively 
even if these do not result in his removal from office. 
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July 9 and 10.  This sentiment allowed him to regain the reins of power which he held till 
his death in 1970 from natural causes.  Although Nasser survived, he could only do so after 
purging several members of the pre-war winning coalition who were made the scapegoats 
for the debacle.  There was a clear split in the prewar winning coalition as the true scale of 
fiasco became known.  A significant section of the senior leadership of the armed forces 
began to actively plot a coup in the immediate aftermath of the war.  They would have 
surely carried out the conspiracy, had they not been purged by Nasser and his supporters.  
It can be speculated that a different set of actors would have succeeded in deposing Nasser 
under such circumstances.  It was Nasser’s alacrity in taking preemptive action that saved 
him from removal and post-exit punishment at the hands of the coup plotters.  A vast 
number of top generals and senior officers were put on trial and sentenced.  Although 
Nasser avoided direct punishment by surviving, the postwar period was highly challenging 
for him and his regime which supports my argument that leaders can face punishment in a 
variety of ways while in office.  In his last three years in power, Nasser had to manage 
“second-order” domestic political consequences that war involvement can generate.   
My argument in Chapter 2 rested on the costliness of the war generating its own 
dynamic that encourages anti-government forces to mobilize and target the incumbent.   
Egypt after the 1967 war presents a challenge to that argument.  When a defeat occurs so 
quickly and decisively, the disaggregation of the independent effects of costs and outcome 
on postwar political events can become difficult to establish.  What is undeniable is that 
this war was followed unprecedented mass unrest:  Within a few months of the end of the 
war, there were demonstrations and protests that were directly motivated by the public 
anger at Egypt’s war performance.  Social groups that had hitherto never dared to openly 
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criticize and protest against the Nasser regime came out in full force to make their voice 
heard.  These included students, workers and intellectuals which is a lethal cocktail that can 
destabilize any country, especially one emerging from a disastrous war.  These unrest 
events compelled Nasser to promise several measures to reform the state apparatus, which 
he is unlikely to have considered otherwise.  An interesting aspect of the postwar public 
reaction was the vocal demand for the resumption of hostilities so that the status quo ante 
could be restored.  The mass public supported greater hawkishness rather than a fatalistic 
acceptance of the war outcome.  With dominant public opinion behind him, Nasser 
launched his country into another full-fledged war with Israel called the War of Attrition on 
March 6, 1969 to “take back” the territories it had lost in 1967.  Egypt again suffered 
significant casualties, including civilians, but its forces performed much better than in 
1967.  However, the War of Attrition ultimately ended in a stalemate in August 1970.  
Nasser died a few weeks later of a heart attack. 
 
          Table 4.3. Egypt in the Six Day War: Basic Facts 
Variable Observation 
Battle Deaths 10,000 
Civilians threatened  No 
Outcome Defeat 
Role in War Initiator 
War Stakes  High 
Number of Leadership Changes during War 0 
Postwar tenure of Wartime Leader Died of natural caused after 3 years 






 Egypt’s costs in the Six Day War  
Egypt was the strongest of the Arab states that fought Israel in this war under the 
command of Field Marshall Abdel Hakim Amer.  Within the first two days of the war, 
Egypt lost 309 planes to Israeli airstrikes.  In the remaining days, it lost an additional 61 
planes.  In the Sinai, the Egyptians deployed 100,000 troops and 930 tanks under the 
command of Abdel Mohsen Mortaugi.  Egypts’ defeat in this theater was comprehensive:  
it lost 700 tanks, 500 artillery pieces, and 10,000 trucks.  According to Clodfelter, the 
breakdown of losses in this war was as follows: 3,000 killed, 5,000 wounded, and 4,990 
taken prisoner, for a total 12,990(Clodfelter, 2008).  Another estimate puts the total 
casualties at 17,500 soldiers of which 11,500 were killed and the rest wounded or captured.  
Out of the prewar strength of 300,000 armed forces, only half of the troop units remained 
intact as cohesive formations when the war ended (Kandil, 2012, p. 79).  The COW 
database estimates the battle deaths to be 10,000 (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).  This 
interstate war is considered to be the most severe in human history in terms of battle deaths 
per day (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010, p. 159).  In addition, 700,000 Egyptian civilians had to 
be evacuated from the towns in the Suez Canal zone that had been shelled (Stephens, 1972, 
p. 510).      
Under the barrage of preemptive Israeli air strikes, the Egyptian air force, in 
particular, was totally gutted making serious offensive operations on the ground 
impossible.  It lost most of its MIG fighters, and all of its TU-16 medium bombers and IL-
28 bombers, during the Six Day War (McLaurin, Mughisuddin, & Wagner, 1977, p. 83).  
The short duration of the war also meant that Egyptian ground troops and infantry were not 
deployed over long periods in a combat environment.  As Muhammad Fawzi, the chief of 
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the Egyptian general staff in June 1967, pointed out:  “A staggering 75 percent of Egypt’s 
ground forces did not even see the enemy, let alone engage in combat (McGregor, 2006, p. 
272).”  In any case, Egypt’s troop strength of 180,00039 would have meant little given the 
overwhelming technical superiority of Israel’s air force (Dekmejian, 1971).  It would have 
been politically foolhardy to have carried on fighting, continue to suffer more losses and 
put its civilian population at risk and lose more territory.   
One of the major reasons for the fatalities incurred by Egyptian forces was the 
mishandling of the retreat from the Sinai battlefront by Field Marshall Amer.  Within hours 
after the land battle began on July 6, Amer decided to order a withdrawal.  Fawzi, the Chief 
of the General Staff at that time was stunned by this decision as he felt that the Egyptian 
land forces were holding their ground.  Instead of falling back and counterattacking Israeli 
positions, Amer ordered a precipitous withdrawal to be completed within twenty-four 
hours.  However, given the number of troops this step proved disastrous (Kandil, 2012, pp. 
81-82).   Almost eighty percent of the Egyptian army’s equipment had to be left behind on 
the battlefront (Gawrych, 2000, p. 71).  Only six percent of the soldiers sent to the Sinai 
returned with their weapons intact (Kandil, 2012, p. 82).  Thousands of the deployed 
soldiers went back to their villages after crossing the Suez Canal rather than rejoin their 
units (Gawrych, 2000, p. 71).  Those who were less fortunate were stranded in the open 
desert as targets of Israeli airpower.  Not surprisingly, almost all the casualties suffered by 
Egypt in this war occurred on July 6 (Kandil, 2012, p. 82). As the future war minister Abd 
al-Ghany al-Gamasy later recalled (quoted in Kandil, 2012, p. 82): 
                                                          
39 Clodfelter (2008) estimates put the total number of armed personnel at approximately 240,000 while Kandil 
(2012) at 300,000. 
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I watched a heavy flow of troops move westward (away from the Sinai).  It was 
completely disorganized…Could a retreat take place in this manner, when it normally 
required extreme discipline and precision and according to the doctrine of war, should take 
place while the fighting still continued…The field command had given up control of its 
forces at the most critical time…the situation can neither be explained nor 
excused…troops withdraw(ing) in the most pathetic way…under continuous enemy air 
attacks…an enormous graveyard of scattered corpses, burning equipment, and exploding 
ammunition. 
 
The immediate economic consequences of the war were no less significant.  A total 
of $400-$500 million annually from the Suez Canal ($230-$250), Sinai Oil Fields ($100) 
and tourism ($100) were no longer available to Egypt (Barnett, 1992, pp. 110-111).  These 
constituted nearly two-thirds of the balance of payments deficit incurred for 1966.  The loss 
of this revenue, the fiscal crisis and immediate costs of defense impacted the government 
budget that was proposed in the aftermath of the war.  Addressing the National Assembly, 
the Deputy President Zakaria Moheiddin reminded his fellow Egyptians regarding their 
obligations while introducing new budget and tax increases:  “It is the duty of every citizen 
to keep the targets of struggle always in sight and adapt to life to new circumstances.”  
Contrary to the public stance of the regime, government decided to protect the Egyptian 
people from the costs of the war.  Thus, while direct taxes were increased by 25%, the lax 
and inefficient tax enforcement machinery of the Egyptian state ensured that such taxes 
would hardly have any impact.  However, indirect taxes and the prices of government 
subsidized commodities increased to some extent.  However, the majority of the revenue 
loss and war expenditure was met by skimming the profits and assets of the public sector 
enterprises.   
The Six Day War shook the ideological foundations of the Nasser regime.  Nasser 
had championed “Arab Socialism” since he emerged as the undisputed leader of Egypt 
thirteen year ago.  Pre-war Egypt was already beset with fiscal, foreign currency and 
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balance of payments crisis which was accentuated by the loss of revenue due to the 1967 
defeat (Barnett, 1992, p. 110).  The economic crisis that followed the war forced Nasser to 
adopt more market-oriented policies.  For example,  exchange controls were liberalized to 
make it easier for Egyptian citizens working abroad and foreign residents to repatriate their 
foreign exchange earnings (Barnett, 1992, p. 113).  In addition, the economic costs of the 
1967 war forced Nasser to look for international donors to resurrect the country’s finances.  
At a conference in Khartoum in 1967, Nasser also actively persuaded oil-rich states – 
Kuwait, Libya and Saudia Arabia – to compensate Egypt to the tune of $266 million for the 
loss in revenue due to the closure of the Suez Canal.  Since this was not enough, he had to 
approach the Soviet Union for assistance as well (Barnett, 1992, pp. 113-115).    
 Egypt before the Six Day War 
Prior to proceeding further with the details of postwar Egyptian politics, it is 
essential to provide a brief background.  Although Egypt had achieved independence from 
British rule in 1882, its political affairs remained under indirect British occupation till 
1954.  On July 23, 1952 a group of military officers that called themselves the “Free 
Officers Movement” organized a coup against King Farouk who had ascended to the throne 
in 1936.40  Nasser was among them.  Although they had a large military presence in the 
country in 1952, the British did not intervene on behalf of the king.  It could be that their 
decision was influenced by the fact that the coup had the unofficial backing of the US.  
After a period (1952-54) of intense struggle for power among different factions of the 
                                                          
40 These came from the first batches of Egyptian officers that had been trained in the Military academy 
created by the British in the 1930s. 
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revolutionaries, Nasser emerged on top (Barnett, 1992; Kandil, 2012).   When the Six Day 
War began in June 1967, Nasser had already been in power for thirteen years.   
 Nasser had successfully deposed his main rival, Naquib who had become President 
following the 1952 coup.  After ascending to power, Nasser systematically eliminated all 
the remnants of Naquib loyalists from the regime. He also cut off his ties with the Muslim 
Brotherhood – an organization with whom he forged a temporary alliance to depose Naquib 
and ordered a brutal crackdown on the organization.  As with most autocratic leaders, 
Nasser relied upon a coterie of trusted lieutenants.  What is crucial to note is that over time, 
a gulf developed between this group of Nasser loyalists and the military as an institution.  
As Nasser wanted to portray himself as the head of a populist regime rather than a military 
dictatorship, he went along with this arrangement.  In the years that followed, the regime 
became crystallized into two factions: the military headed by Amer41 as the chief general 
while the political and administrative institutions headed by Nasser as the chief politician.  
(Kandil, 2012, pp. 41-42).   
On the global stage, Nasser saw himself as a radical, anti-imperialist Third World 
leader that resisted attempts by the US to break his relations with Russia.  In the region, the 
ramifications of the Arab-Israeli conflict defined his worldview.  He became a leading 
advocate of the solidarity expressed by various Arab states (“Pan-Arabism”) with the cause 
of the Palestinians who had lost a major part of their homeland.  He viewed Israel as an 
expansionist state that was a danger to all its Arab neighbors and part of the international 
Zionist movement supported by Western imperialist powers led by the US (Stephens, 
                                                          
41 Amer was a longtime friend of Nasser and part of the Free Officers Movement.  He was the Field Marshall 
of the Egyptian army when the 1967 war occurred. After the 1967 war, he briefly became the rallying point 
for anti-Nasser forces.  
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1972).   However, the Soviet opposition to his efforts to bring the Arab states – Egypt, 
Syria and Iraq – closer meant that Nasser also remained suspicious of them despite 
receiving significant military and financial assistance (Dekmejian, 1971, p. 237).  In the 
first phase of his reign, Nasser’s main resistance and opposition were directed against the 
efforts to induce Arab states into a Western alliance system that had already been 
established under the US leadership.42   
At home, Nasser biggest challenge was to consolidate power while being mindful of 
the growing influence of Amer who was gradually creating a constituency of supporters 
loyal to him within the military.  While Nasser was not in total control of the military, he 
ensured that the internal security apparatus was populated by his loyalists. Over the thirteen 
years between 1954 till 1967, Egypt under Nasser grew into a massive intelligence and 
surveillance state with the senior officers of the internal security agencies as the most 
powerful members of the ruling elite or a “security aristocracy.”  Nasser was heavily reliant 
on them for keeping opponents in check.  Therefore, the anti-Naquib coalition that had 
captured power in 1954 gradually organized itself into two competing groups of security 
institutions: (i) Political: Ministry of Interior and President Bureau of Information and (ii) 
Military: Commander-in-Chief of Political Guidance, the Military Intelligence Department 
(MID) and General Intelligence Service (Kandil, 2012, p. 43).   
Nasser’s domestic reputation as a leader was considerably enhanced by the Sinai 
War of 1956 when Egypt faced the combined might of France, Israel and UK after he 
                                                          
42In 1955, Nasser joined a group of “non-aligned” leaders from other Third World nations at Bandung, 




nationalized the Suez Canal.  After early reversals, Nasser temporarily took over command 
of the armed forces from Amer, whose leadership skills had come under a cloud.  Despite 
Amer’s perceived failings as a military leader, he was allowed to return to his position after 
the war.  It is generally believed that Nasser’s close friendship with Amer precluded him 
from firing the latter, despite clear evidence of gross incompetence.  Nasser’s personal 
popularity grew because he had managed to keep most of the Egyptian armed forces and 
equipment intact despite facing a relatively more powerful coalition.  His opponents were 
denied a total victory as both the superpowers – US and the USSR – made strenuous 
diplomatic interventions to ensure that the war was terminated (Kandil, 2012, p. 44).          
 In 1962 Egypt became military engaged in the Yemeni civil war on the side of its 
royal government.  As this intervention lasted five years, it had a negative impact on 
Egypt’s military readiness for the 1967 war.  Egypt had invested an immense amount of 
expenditure and suffered considerable casualties in the Yemeni intervention:  Its monetary 
investment was in the range of $60 to $ 120 million per year over this five year period 
while it lost 15,000 military personnel – including officers – between 1962 and June 1964 
alone (Rogan & Aclimandos, 2012, pp. 154-155). In his memoirs a leading Egyptian army 
officer, Field Marshal El-Gamasy stated that the involvement in Yemen had serious 
debilitating effects on its armed forces: On the eve of the 1967 war, “nearly a third of our 
land forces, supported by our air force and navy, were engaged in an operation 
approximately two thousand kilometres away from Egypt, with no prospects of a political 
or a military settlement.”  As he recalled, Egypt’s lack of military readiness prior to the 
1967 war was astonishing (quoted in Rogan & Aclimandos, 2012, p. 163): 
We incurred heavy losses in manpower, our military budget was drained, 
discipline and training suffered, weapons and equipment deteriorated, and fighting 
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capability was seriously affected.  Soldiers returning from Yemen were given furloughs 
during which weapons were overhauled, but levels of training consequently declined.  
Planes and technical equipment belonging to the air force were subjected to heavy wear 
and tear as a result of airborne operations and troop movements. 
 
 The conscription policy practiced by the Nasser government further compounded 
these problems.  It continued to give exemptions for those that belonged to the more 
affluent sections of society.  Even after the heavy casualties suffered in the Yemeni 
intervention, the government only recruited university graduates on a limited basis.  The 
majority of the Egyptian army that fought in the Yemeni civil war and the 1967 Six Day 
War came from the lower income groups (Barnett, 1992, pp. 101-102).  This meant that the 
most vocal and affluent groups of Egyptian society probably did not pay a personal cost in 
the Six Day War.   
While the rational response to a costly military engagement in Yemen should have 
been to avoid brinkmanship and military hostilities with Israel, the Egyptian government 
ended up doing the opposite (Rogan & Aclimandos, 2012, pp. 148-151).  One of the key 
domestic reasons why Egypt escalated tensions when it was not in its interest to do so can 
be found in the peculiar regime structure that had evolved under Nasser.  As mentioned 
earlier, despite holding executive powers Nasser did not have complete control over the 
military which had developed into a semi-autonomous segment of the Egyptian state.  
There was deep mistrust between the factions loyal to Nasser and various loyalists of Field 
Marshall Amer that populated the armed forces in the period prior to the outbreak of the 
1967 hostilities. The Amer faction was insecure because of the miserable performance of 
the military in the Yemeni intervention.  Amer and his loyalists may have found it in their 
interest to precipitate a crisis with Israel to ensure that they could avoid their accountability 
for the Yemeni disaster. Accounts of the pre-war escalatory steps taken by Egypt place a 
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large proportion of the blame on Amer.  Amer seems to have deliberately misrepresented 
facts in internal deliberations and taken unilateral decisions to mobilize troops on the Sinai 
border which ensured that a war could be precipitated.  There is evidence that Amer and his 
faction only wanted to engage in some saber-rattling with Israel to restore the military’s 
credibility and strengthen his position in the regime rather than wage war (Kandil, 2012, 
pp. 76-79).  This was confirmed later by an important member of Amer’s faction who was 
the then war minister, Shams Badran.  During his postwar trial to hold him accountable for 
the 1967 debacle, he confessed: “We were 100 percent sure that Israel would not dare to 
attack (quoted in Kandil, 2012, p. 83).” However, once the initial escalatory steps were 
taken they created their own dynamic that resulted in the outbreak of war.  
 Eve of the Six Day War 
Nasser’s pre-war behavior seems to suggest considerable confusion on what he 
really wanted to do.  He was confident of the capabilities of the Egyptian armed forces to 
engage in a prolonged defensive battle which would involve the bigger powers and provoke 
a global crisis – a situation that (he thought) could be manipulated to press Egypt’s 
interests.  On the other hand, if Israel blinked in the game of escalation and brinkmanship it 
would be a triumph for Arab nationalism and reestablishment of the Egypt’s sovereignty 
over the Tiran straits (James, 2012).  The war of 1967 appears to have been the result of a 
genuine miscalculation by Nasser about the willingness of Israel to strike first if the 
escalation proceeded forward.  As mentioned in the previous section, he was badly served 
by the military top brass headed by Amer who had their own political motivations in 
precipitating a crisis.  The Egyptian mobilization for the war had begun on 13 May in 
response to reports sourced from the Soviet government that the Israelis were massing their 
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forces on the Syrian border.  The Egyptian government ordered full mobilization a day later 
and forces were concentrated in the Sinai desert.  However, this decision was not 
unanimous. Nasser had serious misgivings about undertaking such a move while Field 
Marshall Amer was advocating it and eventually acted without Nasser’s consent.  Amer 
later justified his actions to Nasser that such a mobilization was mandated by the Egyptian-
Syrian defense pact of 1962.  The extent of mistrust between Amer and Nasser can be 
gauged by the fact that the latter sent the Army Chief of Staff and Nasser loyalist, Fawzi to 
Damuscus to confirm whether an Israeli attack was likely to occur soon.  The Fawzi report 
contradicted the Soviet claims that were the basis of Egypt’s troop mobilization.  Despite 
this finding, the Egyptian government’s posture did not soften (Kandil, 2012, p. 76).  
  The probability of open hostilities increased further when Egypt ordered the 
evacuation of United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Sinai.  Here again, although 
Nasser seemed to recognize that doing so would hurtle Egypt into war, he was 
outmaneuvered by Amer.  Nasser tried to modify the evacuation order to the head of the 
UNEF by saying that Egypt would be satisfied with a partial withdrawal. Amer 
manipulated the situation by ensuring that the English draft of the order sent to the UN 
headquarters retained the demand for full withdrawal.  Nasser contacted UN undersecretary 
general Ralph Bunche to retract the order but he mysteriously refused to respond.  The final 
step on the escalatory ladder taken by Amer was the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli 
access by controlling passage through the Tiran Straits which blockaded the port of Eilat on 
May 22.  It was long known to Egypt that any Israeli government would treat this as casus 
belli which it did.  When Nasser asked Amer and war minister Badran about Egypt’s 
military readiness for war, both gave strong assurances.  Badran told Nasser that he had 
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been assured by his counterparts on a recent visit to Moscow that Soviet Union would 
come to Egypt’s rescue if war really broke out.  This claim was denied later by the Soviet 
leaders at that time as well as Egypt’s ambassador to Moscow. The fact was that the Amer 
faction had decided to close the Tiran Straits six days earlier.  They had deliberately closed 
off any prospects of de-escalation.  Nasser had his own rationalizations for favoring an 
escalation.  Hence, he went along with Amer and his loyalists on the condition that Egypt 
would not strike first as this would turn the international community against it (James, 
2012; Kandil, 2012, pp. 76-78). 
 Wartime developments and postwar period 
On the morning of Monday, 5 June Egypt was attacked by Israel.  This assault left 
most of the Egyptian air force in tatters and forced Field Marshall Amer to order a retreat 
from the Sinai Peninsula which was not enough to prevent a total collapse.  By 8 June, the 
entire Sinai had been occupied(James, 2012, p. 74).  The Egyptian government agreed to a 
cease-fire the same evening  (James, 2012, pp. 74-75).  The rapidity of the capitulation of 
the Egyptian armed forces sent Nasser into a state of shock.  Later, he recalled that the 
immediate aftermath of the war as “one continuous nightmare…We were in a strange state 
of confusion, uncertainty and doubt…We did not know, but we feared what the Israeli were 
going to do.”   
Although Nasser resigned on June 9 taking moral responsibility for the defeat, he 
may not have totally come to terms with the scale of the defeat that his country had 
suffered. In the days following the ceasefire, he was still hoping for a ‘post-withdrawal” 
situation where outstanding issues could be negotiated (James, 2012, p. 75).  At that point 
in time, Nasser was very fearful of a public backlash to the outcome.  He told his Minister 
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of Information Mohammaed Fayek prior to his resignation broadcast: “They’ll put me on 
trial and hang me in the middle of Cairo (James, 2012).”   
Nasser’s fear proved to be unfounded.  The public reaction to his broadcast taking 
full responsibility and decision to resign was very surprising.  There was a popular demand 
that Nasser stay on and he did.  Nasser’s personal political stature remained inexplicably 
unaffected by the debacle.  One possible theory for this is that the people of Egypt wanted 
to “salvage something from this bitter defeat” and blaming and degrading Nasser would 
have only added to their sense of collective shame.  Moreover, in Egyptian society’s 
popular consciousness Nasser embodied the spirit of defiant Arab nationalism.  Driving 
him out of office following a defeat would further strengthen the hands of their enemy – 
Israel and its Western allies (Barnett, 1992; Gawrych, 2000).   Faoud Ajami argues that 
there was a fervent desire to “believe in someone” who could maintain a sense of 
continuity in a difficult time.  Hence, the public anger became directed towards the political 
and military apparatus rather than at Nasser.  In a sense, the signal that Nasser was given by 
the public was to undertake a purge and fix accountability for this miserable failure while 
remaining in the saddle (Ajami, 1981).     
The address to the nation that Nasser gave also helped in ensuring that the public 
opprobrium for the war outcome and its attendant costs would not be personally directed 
against him.  The speech that he delivered had the right mix of humility and emotion that 
conveyed the significance of the disaster while explaining why Egypt had no choice but to 
militarily assist Syria against the possibility of Israeli incursion.  As he pithily said: “Who 
starts with Syria will finish with Egypt (Gawrych, 2000, p. 72).”  Even as Nasser was 
offering to resign, he was trying his best to absolve himself of his role in the escalation that 
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led to the outbreak of hostilities.  The dominant Egyptian public opinion seems to have 
sided with Nasser’s view that the war could not have been avoided.  The only question now 
was to fix blame for the defeat.  In the senior officer corps of the armed forces, Nasser and 
the Egyptian people found plenty of convenient scapegoats for this purpose. 
Unsurprisingly, a strong undercurrent of discontent emerged within the army for 
being blamed for the defeat.   In Field Marshall Amer, these elements found a spokesperson 
who would articulate their grievances.  As mentioned in the previous section, Egypt was 
ruled by a peculiarly structured authoritarian regime in which Nasser was not in total 
control of the armed forces.  Amer had converted the army into his personal fiefdom.  He 
had used his time as Army chief to cultivate an independent base of support within the 
military thanks to an efficient patronage network.  This system was run through cliques 
(shilla) or power centers (markaszat al-quwwat) which owed their loyalty to Amer 
(Gawrych, 2000, p. 73; James, 2012, pp. 76-77).  Amer had long been perceived as a 
possible threat by Nasser’s backers.  The 1967 disaster and the prospect of a coup 
organized by Amer and his supporters convinced Nasser to finally get rid of Amer and 
wrest control of the army. 
When Nasser dismissed him as commander-in-chief after the war, Amer refused to 
exit graciously.  Amer’s personal defiance and general feeling of discontent among officers 
loyal to him raised the specter of a coup (Bowen, 2005, p. 321; Gawrych, 2000).  Within a 
couple of days of the end of the war, some of Amer’s loyalists within the army officer 
corps communicated their displeasure to Nasser, backed by a show of force.  Nasser 
offered a compromise to this faction by offering Amer the post of Vice President and set up 
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a committee to address their grievances.  At the same time, Nasser refused to reinstate 
Amer as military commander.   
Nasser was acutely aware that his personal safety could be in jeopardy.  However, 
the Amer loyalists did not carry out any visible action that could be construed as a direct 
and open challenge to Nasser’s grip on power.  Although it is reported that on June 11 a 
few armored vehicles were sent by Amer loyalists to Nasser’s residence, this seems to have 
been more of a pressure tactic rather than an overt and serious attempt at deposing him 
(Stephens, 1972, p. 513).  However, it is clear that the prewar winning coalition had frayed 
in the face of the 1967 debacle.  The postwar contestation was over who will take the 
blame for the fiasco.   
There was an open dispute between Nasser and Amer loyalists over the tactics that 
were chosen in the war.  Amer loyalists felt that Nasser was evading responsibility for his 
no-first strike policy which gave an undue advantage to the Israelis.  Nasser publicly 
rejected this view and criticized the state of confusion in the army command and their 
failure to adequately prepare for the scale and lethality of the Israeli attack.  In his first 
public speech since rescinding his resignation, Nasser stated on 23 July that an Egyptian 
attack would have surely invited US intervention on Israel’s behalf and the denunciation of 
the international community(Stephens, 1972, p. 513).  The relative merits of these two 
arguments are not very important as the Egyptian public seem to clearly side with Nasser.  
The public directed all its anger for the defeat towards the army and respect for it declined 
considerably.  This initially helped Nasser in consolidating his hold over the army and 
eliminate any threat of a coup by Amer loyalists.   
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The danger of a coup was very real especially in the weeks following Amer’s 
removal.  It was the former war minister Badran – fired along with Amer – who took the 
lead in conspiring with a number of active and retired military officers to reinstate Amer.  
This plot had the tacit approval of Amer (Gawrych, 2000, p. 73).  If this plot had 
succeeded, there is little doubt that Nasser would have been deposed.  Anticipating these 
dangers, Nasser and his loyalists within the regime acted ruthlessly to eliminate them.  
Nasser and his trusted advisors had decided that they would get rid of Amer and a plan 
called “Operation Johnston” was hatched.  On 25 August, Amer was placed under house 
arrest and there was talk that he would be tried for conspiring against the government.  
Three weeks later, on 14 September, he was found dead.  Although the stated cause of 
death was suicide, there is no firm evidence supporting that theory.  He may well have been 
murdered on Nasser’s orders, as alleged by his family (Bowen, 2005, p. 321; Gawrych, 
2000, p. 73).  
Anyone within the pre-war winning coalition suspected of being close to former 
Field Marshall Amer were either imprisoned or dismissed.  The war minister Badran, Head 
of General Intelligence Salah Nasr and Interior Minister Fathi Radwan were arrested 
(James, 2012, p. 77).  Virtually all the four-star generals were fired including the chiefs of 
three branches of the military.  This was followed by a purge of major generals and other 
senior officers over the next few months.  They were replaced by officers that he trusted 
such as General Muhammad Fawzi as the new commander in chief.  In all, fifty top 
commanders and senior civilian officials were sacked and arrested in one fell swoop 
(Gawrych, 2000, p. 73).  Nasser also mandated that all promotions for the rank of colonel 
and above would require his assent.  He moved the military out of internal security function 
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and strengthened the role of the police for these purposes.  Nasser was now clearly in 
command of the armed forces.  This was the first major consequence of the war.  In 
addition, Nasser moved to reorganize the way the government was structured so that he 
could have control over the state apparatus.  He now held the post of president, prime 
minister and chief of his party, the Arab Socialist Union.  Nasser also tried to further shore 
up his credentials with Islamist organizations which was reflected in the greater use of 
religious phrases in his public speeches (Dekmejian, 1971, p. 252).  By the time Nasser left 
for the Arab summit in Khartoum at the end of August 1967, Nasser “was more secure that 
he had been in years (Bowen, 2005, p. 322).” 
There were other changes in the regime as ideological divisions among senior 
officials between the pro-Western and pro-Soviet factions became more pronounced.  The 
pro-Soviet faction grew in power as Egypt became more reliant on Soviet assistance to 
rebuild its military (James, 2012, p. 77). On the eve of the war, it had an unserviceable debt 
of $2 billion which it would have great difficulty repaying as it had lost valuable sources of 
revenue due to the defeat.  The reliance on foreign assistance to tide over these economic 
problems also locked Egypt into renewed confrontation and possible war with Israel as 
many of its regional donors – Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Libya – made their assistance 
conditional on such a policy (James, 2012, p. 78).  
 In the immediate aftermath of the war it appeared that Nasser had not only escaped 
personal punishment for the 1967 debacle but had actually strengthened his domestic 
position.  However, the public anger with the conduct of the war would continue to 
reverberate and influence Egyptian domestic politics in unprecedented ways.  Unlike most 
totalitarian regimes, the Egyptian society and polity underwent an extremely public self-
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examination to try to understand why their armed forced performed so poorly.  Nasser soon 
realized that the purge of the open and suspected defectors from his winning coalition was 
not sufficient to protect his position.  The public clamor for accountability for the disaster 
had not been satisfied yet.  Something had to done to restore the military’s credibility in the 
eyes of the public.  
Within two weeks of Amer’s apparent suicide, the government announced the 
setting up of military courts and tribunals to probe officers accused of incompetence in the 
war.  The depth of the public anger against the armed forces was truly revealed in February 
1968 when the sentences for some of the senior military officials were handed down.  
Among the senior most officers on trial included:  General Muhammad Sidqi Mahmud, the 
commander of the air force and air defense; General Gamal Afifi, his chief of staff and 
deputy commander; Major General Abd al-Hamid Daghdidi, the commanding general of 
the Eastern Military District in which the Sinai was located; and Major General Ismail 
Labib, the chief of the antiair defenses.  Of these, Afifi and Daghdidi were found innocent 
while Sidqi received fifteen years and Labib was given ten years for dereliction of duty.  
These sentences were universally criticized as being too lenient and were to become a 
rallying point for the demonstrations that followed (Gawrych, 2000, p. 88).  
The trials and the subsequent sentences provided the trigger for the public 
antigovernment mobilization to demand accountability for its poor war performance.   The 
legitimacy of the regime was also severely dented by the exposure of the army’s internal 
workings and procedures during the trial of the officers accused of dereliction of duty.  
These trials brought to light the systemic inefficiency, cronyism and corruption among the 
highest echelons of the military high command adding further fuel to the public anger.  In 
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1968, Egypt witnessed riots, demonstrations and unrest led by students, workers and 
supported by ordinary citizens.  Since Nasser came to power in the early 1950s, Egypt had 
not seen such an open defiance of the state by members of public.  Besides vocal 
complaints against the military, questions began to be raised about the lack of access of 
democratic participation and questioning the credibility of state institutions (Barnett, 1992, 
p. 103).  Agitations and student clashes with police occurred in Cairo, Alexandria and 
Asyut.  While there were sporadic cases where protestors criticized Nasser personally, the 
dominant demands of the protestors centered on holding the military leadership 
accountable for the humiliation of 1967 (Gawrych, 2000, p. 88).  The other slogans that 
were heard at these protests were “Down with the Military State” and “Down with the 
Police State” (Kandil, 2012, p. 96). These expressions of dissent against powerful state 
institutions and public debate over fixing accountability of senior officials were nothing 
short of extraordinary for a regime like Egypt.  The protests seem to convey a deep sense of 
disgust with the inefficiency and lack of transparency of important organs of the state as 
well as the harassment and arbitrariness of the repressive domestic security apparatus.      
The first visible coalescing of these sentiments came in February 1968, at the 
Helwan Steel plant (Barnett, 1992, pp. 103-104). A pro-regime gathering at the plant had 
been organized by Ali Sabri of the Arab Socialist Union, which was Egypt’s only political 
party owing allegiance to Nasser.  Ironically, a show of support for the Nasser regime 
ended up triggering public anger against the state.  Official miscommunication played no 
mean part in escalating an event that would have gone unnoticed otherwise.  The police had 
not been told that it was the ASU that was behind this gathering.  When they tried to 
forcibly break up the meeting, it led to a confrontation.  When the news reached Cairo that 
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a workers in Helwan had been forcibly suppressed, it triggered a spontaneous mobilization 
by the students of Cairo University. The protestors were joined by ordinary people who 
wanted to express their unhappiness with the military’s conduct of the war.  Soon the 
protests turned violent that resulted in injuries to 20 civilians and 60 policemen(Stephens, 
1972, p. 533).    
As these persisted, the student demonstrations also became directed against 
cronyism that denied economic opportunities to those who did not belong to the military 
nor had some association with that institution (Barnett, 1992, p. 104). The significance for 
these protests in Egypt can be gauged from the fact that, in scale and scope, they were the 
first such event since 1952(Vatikiotis, 1978, p. 185). The general sentiment of the students’ 
movement was very hawkish as they were disgruntled with the military’s failure give a 
befitting reply to the Israeli attack in the 1967 war (Barnett, 1992, p. 104).  This 
hawkishness is understandable because the danger of Israeli attacks did not cease after the 
war of 1967 ended.   For example, the November 1968 protests in Assiut University in 
Upper Egypt were mainly triggered in response to the unchallenged entry of Israeli jets into 
Egyptian airspace over Nag Hammdi which succeeded in bombing an electrical facility 
(Gordon, 2006, pp. 105-106).  
The war also had an effect on intra-regime dynamics:  there was a bureaucratic 
tussle between the civilian technocratic elite and the military brass.  The technocrats 
exploited the opprobrium being heaped on the military to further their own ends. They 
accused the military of being more interested in political affairs instead of defending the 
country.  For his own political reasons, Nasser sided with the civilian bureaucracy and 
started to reduce the involvement of the military in issues that were unrelated to defense.  
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This had an effect on the overall ideological orientation of the government.  Most of the 
Western-educated civilian bureaucrats were suspicious of the radicalization of Egyptian 
society.   Moreover, they were more sympathetic to the role of the private sector in the 
economy than the vision of Arab socialism that Nasser had championed for years. The fact 
that Nasser went along with this shift in policy is another indication that his core 
ideological beliefs had been shaken by the 1967 defeat (Barnett, 1992, p. 104).  However, 
he was sure that if he had to survive he would have to undertake measures to confront the 
Israelis pretty soon in a full-fledged war. 
As a shrewd politician, Nasser recognized that although the retrials had temporarily 
pacified the demonstrators, he had to be seen as doing something to improve the existing 
order.  These protests represented a fervent dissatisfaction among a significant segment of 
Egyptian society with the status quo.  While he had managed to ride out the immediate 
manifestation of the sourness of the public mood, his domestic problems were far from 
over.  Members of the Nasser government during the post-protest phase period recall that 
Nasser began obsessively tracking any fluctuation in food and commodity prices for fear 
these might further worsen public sentiment and prompt a popular revolutionary upsurge in 
Egypt.  Nasser recognized that these protests reflected an open expression of total distrust 
in the existing order (Gawrych, 2000, p. 89).  As an autocratic ruler in a personalist regime 
that presided over a powerful and loyal state machinery, it would have been remarkable if 
he had accepted the demands for greater political liberalization.  However, he showed a 
keen astuteness of the seriousness of this challenge and responded as well as could be 
expected from an autocratic leader.  He knew that he must be seen undertaking some 
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tangible reforms to address the concerns of the Egyptian people with the functioning of the 
military and the police.   
Nasser announced a slew of reforms under the banner of the “March 30 Program” 
in 1968 to address the deficiencies in both these organizations as well as welfare-statist 
measures, protection of basic freedoms and rule of law.43 A senior Egyptian journalist, 
Haykal and his newspaper Al-Ahram emerged as a champion of personal liberties vis-à-vis 
the security agencies.  Haykal also drew his influence from the fact that he was considered 
close to Nasser. It was frequently rumored that his weekly columns were actually Nasser’s 
ideas and he used this platform to gauge the public reaction to new ideas.  However, such a 
major reorientation of an authoritarian state was easier said than done, especially given the 
emergency situation that the country was facing (Dekmejian, 1971, p. 261).  The major 
obstacle to these measures came from the Arab Socialist Union (ASU)44 who felt that 
expanding political liberties to elements outside their party would bring chaos.  Their real 
reason for opposing Haykal’s ideas may have been the fear that political liberalization 
would result in the loss of their privileged position that came from being the member of the 
sole political party in Egypt.  Again, Nasser avoided taking a visible stand in this dispute as 
the opponents of reform directed their attacks at Haykal (Dekmejian, 1971, pp. 263-264).45   
                                                          
43 In October of 1968 the new reformist order was put to the test. A government statistician dissented against 
the head of his organization, who was s senior military officer.  The latter had him arrested.  Haykal directly 
attacked the military security agencies for this and carried on with his criticism even after the statistician was 
released which was an unprecedented challenge to the security apparatus on behalf of an ordinary citizen.  In 
August 1969 another major development occurred when the Minister of Justice, Abu Nusayr was forced to 
resign when it was revealed that it had facilitated the arrest and illegal detention of a number of citizens 
(Dekmejian, 1971, pp. 261-262).       
44 ASU was formed in 1962 to promote the principles of Nasserism.  It was the sole political party permitted 
to function in Egypt. 
45 However, Nasser did give minor concessions to the reformists when his regime permitted some candidates 
to run in the National Assembly elections of 1969 who did not have the backing of the ASU (Dekmejian, 
1971, p. 285).   
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Nasser gave priority to changing the functioning of the military.  He knew that if he 
pushed the military too hard to change the way it had been functioning, it may turn against 
him.  The best evidence for this is the way Nasser seems to have resisted demands from 
ASU to make the military ideologically in sync with the revolutionary principles of the 
party and to induct party cadres in large numbers into leadership positions within the 
organization to ensure that this was done.  However, Nasser drastically changed the 
conscription policies to include more educated men and tried to professionalize its internal 
management.  Nasser had a bigger problem in reforming the police because the reasons that 
it was a hated institution by the Egyptian public – accusations of brutality, lack of 
transparency and accountability – were essential to combat attempts by domestic opponents 
to unseat him.  However, Nasser made a public show of demanding that the police show 
restraint with the people and act as “servants of the people and the revolution (Dekmejian, 
1971, pp. 255-257).”  In reality, police reforms were hardly implemented on the ground.  
However, for Nasser’s mass constituency a declaration of his intentions may have been 
enough to satisfy them in the short term. 
Nasser dealt with the strikers and demonstrators by a combination of repression to 
restore order followed by a series of steps to meet some of their demands.  The most 
strident student and workers demonstrations were concentrated over two spells during 
1968: once in February and then again in November.  Each time the most severe 
manifestations of unrest lasted for almost a week.  Ultimately, it was the police crackdown 
under the guidance of the Interior Ministry that ended these demonstrations.  One estimate 
of the total human toll in these two episodes was 21 dead, 772 injured and the detention of 
1,100 (Kandil, 2012, p. 96).   
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Although the police action stamped down these eruptions of popular anger and 
seemingly restored stability, Nasser knew very well that the discontent articulated by the 
demonstrators had popular resonance in Egyptian society.  Nasser initially went against the 
counsel of his advisors who suggested that any compromise with the demonstrators would 
weaken his position.  Nasser realized that if he mishandled this popular upsurge it could 
pose a serious danger to his survival.  Sacrificing commanders at the altar of public 
outrage, some of whose loyalties he suspected, was a relatively easier choice for Nasser.  
On 25 February, less than a week after the verdicts had been handed down, a retrial of the 
four defendants mentioned earlier.  In August 1968, the judges handed out revised 
sentences imposing stiffer penalties on Sidqi Mahmud and Labib while keeping the prior 
acquittal of Afifi and Daghdidi unchanged (Dekmejian, 1971, p. 258; Gawrych, 2000, pp. 
88-89).   
Nasser also asked members of the National Assembly to open up talks with student 
leaders.  Nasser also addressed a workers rally at the Helwan plant on 3 March where he 
skillfully sided with the protestors and openly castigated the police for its use of force.  
Instead of attacking the entire body of demonstrators for the disturbances, he blamed a few 
“reactionary agitators” among them.  Finally, he gave a rhetorical riposte to the main 
reason many Egyptians, including the demonstrators were agitated.  He promised them that 
he will take back every inch of the territory that had been lost in the 1967 war (Dekmejian, 
1971, p. 258).   Nasser also signaled that he shared the public’s low esteem of the military 
leadership by dramatically reducing their representation in his cabinet (See Table 4.4).  The 
civilians that were included in the cabinet included seven university professors that had 
some credibility with the student protestors (Dekmejian, 1971, p. 261).   However, this did 
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not mean that these civilians were granted significant powers as policy makers but were 
used to signal that Nasser was sympathetic to the demands that the protestors had made 
(Vatikiotis, 1978, p. 186).   He also had a sort of temporary rapprochement with the 
Muslim Brothers: several of the Brothers were released from prison as a gesture of 
goodwill.  
Things got trickier for Nasser when the second round of the 1968 protests occurred 
in November.  Impatience with the lack of real changes in the functioning of the state as 
well as periodic Israeli shelling triggered a more violent explosion of mass sentiment.  In 
Alexandria, when protestors mobilized with an explicit demand for more civil liberties, it 
degenerated in mass rioting. 491 people were arrested, 91 were detained.  Of these 46 were 
tried.  The Alexandria riots were significant because ordinary people joined the students.  
In Mansoura, when Islamic divinity students demanded a change in the examination system 
four of them were killed in ensuing clashes. These protests attracted a wide spectrum of 
political groups – Muslim Brothers, Communists – as well as adherents to liberal and 
radical ideologies.  These protests seems to lack a focused ideological program but 
encompassed a broad coalition of Egyptians who wanted greater political freedom 
(Stephens, 1972, pp. 536-537). 
While Nasser publicly dismissed these eruptions of anti-government and pro-
freedom sentiment as “counter-revolutionary tendencies” incited by an “irresponsible 
minority”(Gordon, 2006, p. 106), he was astute enough to quickly recognize the 
seriousness of the challenge facing him.  He realized that the growing ferment in Egyptian 
society that had found its most visible expression in the student-worker protests in 1968 
had to have a political response.  He may have hung on to office after the 1967 debacle but 
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these protests were a stark reminder that all was not well.  In the ultimate analysis, Nasser 
sided with those within his coterie that did not want to open up the political system (Kandil, 
2012, pp. 96-97).  However, for a brief period the opportunity for transforming the 
authoritarian polity of Egypt seemed real.  My contention is that absent the war such an 
opening is unlikely to have occurred.   Despite the popular anti-government protests and 
unprecedentedly public expressions of anger at state institutions that extended from street 
protests, the press, academic institutions and the arts, these were not sufficient to produce 
tangible liberal democratic reforms in Egypt (Gordon, 2006, p. 107).  By mid-1969 the 
upheaval had fizzled out as Egypt made preparations for another war with Israel.  Nasser’s 
response to November 1968 riots was to tighten his internal security apparatus even further 
and organize spy and conspiracy trials in which seven Egyptians were tried for planning to 
assassinate Nasser and overthrowing the regime (Stephens, 1972, p. 537).      
In the aftermath of the war, Nasser had been under constant pressure to resume the 
Arab-Israeli conflict and avenge the loss of 1967.  The capture of the Sinai by Israel was 
something that had transformed the stakes in the conflict for Egypt.  Nasser’s launching of 
the War of Attrition in 1969 was driven by the logic that he could not afford to let the status 
quo stand  From being a dispute that was propelled by Pan-Arabism and standing with the 
Palestinian cause, the conflict had been transformed into one where Egypt had lost a vital 
piece of territory which it could not let go (Barnett, 1992, p. 105).  This was one of main 
issues agitating a majority of the demonstrators in 1968 as well.   Nasser realized that 
another full-scale war would mean imposing economic privations on the Egyptian people.  
Fawzi later recalled that one of the main reasons why Nasser proceeded to implement his 
policy of “what was taken by force can only be recovered by force” was the incredible 
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public pressure to do so (Gordon, 2006, p. 109).  Nasser was aware that it would not take 
long for the hawkish public opinion to turn into anti-government opposition that could 
topple him (Barnett, 1992, p. 106).   
In order to fulfil the public clamor for a response while avoiding a full-fledged war, 
Nasser tried to pressurize Israel by shelling its positions on the East Bank.  This move 
backfired as well as Israel responded by bombing the Suez cities and engaging in deep 
penetration strikes.  The destruction of the Canal cities created a massive population 
exodus to Cairo where many became homeless, destitute and unemployed.  This furthered 
the societal pressures on the regime and increased its financial straits (Barnett, 1992, p. 
105).  The period from December 1967 to March 1968 the main preoccupation of the 
Nasser Cabinet was to decide whether to prioritize the rebuilding of the military for another 
war with Israel or to focus on the economic difficulties that the country was undergoing.  
Eventually, although the public stance was that both had to be done together, the reality is 
that the Nasser regime was totally focused on rearmament to recover the territory it had lost 
in 1967.   As the preparations for another war with Israel were going on, small-scale 
fighting continued along the Suez Canal (Gordon, 2006, pp. 109-110).     
Following the 1967 war, conscription was expanded to cover the entire male 
population of draft age. There was a deliberate class bias that existed prior to 1967 that 
allowed men with higher education or those from wealthier families to avoid service.  The 
medical standards were lowered and women were recruited to serve in support roles 
(Barnett, 1992, p. 104).   Although there was some murmurings from student groups that 
the state grant greater political rights, the dominance of a hawkish sentiment in Egyptian 
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society helped Nasser to implement his policy of total conscription with little resistance 
(Ajami, 1981). 
Egypts’ War of Attrition with Israel formally began on March 6, 1969.  The period 
between the ceasefire of 10 June that ended the 1967 war and the start of the War of 
Attrition of 1969 witnessed several episodes of low-intensity fighting.  There was 
consistent sniper fire and small engagements along the new Israeli positions along the Suez 
Canal and the Sinai (McGregor, 2006, p. 273).  Israel responded to Egyptian artillery 
barrage across the Suez Canal with massive air strikes and artillery shelling of its own.  
Both sides targeted civilians in the War of Attrition although Egypts’ noncombatant losses 
were far greater (Downes, 2008). Israel also targeted Egyptian civilians in the war through 
bombing raids hoping that this would help topple Nasser from power.  With neither side 
able to make much headway, a ceasefire was arranged in August 1970 (Downes, 2006).  
On September 28, Nasser died after suffering a heart attack.      
 
Table 4.4 Postwar Changes in Nasser's Cabinet (Source: Dekmejian, 1971) 
CABINET TOTAL MILITARY CIVILIAN 
           N % N % 
June 1967 29 19 65.4 10 34.4 







 Political impact of the war costs 
While there is little doubt that the human costs of the Six Day War were significant, 
the main reason why the Nasser regime was forced to concede defeat within days was the 
degradation of its military capabilities and total collapse of its military command. The 
peculiar nature of this war requires that we reexamine what we mean by the “costs” of war.  
While battle deaths and civilian casualties serve as useful proxies for operationalizing this 
concept, how these “costs” are perceived by the mass public following a massive defeat 
may be different.  Although the Egyptian casualty count was reasonably high for an 
interstate war, the hostilities neither involved most of the Egyptian armed forces nor did 
they directly threaten the well-being of the civilian population.   
This may explain why the prevailing postwar political sentiment among Egyptians 
was to reject the war’s outcome and desire to fight again to regain the territory that was 
lost.  While they might have been demoralized by the battle deaths that had been incurred, 
this does not appear to have been the primary motivator of the anti-regime sentiment that 
manifested after the war.  In the immediate aftermath of the war, members of the Egyptian 
public were so shocked by the outcome that many refused to believe that they had been 
comprehensively defeated: As the Egyptian Chief of Staff in 1967, Fawzi observed: 
“Egyptians did not considered themselves to have fought a war and lost it; the term defeat 
did not seem to apply…The June experience was therefore referred to as the ‘setback’ 
(quoted in McGregor, 2006, p. 272).”  
As the true scale of the defeat sank in, public resentment with the architects of war 
policy became more pronounced.  In this war, the technological superiority of Israeli 
airpower had degraded Egypt’s warfighting capabilities with amazing speed.  Therefore, 
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the tolerance of the Egyptian people to war casualties or their “willingness to be harmed” 
was not truly tested:  In other words, how many Egyptian lives were they willing to lose to 
defend the Sinai? (Rosen, 1972, p. 169).  Since Egypt’s technical capacities to carry on 
fighting were stymied by its rival very quickly, the tolerance level of the Egyptian society 
did not become an issue in the war.  Under such circumstances, the level of casualties may 
not adequately explain why the war was terminated or what happened in its aftermath.  
Egypt’s fighting capabilities was decimated and rearmament was impossible in the short-
term.  Further resistance would have only added to the body count without changing the 
eventual result.  The degradation of military hardware convinced Nasser and his advisors 
that there was absolutely no chance of resurrection.    
As described in the previous section, the demonstrations in 1968 were the first 
visible expressions of postwar public opinion after the massive gathering in July 1967 
asking Nasser to rescind his resignation.  While the demands made by the protestors 
became more expansive as the demonstrations gathered steam, the proximate cause of these 
popular outbursts was the 1967 war.  The key question for this study is whether these 
protestors were angered by the costliness of the war measured in terms of war-related 
casualties or the national humiliation of a military defeat that had tangible consequences in 
terms of loss of territory.  The war-related themes that were highlighted during these 
protests focused primarily on the bad war performance of the military leadership which 
gradually transformed into expressions of long-held grievances against the repressive 
nature of the Egyptian state.  In a way, the unambiguous nature of the defeat opened the 
door for other complaints to be aired which sought a renegotiation of the scope of political 
and civil rights of the Egyptian citizen vis-à-vis the state.  I am not convinced that if Egypt 
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had lost fewer soldiers in the 1967 war then these demonstrations were less likely to occur, 
holding the war outcome constant.  Given the enormity of the interests at stake in the war, 
it can be speculated that the Egyptian mass public would have tolerated even higher 
casualties if there was a prospect of a victory or even a stalemate.  It was the sudden and 
total capitulation by the armed forces that seemed to be at the heart of the postwar anger of 
the Egyptian mass public.          
Therefore, I have to conclude that the postwar domestic political consequences 
seem to be more a function of the outcome of the war, specifically the loss of the Sinai. The 
enormity of outcome is likely to have overwhelmed the marginal effect of the losses that 
were suffered in the war.  There was almost complete unanimity among Egyptians that 
everything should be done to recover the territory occupied by Israel.  There was a popular 
demand that Egypt wage another war to retake the territory that had been lost.  When 
Nasser’s regime widened the net of conscription following the 1967 defeat, to include new 
social groups (university graduates, upper classes and women), there was hardly any 
resistance.  This clearly shows that there was an appetite for further war involvement 
among the Egyptian people when the Six Day War ended.  The costliness of the Six Day 
War was not enough of to deter the Egyptian public from wholeheartedly supporting a 
resumption of hostilities with Israel which would bring more casualties in its wake.   
In these circumstances, Nasser recognized the primary danger to his survival would 
come from the army which bore the brunt of the public anger at the result of the Six Day 
War.  After his offer to resign and the subsequent public reaction assured him that his 
personal popularity had not suffered to the extent that he had feared, he maneuvered the 
public’s anger against the military to strengthen his own position.  In Field Marshall Amer 
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and his loyalists, Nasser found an ideal set of scapegoats to pin the blame for the war.  
Amer was eliminated in a very public way from his inner circle and all his loyalists found 
themselves purged as well.   
Given that Egypt was an authoritarian regime, it is justified to be skeptical of the 
popular upsurge to request Nasser to rescind his resignation.  The fact is that there is little 
doubt the expressions of popular will that led to the reinstatement of Nasser on 9 June was 
genuine and widespread.  One of the explanations for Nasser’s survival after the 1967 
defeat may lie with the reservoir of goodwill that he had generated.  Through his rule, 
Nasser had successfully cultivated a personal reputation for incorruptibility among a large 
proportion of Egyptians.  Even when people were extremely unhappy with various 
institutions of his regime – the cabinet, military and internal security apparatus – Nasser 
was rarely blamed directly for the shortcomings of his government.  A “setback” in 1967 
was not enough to wipe this out the legitimacy of a charismatic, nationalist leader that was 
admired by most Egyptians.  The other factor that may have helped Nasser survive was the 
unambiguous desire by the Israeli government and its allies to see Nasser go.  Conversely, 
this made the Egyptian public support Nasser as a collective gesture of defiance.   
In addition, there might have been some that wanted Nasser to stay in power 
because they may have instinctively feared that if he was removed the country would 
descend into chaos (Dekmejian, 1971, p. 245).  However, the public discrediting of the 
military did give an opportunity to students, workers and artistes to express their discontent 
and criticize the state in unprecedented ways.  It is true that the workers would have been 
motivated primarily by the deteriorating economic conditions rather than fixing 
accountability on military officials.  However, absent the war, it is hard to imagine such 
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open expression of anti-regime sentiment being expressed.  My theory articulated in 
Chapter 2, focused on the changes in the incentives of key members of the selectorate.  In 
this case, Nasser successfully liquidated the quasi-challenge from defectors from his 
winning coalition.  Once that happened, his position was more or less secure.  He faced a 
second wave of challenges from the members of the mass public.  With them, he initially 
offered some concessions and began a process of political and administrative reforms.  He 
may have realized that a transition to a more open government may endanger his own 
survival.  Thus, he went back to his security apparatus to prevent the activists and 
protestors from organizing a full-scale rebellion.   
Although Nasser survived the 1967 debacle, his postwar reign cannot be classified 
as stable.  The attempts by Amer and his loyalists to defect from the winning coalition in 
the immediate aftermath of the war were a genuine threat to his survival. Nasser handled 
these defections with alacrity and extreme ruthlessness.  A more competent set of rivals 
could have deposed Nasser in the immediate aftermath of the war when he was truly 
vulnerable.  Although he survived that phase, he had to sacrifice an extraordinary 
proportion of his colleagues within the regime and the military establishment to convince a 
restive public that someone was being held accountable for the debacle.  Despite being a 
uniquely popular figure among Egyptians, his regime had to face manifestation of public 
anger as well.  The very fact that these challenges occurred, is a sign that despite surviving 
the 1967 war, the debacle had shaken his grip on power.  Just because he managed to 
surmount postwar challenges should not detract from the fact that the war generated 
negative domestic consequences for him.    
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The case of Nasser after 1967 helps to illustrate two critical questions that are at the 
heart of this dissertation: (1) Does costliness of war help to explain postwar domestic 
discontent against governments? (2) Do we need to differentiate among surviving wartime 
leaders? The peculiar nature of the 1967 war meant that the postwar behavior of the 
defectors from winning coalition and the mass public seem to be overwhelmingly driven by 
the outcome – a total defeat.  These defectors wanted to pin the blame on Nasser and use 
the opportunity to depose him.  The mass public was also motivated to renew the war to 
regain the territory that had been lost.  It is clear that they were willing to pay more costs to 
achieve this goal.  Hence, the costliness of the 1967 war does not appear to be the primary 
motivating factor in generating their disquiet with the regime.  It was their military’s 
inability to take on the Israelis that seem to be driving the initial wave of protests in 1968.  
Of course, once the political space was opened for anti-regime sentiment other claims 
relating to police suppression and civil rights were added to the list of demands that were 
articulated.  The postwar domestic problems that Nasser had to face bring into question the 
crude indicators of leader fate that only code survival, removal or post-exit punishment.  
These are not the only possible domestic political consequences that a wartime leader can 
face. He may survive but also be forced to undertake a series of unanticipated actions to 













5.1 Purpose of Study and Findings 
This dissertation grew out of my general interest in questions that lie at the 
intersection of international relations and domestic politics.   I do not agree with those that 
argue that domestic politics of states is a “black box” that can be left unopened by students 
of international relations.  The research that straddles the artificial international-domestic 
divide has tended to explore the connections between various foreign policy choices by 
leaders and domestic political processes and events.  The causal chain linking variables in 
these two domains has been tested in both directions to pursue a variety of interesting 
research agendas.  A subset of this literature examines the domestic political accountability 
of leaders for their performance in interstate war.  I set out to reexamine the assumptions 
that motivate this body of scholarship.  I was especially interested in the literature that 
compared the fate of wartime leaders using explanatory variables like war outcome, 
culpability and regime type.  Victorious wartime leaders that faced severe domestic 
problems – or were deposed – in the postwar period motivated me to delve into the general 
question of war and political punishment.   
I took the view that such cases complicate the neat association that previous studies 
have established between war performance and political punishment – operationalized as 
removal from office or post-removal retribution such as exile, arrest or execution.  Hence, 
these merit scholarly attention.  In trying to find a war-related variable that could fill this 
gap in the literature, I settled on costliness.  I argued that besides outcome, the costliness of 
war is likely to generate discontent in the mass public and thereby change the incentives 
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motivating members of the groups that constitute any selectorate: the counter-elites, 
smaller groups capable of causing problems for the incumbent and the existing winning 
coalition.  Therefore, I argued in Chapter 2 that the literature on war and leader survival 
would be enriched if we examine the effect of costliness of war on domestic politics in 
greater depth.   
Secondly, I sought to establish that the binary coding scheme that distinguishes 
among wartime leaders based on whether they survived or not is insufficient to understand 
the range of domestic political consequences of interstate wars.  Besides examining the 
survival of leaders, it is equally important to observe the variation in the level of hostility 
faced by governments from domestic actors in the postwar period.  This is why I chose 
anti-government actions and events as my dependent variable.  The core hypotheses that I 
tested was that costlier wars are likely to be associated with higher incidence of anti-
government activities in countries that wage them.  In order to test my hypotheses, I 
conducted a variety of large-n empirical tests and analyzed two cases in detail.  In the 
remaining parts of this section, I will review the main findings of this dissertation.  
Following this, Section 5.2 will make suggestions on how my work can contribute to the 
wider discipline.   I will also offer some suggestions on how this research can be extended.    
 Empirical Findings 
In Chapter 3, I explored whether the number of postwar anti-government actions is 
associated with the costliness of war.  Costliness was operationalized with two indicators: 
battle deaths and civilian casualties.   In addition, I tested three hypotheses to test whether 
the relationship of a war’s costliness with manifestation of anti-government antagonism 
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was influenced by three variables – role of the state in the war, its regime type and the 
stakes involved.    
The evidence of the independent effect of costliness on anti-government sentiment 
is decidedly mixed.  The battle deaths measure – normalized using a variety of commonly 
used techniques – had been found to be a valid indicator of survival rate of war leaders (e.g. 
Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson, 1995).  Therefore, it was very surprising when this 
variable failed to work as a predictor of events that indicate anti-government hostility in the 
aftermath of war.  There could be several plausible explanations for this finding.  The first 
possibility is that there are limitations with the Banks time series dataset that I used to 
construct the combined event count of postwar anti-government sentiment.  It can be 
subject to “reporting biases” as it relied on country-specific media coverage to count the 
incidence of different events.  As Bueno de Mesquita and Smith observe, “Differing levels 
of press penetration mean it is possible that events are more likely to be recorded in, for 
example, the United States than in Ghana  (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2010, p. 941).”  It 
is quite possible that the Banks data has under reported postwar antigovernment activity for 
several crucial cases thereby impacting the results.  At the same time, I must mention that 
these manifestations of anti-government hostility in the Banks archive are strongly 
associated with postwar leader turnover, when I tested this relationship as a robustness 
check.  Hence, while underreporting might be an issue this events data seems to capture the 
general level of unrest or instability within a country during the period of observation. 
The second possibility is that there is actually no association between battle deaths 
and expressions of anti-government sentiment because states have tried to build a 
mechanism to shield the mass public from directly suffering physical harm due to war 
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involvement.   It is a matter of record that several countries that are part of my analysis 
waged wars without enforcing conscription or a draft.  This meant that the risk of battle 
deaths was borne by professional armed forces in combat.  Thus, the societal link between 
the armed forces and the rest of society may not be very strong.  It is possible that in 
several cases, the professionalization of the combat forces could have precluded the first 
step in the causal chain that I describe in Chapter 2: the rise of discontent in the mass 
public corresponding to higher battle deaths.  As I argued in that chapter, it’s the perceived 
unhappiness of the mass public with the costs incurred that would motivate influential and 
noninfluential members of the selectorate to act against the incumbent.  If battle deaths do 
not generate a negative reaction in the mass public because these do not impact them 
directly, then the rest of the theoretical mechanism may not follow.  The mass public may 
genuinely believe that battle deaths are justified given the interests at stake.  The strong 
positive effect of the war outcome that I found in my analysis seems to indicate that defeat 
is more likely to motivate the mass public to express their discontent.    
The other indicator of costliness that I used was the incidence of civilian targeting.  
This variable related to the outcome of interest as expected by my theory.  Countries that 
saw civilian deaths during war were at much higher risk of witnessing expressions of anti-
government hostility after the war concluded.  This relates to the point made earlier in this 
section that my theory relies very heavily on the reaction of the mass public to the 
costliness of the war.  From what I have found, it appears that it is only when population 
centers are targeted that the causal mechanism that links costliness to public discontent 
comes into effect.  When civilians face a proximate danger of violence the costliness of 
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warfighting becomes a domestic political issue on which they are forced to take a clear 
stand.   Hence, the tolerance of the mass public to paying the costs of war is directly tested.  
Among the three contingent variables, the most reliable result that I can report is 
that the levels of discontent among the mass publics tend to be associated with marginal 
increases in indicators of costliness for countries that started wars.  This provides support 
for the basic argument outlined in Chapter 2: Initiators have to make the case and build 
support among the mass public that waging war is preferable to the status quo.  In trying to 
build support and boost national morale on the eve of war, a leader is likely to signal to the 
mass public that the war aims can be achieved at reasonable cost.  Conversely, initiators are 
more likely to signal that the prospective gains from a military victory would outweigh the 
sacrifices.   So when these prewar estimates of the likely costs turn out to be wrong, this is 
more likely to trigger a negative reaction of the mass publics and other members of the 
selectorate.             
 Case Study Findings 
Chapter 4 presented two case studies that were chosen to study the mechanisms 
underlying two kinds of situations that can arise in a country after it has waged a war:       
(1) removal of a leader after presiding over a victory – President Ayala of Paraguay after 
the Chaco War and (2) survival of a leader following a defeat – President Nasser of Egypt 
after the Six Day War.  Despite the strides that the discipline has made in using statistical 
methods to test hypotheses, case studies serve a useful methodological tool for international 
relations research.   
T In Chapter 4, I tried to undertake “the investigation of a well-defined aspect of a 
historical happening that the investigator selects for analysis, rather than a historical 
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happening itself (Bennett, 2004, p. 21).”   The primary goal of these two case studies was 
to analyze the exact scale of costs that were incurred by Paraguay and Egypt in fighting 
these wars.  The second objective was to study whether these costs were related to any 
observable antigovernment sentiment after the war had concluded.  Given the powerful 
effect of outcome on the dependent variable that had been detected through the statistical 
results, this variable was a major criterion for case selection.  I wanted to explore the 
relative effects of outcome and costliness on postwar manifestations of threats to the 
government.   
The events in Paraguay fit some elements of the causal mechanism that I discussed 
in Chapter 2.  The absolute numbers of battle deaths were quite high for a small country 
like Paraguay.  The war dragged on for over three years with reports of massive casualties 
from the Chaco front.  This clearly created discernible disquiet across Paraguayan society 
with the management of the war under President Ayala’s leadership.  This discontent was 
exacerbated by claims made by the opponents of the Ayala regime that the President and 
his leading commander Estigarriabia had failed to press home the advantage when the 
Bolivian forces had been weakened by a string of early reversals.  They claimed that this 
allowed Bolivia to regroup and extended the war.  It did not help that most of the casualties 
were incurred by Paraguay during the last phase of the war.  These accumulated casualties 
also put immense pressure on the political-military leadership of Paraguay to signal to the 
weary public that their country had extracted some tangible gains from their adversary by 
waging this war at such a huge cost.   
The rapid demobilization of the armed forces and the immediate dislocation in the 
economy signaled to the counter-elites that this was an opportune time to mobilize against 
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President Ayala under the leadership of a charismatic and controversial military officer, 
Rafael Franco.  While the Paraguayan political system was prone to leadership turnover 
prior to the war, the February revolution of 1936 that brought down the wartime President 
Ayala was no ordinary factional struggle.  It brought together a diverse counter-coalition 
that ended the Liberal Party’s hold on power and irrevocably changed the course of 
Paraguayan politics.  There is a clearly a link between the costliness of the Chaco War with 
the postwar removal of the wartime leader President Ayala in a coup.  The counter-elites 
and smaller anti-government groups that backed this coup exploited the discontent among 
the mass public in general, and the armed forces in particular, that the costs of the Chaco 
War had generated.   
Since Paraguay had succeeded in decisively beating back Bolivian aggression and 
emerged victorious, war outcome can be ruled out as an explanation for Ayala’s fall.  The 
case illustrates that the negative fallout of the costliness of the war had made Ayala and his 
allies politically vulnerable by the time the war ended in 1935.  The costliness of the Chaco 
War continued to impact Paraguayan politics after Ayala was deposed by the February 
revolution.  One of the key planks on which the new government sought to distinguish 
itself from Ayala was that it will protect the national interest in the postwar peace 
negotiations.  This can explain the decision of the Franco regime to refuse the 
recommendations of the Neutral Military Commission to vacate occupied territories in the 
Chaco region where they expected to find oil deposits. This intractability of the Franco 
regime delayed a postwar settlement.  It was only after international experts presented 
incontrovertible evidence that Paraguayan hopes of an oil bonanza were misplaced, did the 
Franco government agree to a withdrawal (Rout, 1970).  The collapse of the Franco regime 
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within a couple of years was not merely due to the internal contradictions of the new 
winning coalition.  The costliness of the Chaco War meant that the Franco regime was 
under as much pressure as its predecessor to deliver tangible fruits of the military victory.  
This made its every move in the negotiations at the Chaco Peace Conference fraught with 
risk.  Ultimately, Franco government’s decision to withdraw from positions that had been 
occupied by Paraguayan forces triggered another revolt within the armed forces and ended 
the regime’s tenure.              
Egyptian domestic politics in the aftermath the Six Dar War presents some 
challenges to the argument that I have advanced while offering some support as well.   This 
case interested me because Nasser’s survival after a defeat contests the intuitive 
expectation that a leader will be punished for a bad war outcome.  The contribution of the 
Egyptian case to this dissertation is in illustrating how war can generate “second-order” 
negative consequences.  This adds another dimension to traditional understandings of 
punishment.   I understand “second-order” negative consequences as those domestic events 
that create problems for a government or leader but do not result in regime change.   
The narrative of the situation in Egypt after the Six Day War shows that this event 
had an immediate impact on the state-society relationship.  The sweeping expressions of 
dissent against the established order and demands for political liberalization were 
unprecedented for Egypt since the Nasser regime had consolidated power in the early 
1950s.  The open criticism of the armed forces bordering on ridicule was also a remarkable 
development for this country.  The success or failure of groups that mobilized against the 
state may be moot.  The very fact that these events occurred is significant in a country 
where the state has been described as an “overwhelming structure” which gives the person 
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“who controls it…immense power over society (Vatikiotis, 1978, p. 316).”  This is why the 
manifestation of anti-regime sentiment against powerful state institutions after the 1967 
war was a serious challenge to Nasser.  Although he successfully countered these 
challenges, there is little doubt that 1967 war disturbed the equilibrium of the Egyptian 
polity.  The fact that the protestors, activists and sundry groups that rose up against the 
state failed to successfully mount a full-scale revolution should not detract from the 
significance of the events that they engineered.   
The other noticeable disruption brought about by the 1967 war was the change in 
the composition of the winning coalition that ruled over the country.  The enormity of the 
defeat would have consumed most leaders.  The primary reason for the survival of Nasser 
after such a major defeat was that the he enjoyed an exalted status within his country.  His 
role in ending the British occupation, building infrastructure and starting a variety of social 
welfare programs had given him a measure of goodwill that would not be dented by a 
defeat.  At a time of national crisis, casting him aside would have eliminated a symbol of 
national resistance (Stephens, 1972, pp. 507-508).  The overwhelming mood within Egypt 
was not to surrender but to fight again to retake the territories that had been lost.  Forcibly 
removing Nasser from the helm would have only made this harder.  However, this may not 
have been sufficient to protect him had he not sacrificed a major section of his winning 
coalition at the altar of political accountability and reconstituted it with new members.  The 
purges of his rivals and trials of senior members of his regime from the armed forces not 
only consolidated Nasser’s position abut also went a long way in defusing the discontent 
that had erupted in Egypt following the war.        
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The Egyptian case gives support for the domestic effect of war outcome and 
illustrates why the defeat dummy performed so strongly in the quantitative analysis as a 
predictor of antigovernment events.  The battle deaths count for Egypt in this war would 
place it quite high on the costliness scale.  However, it is clear that it was the humiliation of 
the defeat that was the overwhelming reason for the anti-regime sentiment that was 
manifested in a variety of events in the aftermath of the war.  The other wrinkle in this case 
is that the dominant public mood was to wage another war with Israel to avenge the defeat.  
This clearly means that although the costs of the Six Day War were quite severe, these had 
not exhausted the limits of tolerance of the Egyptian people.  It would seem that the 
demand to restore Egypt’s pride through another full-scale war and a demand for political 
liberalization and civil rights were being made simultaneously by groups arrayed against 
the regime.                      
5.2 Relevance for the Discipline and Future Directions 
The findings from this dissertation build upon the insights gained by various studies 
of domestic politics of belligerent states.  The dissertation highlights the value of opening 
the “black box” of internal politics of countries involved in interstate war.  I have tried to 
make a case why we cannot limit ourselves to leader survival in discerning the domestic 
consequences of war involvement.  A bare bones approach to coding the fate of leaders 
may be parsimonious but it overlooks important postwar political events inside countries 
that can be associated with key variables of war participation – costs, outcome, role in war, 
stakes etc.   
Relaxing this dichotomous dependent variable and analyzing antigovernment actions 
can convey a richer picture of the real political effects of war involvement.  The 
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dissertation makes a beginning in this endeavor. As a next step, elaborate case analysis of 
the wartime and postwar periods of warring states can tell us which of the manifestations of 
postwar antigovernment discontent can be reasonably related to the war.  There are a host 
of factors unrelated to the war that can explain why a government or leader loses popularity 
or sees a spike in threat events.  Just because these occur in the aftermath of war does not 
necessarily mean they are connected with one another.  This can also help to isolate cases 
of leader removal that may have been misspecified under the “punished” category in 
previous studies.  The exact circumstances surrounding the removal of a leader can 
illuminate whether the punishment was due to some war-related factor or not.  In my view, 
I can use this dissertation as a stepping stone to reexamine the postwar tenure of all leaders 
that survived defeats or were deposed following a victory.  Using these two ideal types as a 
baseline, an interesting cross-national events database for wartime leaders can be 
developed which can further advance leader-based studies of war.  There is also scope to 
examine whether there are other leaders like Ayala that were victorious is costlier wars but 
found it harder to agree to a postwar peace settlement because of domestic pressure.         
This dissertation has highlighted issues and shortcomings relating to the 
operationalization of the costliness of war as an independent variable.  This can be useful 
for anyone that uses this data.  The certainty with which the number of battle deaths is used 
as a proxy for costliness of war may have to be reassessed for large-n studies.  More 
complex ways of evaluating the costliness factor need to be developed that can truly 
capture its impact on the mass public.  In a recent piece, Fazal has advocated that advances 
in modern medicine and improvements in transporting the wounded has raised the survival 
rate of combatants (Fazal, 2014).  This problematizes the counting of battle deaths in 
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existing datasets and its use as an explanatory variable.  Greater attention to the number of 
the injured as well as questioning the current threshold for classification for interstate war 
may be the direction in which the operationalization of war cost may have to head.   
One of the key aspects of the costs incurred by Paraguay in the Chaco War was that 
the war was preceded by a process of coercive mass mobilization by the state.  It could be 
that the negative fallout that I was expecting for higher battle deaths only occurs when war 
causes societal dislocation that forced conscription may generate.  The cumulative 
unhappiness with battle deaths may be a function of whether it is a professional army that 
is incurring these casualties or fresh recruits that have been mobilized for the war.  The 
Egyptian case study can also motivate questions that pertain to the relative effect of 
outcome and cost on domestic politics: Are the domestic political consequences of an 
unambiguous defeat fundamentally different from costliness?  Does the mass public make a 
distinction between the costliness of the war and its outcome under conditions of total 
defeat?  It will be interesting to explore whether the marginal effect of costliness on 
domestic public opinion hold any relevance when countries suffer total defeat in war.               
 One of the results of the large-n analysis that support my core argument is that 
countries that suffered civilian fatalities also experienced higher incidence of 
antigovernment events in the postwar period.  This supports the basic logic of my argument 
that costliness is a very important variable for explaining political developments inside a 
warring country.  When noncombatants are targeted, they face a proximate effect of the 
political decision of their government to take part in war.  In such cases, there is 
tremendous scope for research on the spatial and temporal domains of civilian casualties.  
Hypotheses can be developed that tests the link between the location and duration of 
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civilian targeting with manifestations of postwar antigovernment discontent.  Is it that once 
civilians come under attack in any part of a warring country, it fundamentally alters the 
domestic political situation for any postwar (or wartime) government?  It will be interesting 
to study the mechanism by which governments that are subject to civilian targeting are 




















































List of Cases Included in Analysis 
Country War Name 
  Battle                
Deaths 
Civilian 
Casualties Anti-Government Threats 
Italy War for Kosovo 0 0 2 
Netherlands War for Kosovo 0 0 2 
Turkey War for Kosovo 0 0 2 
France War for Kosovo 0 0 1 
United Kingdom War for Kosovo 0 0 0 
Germany War for Kosovo 0 0 0 
Australia World War II 23265 0 0 
New Zealand World War II 10033 0 0 
El Salvador Football 107 1201 2 
Japan Second Sino-Japanese 10000 0 8 
Israel Six Day War 1967 1839 20 7 
Israel Lebanon War 368 0 4 
Chad War over the Aouzou Strip 1000 0 10 
United States of 
America Gulf War of 1990-91 146 0 0 
Italy Gulf War of 1990-91 0 0 16 
United Kingdom World War II 264443 65000 3 
United States of 
America Kosovo War 2 0 0 
Canada World War II 45631 0 0 
Turkey Turco-Cypriot War 300 500 16 
Canada Gulf War of 1990-91 0 0 1 
France Gulf War of 1990-91 2 0 1 
Brazil World War II 943 0 7 
Italy Italo-Ethiopian War 2313 0 0 
Russia Sino-Soviet War 143 0 4 
Egypt Gulf War of 1990-91 12 0 18 
China Off-shore Islands 1003 0 5 
Uganda Ugandan-Tanzanian War 1978-79 1500 500 8 
USSR World War II 6329600 17055700 2 
Saudi Arabia Gulf War of 1990-91 29 0 0 
Morocco Gulf War of 1990-91 0 0 4 
Somalia Second Ogaden War Phase 2 8000 1251 3 
India Bangladesh 3241 178 8 
China (PRC) Sino-Indian War 722 0 3 
Israel Sinai War 189 0 6 
Armenia Azeri-Armenian War 1993-94 5500 7500 5 
USSR Soviet Invasion of Hungary 669 0 0 
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Casualties Anti-Government Threats 
Cuba Second Ogaden War Phase 2 700 0 0 
Syria Gulf War of 1990-91 0 0 0 
     
United Kingdom Gulf War of 1990-91 16 0 9 
Kuwait Gulf War of 1990-91 1000 1000 0 
Libya Ugandan-Tanzanian War 1978-79 500 0 1 
Greece Second Greco-Turkish War 30000 25000 7 
Italy World War II 200700 80000 29 
Saudi Arabia Yom Kippur War 100 0 1 
Hungary World War II 200000 0 3 
Argentina Falklands War 746 3 3 
Lebanon Arab-Israeli War 500 0 10 
Egypt War of Attrition 5000 1000 4 
Jordan Six Day War 1967 696 125 37 
Iraq Yom Kippur War 278 0 7 
Syria Arab-Israeli War 1000 0 9 
Iraq Arab-Israeli War 500 0 7 
Egypt Yom Kippur War 7700 0 4 
Jordan Arab-Israeli War 1000 0 5 
Jordan Yom Kippur War 23 0 1 
Pakistan Kargil War 745 0 10 
South Africa War over Angola 1975-76 28 0 11 
Syria Yom Kippur War 3100 101 2 
Czechoslovakia Hungarian Adversaries War 2000 0 1 
France Korean War 271 0 14 
United States of 
America Korean War 33667 0 7 
Australia Vietnam War 425 0 4 
Pakistan Second Kashmir War 1500 500 6 
United Kingdom Korean War 1078 0 4 
China Sin-Vietnamese Punitive War 10000 2200 0 
United States of 
America Vietnam War 47000 0 4 
Canada Korean War 516 0 1 
Philippines Korean War 128 0 5 
United Kingdom Sinai War 22 0 1 
Belgium Korean War 104 0 1 
Thailand Korean War 136 0 4 
France Franco-Turkish War 1919-20 5000 27600 17 
Greece Korean War 194 0 17 
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Casualties Anti-Government Threats 
France Sinai War 10 0 21 
Vietnam Sino-Vietnamese Border of 1987 2200 0 0 
Netherlands Korean War 120 0 2 
Thailand Vietnam War 351 0 14 
China Sino-Vietnamese Border of 1987 1800 0 2 
Australia Korean War 306 0 0 
Iraq Iran-Iraq War 105000 1000 13 
Turkey Korean War 889 0 2 
Philippines Vietnam War 1000 0 14 
South Korea Vietnam War 4687 0 4 
China (PRC) Taiwan Straits 239 0 5 
China Korean War 401401 0 5 
India Sino-Indian War 1423 0 12 
Hungary Soviet Invasion of Hungary 926 3000 1 
Syria Six Day War 1967 4296 0 8 
Finland World War II 79047 650 2 
China Second Sino-Japanese 50000 10000 22 
Pakistan Bangladesh 7982 305 5 
Egypt Six Day War 1967 3000 125 3 
Ethiopia Second Ogaden War Phase 2 1800 550 8 
Azerbaijan Azeri-Armenian War 1993-94 8500 7500 5 
Libya War over the Aouzou Strip 7500 0 0 
Egypt Sinai War 1000 1000 0 
Tanzania Ugandan-Tanzanian War 1978-79 1000 1500 1 
China Sino-Soviet War 1035 2000 22 
Iraq Gulf War of 1990-91 400000 3250 14 
Honduras Football 1200 401 3 
Israel* War of Attrition 641 152 6 
Vietnam(PRV) Vietnam War 1000000 300000 3 
Hungary Hungarian Adversaries War 6000 1000 5 
Israel Yom Kippur War 2838 0 6 
United States of 
America World War II 292131 0 1 
United Kingdom Falklands War 277 0 4 
India Kargil War 474 0 10 
Cuba War over Angola 1975-76 500 0 0 
Ethiopia Badme Border War of 1998-2000 70000 250 0 
Iran Iran-Iraq War 262000 12420 0 
India Second Kashmir War 3712 500 20 
South Korea Korean War 184573 675000 4 
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Casualties Anti-Government Threats 
France Ifni War 0 0 23 






















Cases Excluded due to Missing Data*    




Casualties Anti-Government Threats 
Colombia Korean 210 0 10 
Ecuador 
Cenepa 
Valley 550 - 8 
Peru 
Cenepa 
Valley 950 - 17 
Bolivia Chaco 5661 0 11 
Paraguay Chaco 12000 0 7 
Poland Russo-Polish 4512 0 8 
Poland 
Lithuanian-
Polish 500 0 8 
Croatia 
Bosnian 
Independence 409 - 1 
Yugoslavia 
Bosnian 
Independence 1890 - 2 
Yugoslavia 
War for 
Kosovo 5000 - 9 
Bosnia 
Bosnian 
Independence 3060 - 5 
Bulgaria1 World War II 6671 2000 3 
Bulgaria2 World War II 7671 2000 3 
Romania 
Hungarian 
Adversaries 30000 0 2 
Romania1 World War II 169882 465000 4 
Romania2 World War II 290000 465000 4 
USSR Russo-Polish 100000 0 20 
Lithuania 
Lithuaninan-
Polsh 500 0 1 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 
War over 
Angola 100 - 5 
Ethiopia Korean 120 0 4 
Eritrea 
Badme 
Border 50000 250 0 
Angola 
War over 
Angola 1000 - 8 
South Africa World War II 6840 0 0 




Turkish 13000 15000 4 
Turkey 
Franco-
Turkish 35000 1000 6 
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Country War Name 
Battle 
Deaths 
Civilian    
Casualties Anti-Government Threats 
Syria 
War over 
Lebanon 1350 10000 1 
Saudia Arabia Saudi-Yemeni 100 0 3 
Yemen Saudi-Yemeni 2000 0 0 
Qatar Gulf War 0 0 1 
United Arab Emirates Gulf War 6 0 0 
Oman Gulf War 0 0 0 
China World War II 1350000 10000000 16 
Mongolia World War II 3000 0 0 
North Korea Korean 214899 750000 0 
Cambodia/KhmerRep/Kampuchea 
Vietnam War 
Phase 2 2500 - 10 
Cambodia 
Communist 
Coalition 5000 - 16 
Cambodia 
Vietnamese 




Phase 2  11250 - 7 
Vietnam 
Vietnamese-




Punitive 10000 4600 0 
South Vietnam Vietnam War  254257 42000 3 
Germany World War II 350000 121200 - 
Japan World War II 174000 658595 - 
India  
First Kashmir 
War 2500 0 - 
Pakistan 
First Kashmir 
War 1000 0 - 
China  
Third Sino-
Japanese 75000 - - 
Japan  
Third Sino-
Japanese 25000 - - 
USSR Changkufeng 1200 - - 
Japan Changkufeng 526 - - 
USSR Nomonhan 5000 - - 
Mongolia Nomonhan 3000 - - 
Japan Nomonhan 20000 - - 
Belgium  World War II 9600 76000 - 
France↑ World War II 213224 350000 - 
Yugoslavia World War II 305000 - - 
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Country War Name 
Battle 
Deaths 
Civilian    
Casualties Anti-Government Threats 
Netherlands↑ World War II 7900 500000 - 
Greece World War II 18300 325000 - 
Poland↑ World War II 320000 56750000 - 
Ethiopia World War II 5000 - - 
Finland Russo-Finnish 24923 - - 
USSR Russo-Finnish 126875 - - 
France Franco-Thai 700 - - 
Thailand Franco-Thai 700 - - 
Israel Arab-Israeli 3000 - - 
Egypt Arab-Israeli 2000 - - 
Taiwan 
Off-Shore 
Islands 1367 - - 
Taiwan Taiwan Straits 1500 - - 
Ethiopia 
Conquest of 
Ethiopia 16000 - - 
Norway World War II 3000 - - 
Country cases where COW counts “phases” as different observations that I treat as one 
Australia 
Vietnam War 
Phase 2  - - 
France World War II    
Italy World War II    
South Korea 
Vietnam War 
Phase 2    
South Vietnam  
Communist 




2    
United States  
Communist 
Coalition 
Phase 2     
Vietnam  
Communist 
Coalition    
     
 
*Those cases which had data on all the three variables shown here had other information missing  
↑The casualty figures for France, Poland and Netherlands in World War II include the period of the 
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